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 ABSTRACT 
 
 
Although rankings have been in existence for almost a century, scholars have 
only developed a limited understanding of the role of such aggregations of performance 
measures in organisational fields. In particular, there is little understanding of how 
cognitive and strategic processes at the organisational level, which underlie the 
measurement and ranking process, impact on macro outcomes on the level of the 
organisational field. This is due to the persistence of two assumptions about the impact 
of rankings on organisations and fields. These are, firstly, that here is a cause-effect 
relationship between the emergence of rankings and change processes in organisational 
fields, and, secondly, that those processes lead to the emergence of a single model of 
organising around which organisational fields and actors homogenise. Refuting these 
assumptions, I develop the concepts of the ranking template and frame to explain the 
ways in which rankings can impact on organisations and fields, given the dynamics 
between organisations that produce and those who are subject to rankings. In particular, 
I show that through ranking frames, the latter develop notions of actual and aspired 
ranking performances and a strategy to align the two. An in-depth analysis of a novel 
longitudinal data set from the Financial Times Global MBA rankings as well as data 
from business schools provides evidence of the multitude of ways in which rankings 
can impact on organisations and fields. Specifically, I show how ranking fields are 
made up of field boundaries, vertical segments of competitors, horizontal segments of 
different performance measures, as well as clusters of peers. I conclude by discussing 
the contribution of these findings to the understanding of the dynamics between 
producers and subjects of performance measures in organisational fields.   
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I  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Rankings assess and compare the political, economic, social, environmental, 
moral and technological performance of organisations. This can be observed in fields as 
diverse as the audit industry, investment banking, sports, human rights, media, 
international business, social and environmental performance, technology, sustainability 
and ethics. In particular, there are several rankings of organisations that have generated 
a considerable amount of media attention, such as, the Times Higher Education World 
University Rankings, the different Financial Times (hereafter: FT) rankings, the 
Bloomberg Businessweek MBA rankings, the Interbrand Best Global Brands rankings, 
the Corporate Knights Global 100 Most Sustainable Companies rankings, the Vault 
rankings of Best Banking, Law and Consulting Firms and the Forbes World’s Most 
Admired Companies rankings. Furthermore, rankings have been the subject of inquiry 
in academic disciplines as diverse as accounting (e.g. Free, Salterio & Shearer, 2009; 
Jeacle & Carter, 2011), information systems (e.g. Scott & Orlikowski, 2011), 
organisation theory (e.g. Mills, Weatherbee & Colwell, 2006; Power, Scheytt, Soin, & 
Sahlin, 2009), sociology (e.g. Burris, 2004; Sauder, 2006) and regulation (Hedmo, 
Sahlin-Andersson & Wedlin, 2009). They have also been the subject of studies to test 
new empirical methods (e.g. Graves, Marchand & Thompson, 1982; Köksalan, 
Büyükbasaran, Özpeynirci, & Wallenius, 2010). However, a consensus about how 
rankings change organisations and organisational fields has not emerged. In particular, 
there is little understanding of how cognitive and strategic processes at the 
organisational level, which underlie the measurement and ranking process, impact on 
macro outcomes on the level of the organisational field. This thesis will develop a 
14 
 
conceptual framework of this process, and present empirical evidence in support of the 
framework.  
I will argue that rankings are particularly interesting subjects of enquiry for 
building an understanding of the dynamics between performance measures and 
organisations and organisational fields. Due to their prominence in some organisational 
fields they can become a focal point, a pathway into understanding dynamics between 
organisations on three levels of analysis. The first level is the dynamics between 
organisations subject to ranking processes and organisations that produce rankings; the 
second is the dynamics between organisations subject to ranking processes; the third 
one is the dynamics between individual actors, who may or may not be part of 
organisations, and individual actors and organisations that are part of the ranking 
process. For the purpose of this thesis, I will assume that organisations subject to 
rankings are unified actors, and thus focus primarily on the first two questions.  
 
 
1 Definitions  
As different authors have used different terms to describe the dynamics of 
rankings, the use of terminology in the current literature is both confused and confusing. 
Therefore, before I discuss the structure and key findings of this thesis in the next 
section, I will first introduce some key terms, as shown in table 1. I will elaborate the 
reasoning for using these definitions below. 
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Term Definition 
Ranking An aggregation of metrics ordered transitively and relatively into a matrix by 
an algorithm 
Ranking actors Organisations that are being ranked 
 
Ranking agents Organisations that compile and publish rankings  
Ranking algorithm The ranking criteria and weightings that transform data inputs into ranks 
 
Ranking field Ranking fields are organisational fields that are constituted by ranking actors, 
ranking agents and ranking stakeholders who can represent a coercive, 
normative or mimetic influence on the ranking process [see DiMaggio and 
Powell’s (1983) definition of organisational fields] 
 Ranking frame The notion of ranking actors about their actual and aspired ranking 
performance and a strategy to align the two, given their past performance and 
aspirations, ranking and other templates, as well as the current and past 
performance and aspirations of their competitors 
Ranking matrix The graphical output of the ranking 
 
Ranking process The sets of interaction between ranking agents, actors and stakeholders that 
result into the creation of the ranking algorithm and matrix 
Ranking stakeholders Organisations other than ranking actors or agents that have a stake in the 
ranking process or provide resources or institutional demands for ranking 
actors, e.g. regulators, funding agencies, customers or other social evaluation 
agents  
Ranking template The models of organising that ranking agents create through rankings, 
thereby defining what is legitimate or of high reputation, status or 
performance in the ranking field 
Ranking zone The state of a ranking field in terms of informational complexity (Driver & 
Streufert, 1969) under which rankings can emerge, given the bounded 
rationality of ranking actors and agents 
Table 1: Key definitions  
 
Some of these definitions are labels, while others are concepts, which I will 
develop in detail in the thesis. Central to the understanding of the dynamics of rankings 
is the relationship between ranking agents, i.e. organisations that compile and publish 
rankings, and ranking actors, i.e. organisations that are ranked. The main place of 
negotiation and contestation between those two actors is the ranking algorithm. 
Through the ranking process, the ranking algorithm orders the aggregation of metrics 
that make up the ranking into the ranking matrix, which is the output that ranking actors 
and stakeholders ‘see’ and consequently base their actions on.  
16 
 
The variety of ranking agents, actors and stakeholders, as well as the ranking 
algorithm and matrix that are the result of the ranking process, make up the ranking 
field. The emergence of the ranking field is dependent on whether the ranking is within 
the ranking zone, i.e. in a state where the levels of informational complexity (Driver & 
Streufert, 1969) allow the emergence of a ranking as a reducer of information, given the 
bounded rationality (Simon, 1997 [1947]) of ranking actors and agents
1
. If this is the 
case, ranking agents will create ranking templates as models of organising that define 
what is legitimate or of high reputation, status or performance in the field. Ranking 
templates set the boundaries within which ranking agents, actors and stakeholders 
negotiate the ranking process. The concept of the ranking template builds on previously 
developed concepts of templates of organising in the ranking field. Importantly, it gives 
a conceptual foundation to the role of the ranking agent within the ranking field, the 
competition of models of organising within the ranking field, as well as the construction 
of models of organising through the ranking agent. I will develop the concepts of the 
ranking zone and ranking template in detail in chapter II. 
Within the boundaries set by ranking agents through ranking templates, ranking 
actors develop ranking frames, i.e. notions about their actual and aspired ranking 
performance and a strategy to align the two. Each ranking actor ‘sees’ the ranking field 
through their ranking frame. Therefore, the ranking frame is based on the notions of the 
past performance and aspirations of ranking actors, ranking and other templates, as well 
as the current and past performance and aspirations of their competitors. As such, the 
ranking frame is a novel concept, as it is explicitly based on the assumption that ranking 
actors are not perfectly, but boundedly rational. Ranking actors thus have cognitive 
limitations, requiring them to resort to reconciling conflicting notions of performance, 
                                                             
 
 
1
 The concept of bounded rationality used in this thesis will be defined in chapter II. 
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aspirations and organisational templates. I will develop the concept of the ranking frame 
in detail in chapter III. 
A conceptual model of how ranking agents, actors and stakeholders work 
together to construct ‘the ranking’ through ranking frames, ranking templates and other 
templates can be seen in figure 1. Through ranking templates, frames and other 
organisational templates, ranking agents, actors and stakeholders construct together 
what comes to be perceived as ‘the ranking’. Since templates and frames differ between 
ranking agents, actors and stakeholders, there is no one single ranking that all 
participants in the ranking process perceive and act upon. This thesis will show that this 
has consequences for how rankings impact on organisational actors and fields.  
 
 
Figure 1: Model of the ranking field 
 
Rankings can also be distinguished by scope (evaluating individuals; concepts; 
an organisation or parts of it), number and type of criteria (financial, technical or 
18 
 
institutional; input, process and output), data sources (scale; primary or secondary data; 
internal or external data sources), methodology (weighting; calculation; published or 
non-published), inclusiveness (criteria for inclusion of ranking actors), interactivity 
(publication of one ranking or of a tool through which users can generate individualised 
rankings) and graphical elements (extent to which the interpretation of the ranking 
matrix is based on colour, textual and structural features). However, this thesis will not 
attempt to construct a typology of rankings, but focus on developing an understanding 
of the role and impact of rankings on organisations and organisational fields. In this 
thesis, I will thus only discuss rankings that evaluate organisations, or parts thereof, and 
are published as one stable ranking. As different authors have used different terms, I 
will refer to ranking lists, indices or league tables as rankings only if they fulfil the 
following three conditions. First, rankings are aggregate metrics, meaning that they are 
the result of a process where several metrics are aggregated into a rank. Second, the 
ranks are ordered transitively, meaning that each organisation or dimension of an 
organisation is allocated a different rank
2
. Third, they are relative, meaning that instead 
of being based on an absolute determination of what constitutes high or low 
performance, rankings set metrics, and consequently ranking actors, into a relationship 
with each other. Rankings are thus different from metrics like ratings, which classify 
organisations into defined, intransitive and absolute categories. As this distinction is 
consequential for the understanding of the sociology of rankings, I will discuss it in 
more detail in chapter III. 
 
 
2 Structure of the thesis  
                                                             
 
 
2
 Not all rankings are forced, i.e. some rankings allocate ties to ranking actors.  
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This thesis is organised in ten chapters. In the introduction, I have offered a new 
set of definitions of rankings as well as of the actors that make up the ranking field.  
In the second chapter, I will show how two assumptions that pervade the 
literature on rankings have led to a limited understanding of the construction of 
templates of organising in the ranking process. The first assumption is that there is a 
cause-effect relationship between the emergence of rankings and change processes in 
organisational fields. The second assumption is that those processes lead to the 
emergence of a single model of organising around which organisational fields and 
actors homogenise. I will show instead that rankings can trigger both processes of 
differentiation and homogenisation. 
In particular, I will point out that the literature on rankings has thus far failed to 
specify what rationality limitations ranking actors and agents are subject to. I will argue 
that both ranking agents and actors are boundedly rational, and that they use rankings as 
a means of overcoming rationality limitations. Based on this, I will provide an 
alternative account of construction of ranking templates, showing the role that the 
agency of ranking actors, existing templates and competition from other devices of 
social evaluation, such as accreditations and ratings, play for the construction of 
templates. In particular, I will demonstrate that competing templates and 
commensuration ambiguities exist within a field that make the emergence of single 
templates, which all field actors use, unlikely. Based on this, I will propose the concept 
of ranking templates as the models of organising that ranking agents create through 
rankings, thereby defining what is legitimate or of high reputation, status or 
performance in the field.  
Following this, I will discuss why rankings are more prevalent and impactful in 
some fields than others. My proposition is that the level of informational complexity 
(Driver & Streufert, 1969) is the main field condition that determines to what extent a 
20 
 
ranking will emerge and impact on organisational fields. I will also propose that the 
degree of informational complexity in a field is related to status orders and the degree of 
structuration and resource conflicts. I will introduce the concept of the ranking zone to 
show how informational complexity interacts with the probability of ranking 
emergence, and show how the degree of institutionalisation of the ranking limits the 
response discretion of ranking actors to ranking templates. 
Based on this discussion, in chapter III, I will introduce the concept of ranking 
frames as cognitive and strategic models that explain how ranking actors see and 
strategise rankings, given their positions, aspirations, the templates of other actors and 
the performance of their competitors. I will also explain the mechanisms of production 
of ranking templates, preliminary and actual ranking frames, as well as the adjustment 
of the ranking frame. In addition, I will show how ranking frames are based on a 
segmentation of the ranking field into horizontal and vertical segments as well as 
clusters. I will base my empirical analysis on an investigation of these segments. 
In chapter IV, I will lay out the structure of the empirical part of the thesis, 
discuss data issues of earlier studies, and explain the choice of a longitudinal and novel 
data set from the Financial Times Global MBA rankings as the main data set for the 
empirical analysis. 
In chapter V and VI, I will discuss the vertical and horizontal segments of the 
ranking field, specifically participation of ranking actors in the ranking process, the role 
of non-published ranking field, entry and exit dynamics to the ranking field, and field 
performance on ranking criteria over time. In particular, I will discuss the development 
of ranking criteria in terms of their capability to serve as markers of distinction between 
low and high performers. 
In further clarification of the mechanisms of adjustment of the ranking frame 
over time, I will present case studies of three business schools. These will show that 
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ranking actors, depending on their ranking performance, adjust their ranking frame by 
comparing their performance to competitors as well as through picking segmental, 
temporal, geographic or criteria-specific reference points. I will also introduce the 
Marginal Improvement Indicator and the Ranking Frame Indicator to show how ranking 
actors change their ranking frames over time.  
Based on this, I will explain the mechanisms through which ranking actors can 
deal with discrepancies between actual and aspired performance. I will show that 
ranking actors employ mechanisms of reinterpretation, learning, lobbying, mergers and 
alliances, challenge, and exit for the adjustment of aspiration levels and mechanisms, 
leading to a variety of possible outcomes. I will conclude that, although the boundaries 
of possible action are set by the ranking templates proposed by ranking agents, ranking 
actors have considerable leeway in creating and adjusting ranking frames. 
In chapter VIII and IX, I will do a cluster analysis of the data set, and present 
evidence for the existence of a decreasing number of clusters over time. I will show 
how core and peripheral clusters emerge from the data set, one European and one 
American. I will find that the criteria on which the clusters and the field distinguished 
themselves most clearly are diversity as well as faculty-related. In particular, I will 
show that cluster members actively engage with the rankings, discuss them in light of 
their strategy, and use reference points to contextualise and reinterpret them. 
In chapter X, I will conclude the thesis by discussing key findings and 
contributions, as well as limitations of the thesis and avenues for future research, and 
end with some final observations. The principal contribution of this thesis is to present 
an integrated framework that explains how the cognitive and strategic components of 
measurement processes impact on macro outcomes on the organisational and field 
levels.  
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II THE CONSTRUCTION OF RANKING TEMPLATES 
 
 
This chapter will focus on three questions. Firstly, do rankings impact on 
organisations and organisational fields? I conclude they do. Secondly, what is the 
mechanism through which rankings impact on ranking actors and fields? Thirdly, why 
do rankings impact more on some organisations and organisational fields than on 
others? To answer these questions, I will introduce the concept of the ranking template.  
Although rankings have been in existence for many years, scholars have only 
started to explore these questions recently. However, it is not well understood how 
different actors construct different models of organising as a result of the ranking 
process, and what impact these models have on ranking fields. In particular, previous 
research has paid little attention to the differential impact that rankings have on different 
levels of organisational fields. The previous focus on the organisational field as the 
main unit of analysis of the impact of rankings (Sauder, 2008; Wedlin, 2006, 2007) has 
obscured the importance of the variety of organisations that exists within and outside of 
the ranking field. Furthermore, the high number of studies from the higher education 
field is not only the outcome of the personal experience of researchers, but suggests that 
the effect of rankings on organisational fields is more apparent in some fields than in 
others. Under what conditions rankings emerge and proliferate in some fields, but not 
others, is largely unclear. While “gaming” strategies (Espeland & Sauder, 2007) have 
been researched in detail, it is unclear how organisations can buffer themselves 
substantively from the influence of rankings. In addition, there is little clarity about 
what ranking criteria are more susceptible to triggering a reaction in ranking actors. 
Finally, it is important to distinguish between different field and organisational stages 
during which rankings can impact on organisations, as ranking actors follow different 
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paths of internalisation and institutionalisation of the ranking (Locke, 2011). In the 
following sections, I will argue that those questions have remained unaddressed because 
the ranking literature has been largely based on two assumptions. The first assumption 
is that there is a cause-effect relationship between the emergence of rankings and 
change processes in organisational fields. The second assumption is that the direction of 
change is the homogenisation of ranking actors and fields. I will discuss these 
assumptions in the light of the available literature, and introduce the concept of the 
ranking template to show that a great variety of models of organising exist within 
ranking fields. I will end this chapter by discussing the field conditions that make the 
impact of rankings more or less likely.  
 
 
1 The cause-effect relationship between rankings and change 
One important question that has virtually been omitted from the literature on 
rankings is whether rankings are the actual cause, rather than the symptom of wider 
changes in organisational fields. Yet, while there seems to be agreement between 
academics and practitioners that there is a cause-effect relationship between the 
emergence of rankings and change processes in organisational fields, there is little 
empirical evidence to support this. Scholars have taken the assertions of qualitative 
accounts of individual actors in ranking fields like higher education at face value, 
resulting in the conceptualisation of rankings as the cause of change. I will argue that 
this is also a result of a reductionist approach in the research on rankings, as researchers 
have tended to focus exclusively on rankings and ignored other factors in the formation 
of social evaluations.  
Despite the wealth of empirical data made available through the proliferation of 
rankings, and a substantial literature critical of the methodological and conceptual 
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shortcomings of rankings (Adler & Harzing, 2009; Devinney, Dowling & Perm-
Ajchariyawong, 2008; Dichev, 1999, 2008; Glick, 2008; Klein & Hamilton, 1998; 
Marginson & Van der Wende, 2007; Sauder & Espeland, 2006), there is little 
conceptual and empirical agreement on how rankings emerge in fields and what their 
relationship with change processes is, apart from the assertion that they are “dangerous” 
(Zemsky, 2008: 6). While some think of rankings as self-reproducing hegemonic 
structures (Ozbilgin, 2009) and a “fashion” that will eventually go away (Czarniawska, 
2011), rankings can also be conceptualised as a social statistic (Espeland & Sauder, 
2007), a sign of “audit society’s deep interest” in organisations (Power, 1997; Walsh, 
2011:217). Even if the popularity of rankings is “silly” and “wrongheaded” (Zemsky, 
2008: 6), they still cater to the deep desire of social actors to understand what 
organisations do, what they are “worth” in social terms, and how they relate to other 
organisations in a field. The question of whether organisational rankings are valid social 
measures is thus less important than the question of whether they matter, and if so, why 
(Martins, 2005; Gioia & Corley, 2002).  
Recognising this, scholars have investigated how the addition of rankings to a 
field of organisations can be a “modest source of field change” (Sauder, 2008:209), how 
rankings can bring together formerly loosely connected actors around whom 
organisational fields crystallise (Wedlin, 2006), how rankings are places where 
organisational identities are renegotiated (Elsbach & Kramer, 1996), and how 
reputational resources are reallocated among actors (Corley & Gioia, 2000; Rindova, 
Williamson, Petkova & Sever, 2005). For example, ranking scholars have concluded 
that “rankings motivate organisational change” (Martins, 2005:701) as they “achieve 
pervasive influence over the fields they evaluate” (Sauder, 2008: 209). Griffith and 
Rask (2007) find that, depending on gender, minority status and ability, choice of 
students of universities is responsive to how institutions perform in rankings. Shin and 
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Toutkoushian (2011) argue that rankings have caused universities to internationalise, 
change in focus, mission and culture; for example, by giving more emphasis to student 
satisfaction and less to ‘soft’ social science research. A qualitative survey of 20 
university leaders in four countries by the Institute for Higher Education Policy 
proposed that rankings changed the way universities made decisions concerning 
strategic positioning and planning, staffing and organisation, quality assurance, resource 
allocation and funding, as well as, admissions and financial aid (2009). This relates to 
the findings of Hazelkorn (2007), who asserts that many university leaders and staff 
perceive of rankings as having a direct impact on changes in academic partnerships, 
programme development, relationships with benefactors, industry partnerships, 
investments, marketing, faculty recruitment, research income and staff morale. She 
concludes that rankings provide “evidence for decision-making, introducing change, 
speeding up reform or pursuing a particular agenda” (2011: 97), as they have 
“ingratiated themselves into the planning and decision-making process of universities 
around the world” (2011:102). 
Contrastingly, few authors have considered the possibility that rankings might 
be symptoms rather than the cause of profound changes in organisational fields. For 
instance, in the higher education field, which has been the place for most ranking 
studies (e.g. Sauder, 2008; Wedlin, 2006, 2007, 2011), there is a long-standing trend 
towards quality assurance, accountability, academic capitalism, performance 
measurement and evaluation (Frolich, Coate, Mignot-Gerard, Knill, 2010; Lawrence & 
Sharma, 2002; Shin, 2011), specifically in conjunction with increased competition and 
internationalisation (Teichler, 2011). Thus, rankings do not impact and change 
organisations in an isolated manner, but need to be investigated taking into account the 
context of a wider trend towards the “audit society” (Power, 1997), which has led to a 
general increase in social measures of public life, and especially of organisations.  
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An aspect that has rarely been considered so far is that rankings are focal points 
of attention around which already existing trends for change are justified, publicised, 
negotiated and implemented (for an exception see Locke, 2011). While it is clear that 
rankings can be a part of this trend, it is also possible that they are receiving a 
disproportionate share of attention in the mind of field actors due to their high visibility. 
Given that the vast majority of studies investigating the impact of rankings have used 
qualitative study designs that focus on perceptions of organisational actors, the question 
of what are the actual versus the perceived effects of rankings is virtually absent from 
the ranking literature. This is especially important, as rankings have been argued to have 
the ability to “recreate social worlds” (Espeland & Sauder, 2007:1). The social 
processes that ensue, as a result of a ranking, can thus create independent perceptions 
about the effect of the ranking. However, some studies indicate that rather than being 
the cause, rankings might be the symptom of change processes, a priori independent of 
rankings. From a survey of university administrators and faculty affected by rankings, 
Locke reports that most respondents agreed or agreed strongly that “changes 
implemented would have happened regardless of the league tables” (2011: 207-208). In 
another study, 63% of respondents disagreed or disagreed strongly with the statement 
that “rankings created pressures to take actions that the institution would rather not have 
taken” (Higher Education Founding Council for England, 2008: 59). Thus, on the 
balance of evidence, scholars should not assume that there is a simple causal link 
between rankings and mechanisms of organisational or field change. 
In addition to arguing that rankings cause change, virtually all ranking scholars 
have argued that the direction of those changes has negative effects on organisations or 
fields. For example, Adler and Harzing argue that rankings put “the very health and 
vibrancy of the field […] at stake” (2009: 72), while Walsh asserts that rankings destroy 
the “sacred in our secular scholarly world” (2011: 215). Osterloh and Frey warn of the 
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detrimental effects of rankings, claiming they lead to “a positional competition or a 
rent-seeking game […] instead of an enhancement of research quality” (2009:17). 
Marginson and Van der Wende criticise that rankings lead to “greater system 
stratification and the concentration of elite researchers” (2007: 306). Van der Wende, 
and Westerheijden (2009) and Teichler (2008) also suggest that rankings have a 
problematic impact on mission diversity, the quality of managerial decision-making and 
the well-being of employees. 
In most studies, however, what quality is or should be, is usually only loosely 
defined or not at all, except for generalised claims such as “ranking schemes diminish 
the professoriate and degrade knowledge work” (Hogler & Gross, 2009:1). Of course, 
what is quality in areas such as research or education is highly contested in itself 
(Denzin, 2009; Harvey & Green, 1993). Usually, the assertion that quality is lost when 
rankings become more prominent has not been tested empirically. An exception is a 
study by Vogel and Kieser on journal ratings (2014). They assert that  
“As soon as rankings are introduced, university administrators hardly 
have any choice to refuse the participation in the imposed competition. 
[…] Rankings transpose differences in the kind of research into 
quantitative differences and thereby simplify in a brutal manner, while 
trying to impress by means of using a scientific method. Information that 
is transmitted besides the ranking position dramatically loses value. 
Rankings are popular because they simplify decisions. However, they 
simplify in a not acceptable way.” (2014:4)3 
 
                                                             
 
 
3
 While the wording of this quote might seem strange, it is taken from the original paper.  
28 
 
Using bibliometric data from 300 randomly selected articles from a stratified 
sample of 31 journals that appeared in three different journal lists (Journal Citation 
Reports® by Thomson Reuters, VHB JOURQUAL, and ABS Academic Journal 
Quality Guide) they tested whether higher performing journals showed less quality in 
terms of theoretical diversity, interdisciplinarity, innovativeness, share of non-economic 
approaches, non-empirical articles and qualitative methods, as well as, methodological 
complexity and practical implications. They found that contrary to their predictions, 
high rating performers were actually more theoretically diverse and more 
interdisciplinary, while all other results were either not significant or contradictory 
between journal lists. In conclusion, the assumption that there is a simple cause-effect 
relationship between the emergence of rankings and change processes in organisational 
fields, and that the change is necessarily negative, is based on a loose and contested 
definition of quality, and has so far not found empirical support. 
The focus on rankings and the dynamics of the wider ranking field has thus led 
to a situation where competing explanations for change are side-lined. Ranking actors 
and agents are contributing to the perceived overpowering effect of rankings by 
overemphasising the importance of ranking templates over other templates of 
organising that exist in organisational fields. Rather, I propose that rankings are the 
publicised outcome of a negotiation between field actors on what is considered 
legitimate and of high status in the field. Due to their ability to visibly and publicly 
codify complex relationships into a multitude of organisational templates, rankings 
serve as focal points of attention in organisational fields around which already existing 
trends for change become visible and institutionalised. This relates to the second 
assumption about the impact of rankings on organisations and fields.  
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2 Rankings as models for homogenisation 
The second main assumption in the ranking literature is that rankings only 
promulgate one single model of what high performance is in a field. As organisations 
emulate this model of organising, ranking actors are becoming more similar to each 
other and the ranking field more homogeneous. Drawing on a review of the literature on 
rankings and new institutional theory, this chapter will argue that this assumption does 
not hold up to scrutiny and has led to a limited understanding of the impact of rankings. 
I will then specify what rationality limitations ranking agents and actors are subject to, 
and introduce the concept of the ranking template to show how rankings produce 
multiple models of organising, given the agency of ranking subjects as well as the 
competition of measurement devices like ratings, audits, and accreditations in the 
ranking field. 
As rankings have become a focal point of attention in some organisational fields, 
practitioners as well as scholars have expressed the conviction that rankings are 
responsible for a trend towards managerial rationalism, commensurability, and 
conformism (Wedlin, 2006; Locke, 2011). Rankings are said to make organisations 
more uniform and stifle field development (Glick, 2008, Jablecka, 2012; Shin & 
Toutkoushian, 2011; Proulx 2009; Tight, 2000; Van Damme, 2009). For example, 
rankings are reported to cause convergence of educational standards within and between 
countries (Engwall, 2007a) as they “constitute sources of isomorphic pressure on 
organizations” (Martins, 2005: 701), which “can be assumed to be great” (Wedlin, 
2007: 36), thereby resulting in a decrease in diversity in the field. Devinney, Dowling & 
Perm-Ajchariyawong contend that “rankings tend to foster imitation on the measured 
criteria, [thereby] reducing heterogeneity” (2008: 197). Hazelkorn proposes that 
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“rankings confer a single definition of excellence in […] insidious ways” (2011:20), 
while Grey asserts that “ranking systems inevitably flatten out variety because they 
posit a unitary scale of goodness” (2009: 355). Consequently, as rankings proliferate, 
organisations “act rationally and strategically, effectively becoming what is being 
measured” (Van der Wende & Westerheijden, 2009: 77).  
Despite their clarity about the outcome of ranking processes, most authors are 
nevertheless silent on the mechanism through which homogenisation is said to occur. 
One mechanism that is implicit in most of the previously mentioned studies is the 
process of attrition of performance measures proposed by Meyer and Gupta (1994) and 
Meyer (2002). They propose that over time, performance measures will ‘run down’, 
meaning that they will “lose variability and hence the capacity to discriminate good 
from bad performance” (Meyer & Gupta, 1994:330). This loss of variability is 
measured in both an increase in means as well as a loss of variance. Thus, most scholars 
have argued that there is a cause-effect relationship between the emergence of rankings 
and homogenisation processes in organisational fields. However, that is 
counterintuitive, as a ranking has by definition the goal of differentiating between 
ranking actors. Therefore, sufficient variance between ranking actors is a pre-condition 
for any ranking. Over time, if the ranking actors became more alike, a ranking would be 
able to show less of a meaningful difference between them. This means, at least in the 
long-term, the homogenisation assumption runs counter to the existence of rankings.   
In addition, the homogenisation assumption hinges on the evidence for variance 
reduction. Empirically, if all actors in a field are trying to conform to one model of what 
constitutes high performance, organisations and thus the field should indeed become 
more homogeneous over time.  However, there is no conclusive evidence that rankings 
make fields or particular organisations more homogenous. If anything, empirical 
research has been equivocal on the question of rankings and their impact on 
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organisations and fields. In her seminal study of the European business school field, 
Wedlin (2006: 98) concluded that “[…] the forming of prototypes and prototypical 
classifications can be assumed to foster mimetic isomorphism […]”. However, she goes 
on to argue that “there is no consistent evidence that the field as a whole is becoming 
more homogenous because of the rankings (2006: 166)”. Wedlin’s explanation is that 
rankings are used “to create belonging to a group and to confirm conformity with the 
template. However, being driven by demands for distinctions, rankings are in essence 
classification systems that rely on measure that will show […] differences between 
organizations in the rankings” (2006: 168). Hence, “rather than stressing conformity, 
[rankings] enhance differentiation between actors along a standardized axis” (Hedmo, 
Sahlin-Andersson & Wedlin, 2006: 322). The latter observation is particularly 
interesting, because ranking agents compile information that measures performance of 
organisations with the stated goal that field actors can make more informed decisions. 
Emphasising the differences between ranking actors by giving them a rank should thus 
lead to clearer distinctions between ranking actors, and have the effect of reducing 
informational asymmetries between field actors. This should lead to an increase in 
competition between ranking actors, with organisations emphasising their distinctive 
capabilities to gain competitive advantage. Indeed, many rankings have been created 
with the explicit purpose of providing for a basis of competition and differentiation, not 
homogenisation (Martins, 2005; for the BusinessWeek MBA rankings see Gioia & 
Corley, 2002; for the FT rankings see Wedlin, 2006). Hence, as rankings become “a 
substitute for more authentic market mechanisms” (Locke, 2011: 225) even under 
conditions of incomplete competition, it is possible that ranking fields become more 
diverse following the introduction of a ranking.  
The literature has usually referred to this process of homogenisation as being 
one of mimetic isomorphic change (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), meaning that 
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organisations are becoming more alike because competitors copy organisational 
processes, policies and structures of each other to enhance their legitimacy. One aspect 
that has been largely ignored is the one of coercive isomorphism. Some governments 
have started tying scholarships to admission in universities that are highly ranked in 
certain league tables. For example, the Ministry of Education of the Kingdom of Brunei 
requires scholarship holders to study in a top 50 university as defined by the Times 
Higher Education World University Rankings (British Universities Brunei Association, 
2014). The Education Bureau of Hong Kong provides full tuition for students studying 
at any institution in the top 100 universities in the QS World University Rankings, the 
Times Higher Education World University Rankings, the Shanghai Jiao Tong 
University’s Academic Ranking of World Universities or the US News and World 
Report’s Best Global Universities (Hong Kong Education Bureau, 2014). Whether the 
processes are coercive or mimetic, isomorphic pressures will become apparent through 
an increase in the mean or a decrease in the variance of the criteria that make up the 
ranking. The implications of this assumption will be further elaborated in the following.  
To summarise, there is wide agreement in the literature on the question that the 
ranking process creates mimetic isomorphic pressures (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) 
which ranking actors can barely resist to, leading to a homogenisation of the ranking 
field. Often, these assertions make reference to the early strands of new organisational 
institutionalism, which proposes that one of the outcomes of isomorphism is 
homogenisation (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). However, New Institutional Theory has 
been widely criticised for failing to explain nonconformity and divergent change in 
organisational fields (Dacin, Goodstein & Scott, 2002; Kraatz & Zajac, 1996; Oliver, 
1991; Scott, 2008; Seo & Creed, 2002). Addressing this gap, research has investigated 
the cognitive and symbolic structures around which converging and diverging change 
takes place in organisational fields. These include archetypes (Greenwood & Hinings, 
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1988, 1993; Miller & Friesen, 1980; Short, Payne & Ketchen, 2008), logics (Dunn & 
Jones, 2010; Lounsboury, 2007; Marquis & Lounsboury, 2007; Seo & Creed, 2002; 
Thornton, 2002; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999, 2008) and frames (Benford & Snow, 2000; 
Kaplan, 2008, 2011; Kaplan & Orlikowski, 2013). However, there are important 
reasons to assume that far from convergence being a necessary outcome, organisations 
react to isomorphic pressures in different ways. Authors have shown how organisations 
deviate from isomorphic pressures and change in ways that diversity, not homogeneity, 
increases in organisational fields (D’Aunno, Succi & Alexander, 2000; Clemens & 
Cook, 1999, DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Greenwood, Diaz, Li & Lorente, 2010; Oliver, 
1991; Kondra & Hinings, 1998; Scheid-Cook, 1992; Scott, 2008; Tolbert & Zucker, 
1996). More recently, this work has drawn on the literature that establishes the existence 
of multiple institutional arrangements that intertwine to create contradicting and 
diverging institutional pressures in organisational fields (D’Aunno, Sutton & Price, 
1991; Friedland & Alford, 1991; Kraatz & Zajac, 1996; Lounsbury, 2007; Marquis & 
Lounsbury, 2007; Seo & Creed, 2002; Thornton & Ocasio, 2008). Thus, New 
Institutional Theory provides for a more complex view of the role of isomorphic 
pressures in organisational change, which has largely been ignored in the ranking 
literature. 
In conclusion, conformity and differentiation are both possible outcomes of the 
emergence of rankings in a field. Nonetheless, the possibility that rankings increase 
diversity, making the ranking field more heterogeneous, or that the ranking field as a 
whole might become more homogeneous while some ranking actors become more 
diverse, has received little or no attention in the literature. In the following, I will 
develop the concept of the ranking template to explain how ranking agents create 
templates that ranking actors react to by both conforming and diverging.  
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3 The ranking template 
In what is acknowledged as one of the first works of New Institutional Theory, 
DiMaggio and Powell conceptualise "templates for organizing" (1991: 27) as models 
from the institutional context of organisations that are used to gain legitimacy (see also 
Fligstein, 1996; Greenwood & Hinings, 1996; Heugens & Lander, 2009). Subsequently, 
D’Aunno, Succi & Alexander (2000:679) define templates as “patterns for arranging 
organizational behaviour that specify organizational structure and goals and reflect a 
distinct set of beliefs and values”. Those templates have a taken-for-granted quality and 
cause actors to “unwittingly accept the prevailing template as appropriate, right, and the 
proper way of doing things” (Greenwood & Hinings, 1996: 1027).  
In her study of the European business school field, Wedlin (2006, 2007) draws 
on the concept of the template to propose that rankings play a role in determining the 
specification of organisational structures and goals. She finds that the FT rankings 
promote the “template of the international business school” (2007:28). This templates 
advances “a generalized notion of an organizational group that serves as a comparison 
for assessing whether an organization belongs in a particular category or class, and is 
formed around perceptions of what is good, proper and ‘true’ for members of this 
group” (Wedlin, 2007:25). Thereby, rankings “provide a comparison group, specify 
measures of competition and comparison in this group, and promote role models for 
imitation and change” (Wedlin, 2007:25). Through mechanisms of information 
processing and redistribution of legitimacy and reputational resources (Sauder & Fine, 
2008), actors converge to this template (see also Engwall, 2007b; Engwall & Danell, 
2011) as it bridges “differences in contexts and values, or logics, underlying the field” 
(Wedlin, 2011: 211). Wedlin also points to the possibility that a “template holds 
multiple values and expectation” (2007:34), leading to a variation in codification as the 
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template is enacted by the ranking actor. She follows that “both similarity and 
difference follow from identification with a common template” are possible (2007:26). 
Given the emphasis of Wedlin’s study, this point has found little recognition in the 
literature (for an exception see Locke, 2011), and has been largely ignored in empirical 
studies (see Wedlin, 2011 for an exception). The prevailing assumption remains that 
rankings create a single, rather than a multitude of templates for a multitude of field 
actors, and that one template prevails over other templates of comparison and 
assessment in the field. In addition, other templates that ranking actors or stakeholders 
may be holding are ignored, or assumed to have less relevance than templates 
emanating from rankings. Given this, most studies have assumed, rather than 
demonstrated, that rankings create isomorphic pressures and thus cause organisations to 
become more homogenous.  
In order to advance a more complete understanding of models of organising 
created by ranking agents, I propose the concept of the ranking template. Through the 
publication of rankings, rankings agents construct templates of organising of what they 
consider to be of high quality, performance, legitimacy or status in a field. Ranking 
templates are therefore defined as the models of organising that ranking agents create 
through rankings, thereby defining what is legitimate or of high reputation, status or 
performance in the field. Rankings are not templates, but serve as the basis of the 
construction of ranking templates. Consequently, a multitude of ranking templates can 
emanate from a single ranking. In the following section, I will show how rankings 
create complex, ambiguous and multi-faceted templates, depending on the prevalence of 
competing templates, the agency of ranking actors, and the competition of measurement 
devices for authority in the field.  
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Competing templates. There is no evidence to suggest that rankings transform 
field competition so profoundly that all other existing historical, technical, competitive 
and institutional pressures are simply overridden. For instance, institutional forces can 
vary as a function of ecological and competitive forces (Dacin, 1997). Furthermore, 
institutional rules stemming from legitimacy pressures and strategic agency stemming 
from technical pressures are antagonistic, but interdependent mechanisms (Beckert, 
1999). Thus, rather than simply overriding existing patterns of legitimacy and 
competition, rankings work in conjunction with existing templates, legitimacy and 
technical pressures (Ruef & Scott, 1998; Suchman, 1995). In addition, the existence of 
multiple, contradicting pressures from different templates may lead to imperfect 
transmission (Zucker, 1988) or translation (Czarniawska-Joerges & Sevon, 1996), 
resulting in the adaptation, rather than the copying, of a template. Furthermore, even if 
templates are copied faithfully, different organisations might react differently to 
legitimation pressures and thus implement templates differently (Glynn, Barr & Dacin, 
2000; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Oliver, 1988, 1991), hence “opening the possibility 
for idiosyncratic interpretation and either deliberate or unwitting variation in practices” 
(Greenwood & Hinings, 1996: 1029). 
To take a specific example, there is no evidence that because of the FT rankings, 
although assumed to be of strong rhetorical power (Devinney, Dowling & Perm-
Ajchariyawong, 2008; Wedlin, 2006), Hong Kong UST Business School sees Harvard 
Business School as a direct competitor, despite them being separated by only two ranks 
in the 2011 ranking. Likewise, while their close rank in the Fortune World’s Most 
Admired Companies 2013 might suggest that PepsiCo (rank 37) is seeing Nestle (rank 
32) and Unilever (rank 39) as its main rivals, historic patterns of competition suggest 
that Coca-Cola (rank 4) is still PepsiCo’s biggest competitor. Thus, the rivalry of both 
firms is imbued with historical legacy, competitive rivalry and status considerations 
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independent of the ranking of either actor. The competition of templates can also be 
explained by reference to the concept of prestige. 
Veblen conceptualises historical legacy, wealth and power as features of prestige 
(1899). One of the features of prestige is that it allows for premium or prestige pricing, 
i.e. setting high prices to suggest quality (McCarthy & Perreault, 1990). However, as 
Weber points out “’mere economic’ power, and above all ‘naked’ money power, is by 
no means a recognized basis of social honour [or prestige]” (1946: 180). Based on this, 
Zhou defines prestige as “social distinction based on persistent differences in social 
positions”, the “transcending of social boundaries” and the “acceptance by a broad 
audience” (2005:94). He however points out the dependence of prestige on concepts of 
legitimacy and appropriateness, on which social actors must base their claims to acquire 
prestige or status “in reference to the institutional realm of shared values and beliefs” 
(2005:95). Thus, while building on the notions of legitimacy, reputation and status, the 
evaluation of prestige is different from these concepts. As prestige takes a long time to 
build up and then depreciates slowly, historical legacy is one of the features that 
distinguish prestigious organisations, as well as their appeal to a broad audience and its 
transcendence of social boundaries. Therefore, prestigious organisations are typically 
those that a great variety of actors in a field can agree on to be of high standing. 
However, as we will see in the following sections, the distinction between reputation, 
status and prestige becomes especially consequential in the context of rankings, as 
highly prestigious organisations will occupy the top end of a status hierarchy. For 
instance, in a study of the US News & World Report rankings
4
, Grewal, Derden and 
Llilien (2008) show considerable stability for prestigious universities like Harvard, 
Princeton, Stanford, Yale, MIT, Pennsylvania, Cal Tech and Duke, with a probability 
                                                             
 
 
4
 Hereafter: USNWR rankings 
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between 0.89 and 0.71 of being ranked in the top 5. Any American university ranking 
that contradicts or challenges this established prestige order would open itself up to 
scrutiny. Ranking agents thus need to take into account pre-existing templates when 
constructing a ranking. I propose that one of the reasons for the dominance of rankings 
over other measurement devices is that rather than challenging established templates, 
ranking templates allow for interpretations that are building upon and extending 
established templates of what is legitimate, prestigious or of low or high reputation and 
status. This construction of rankings alongside and based on existing templates of 
different actors implies that the construction of unitary ranking templates is unlikely.  
 
Commensuration ambiguities. In virtually all of the literature on rankings, there 
is a strong assumption that ranking actors will model themselves after the best 
performers of the ranking, i.e. those that excel in most of the ranking criteria. This focus 
on a single template emanating from the ranking process is a consequence of one of the 
prominent features of the ranking process; the “transformation of qualities into 
quantities that share a metric”, thereby shaping “what we pay attention to, which things 
are connected to other things, and how we express sameness and difference” (Espeland 
& Sauder 2007: 16). The ensuing reductive nature of rankings can lead to the perception 
that there is only ‘one ranking’ that is perceived equally by all members of the ranking 
field. Nevertheless, and despite a bourgeoning literature on rankings, there is little 
agreement on what rankings measure. In a quantitative study, where 1600 corporate 
recruiters were asked to rate 107 U.S. Business Schools, Rindova et al. (2005) measured 
how media rankings of business schools were affecting the prominence of business 
schools in the mind of their stakeholders. Remarkably, they found that media rankings 
had a strong direct and significant effect on the prominence dimension (-.51), more than 
faculty publications (.17) and faculty degree prestige (.18), and the largest indirect 
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effect on the price-premium dimension (-.30) of all variables. Compared to that, 
perceived quality only had an effect of .13 on the prominence dimension. Yet, when 
assessing the effects of rankings, other authors have been using arguably different 
concepts (Bitektine, 2011; Deephouse & Carter, 2005; Jensen & Roy, 2008; Shenkar & 
Yuchtman-Yaar, 1997) such as status, prestige, quality, performance and reputation, in 
most cases interchangeably. Hence rankings have been considered to be a noisy 
measure of performance (Dichev, 1999), reputation (Baden-Fuller, Ravazzolo & 
Schweizer, 2000; Corley & Gioia, 2000; Martins, 2005; Morgeson & Nahrgang, 2008; 
Sauder & Fine, 2008; Vidaver-Cohen, 2007), perceptions of quality (Sauder & 
Espeland, 2006), quality and positional status (Devinney, Dowling & Perm-
Ajchariyawong, 2008), status (D’Aveni, 1996; Sauder, 2006), prestige (Zhou, 2005), 
prestige and status (Marginson & Van der Wende, 2007), positional status and 
reputation (Elsbach & Kramer, 1996) and, depending on the user, a measure of 
customer satisfaction, quality or market position (Zemsky, 2008). Thus, the balance of 
evidence suggests that there is little agreement on what rankings measure, making the 
emergence of a unitary ranking template unlikely.  
In addition, the exact ranking algorithms or method of data collection and 
processing are often not made public. This leads to the creation of ambiguous templates. 
Furthermore, even if public, ranking algorithms are often ambiguous (Wedlin, 2007), 
and reengineering of rankings does not necessarily deliver actionable results (Devinney, 
Dowling & Perm-Ajchariyawong, 2008; Klein & Hamilton, 1998). Noticeably, while 
few ranking actors have been found to falsify ranking data, ranking actors often have 
the possibility “to exploit ambiguity in a number of the definitions without actually 
committing falsification” (Locke, 2011: 219). Meanwhile, ambiguity is not an unwanted 
side effect, but rather a central feature of rankings. Through the use of ambiguous 
signals, “[…] the template secures similarity and recognition of ‘belonging together’ in 
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the field while allowing for considerable variation in organizational practices and 
identities” (Wedlin, 2007: 24). With ambiguous templates, “organizations will likely 
have a greater range of available responses to institutional forces” (Glynn, Barr & 
Dacin, 2000: 730). Hence, rankings are fine-grained performance measurement systems 
that are so seemingly precise that they create more ambiguous than clear templates (see 
Bowker & Star, 2000; Fleischer, 2009). The more ambiguous these ranking templates 
are, the more discretion ranking actors will have in responding to them.  
 
Competition of measurement devices. Rankings rarely are the only tools of 
social evaluation that contribute to the formation of templates in a field, but usually 
form part of an array of social measures. These are produced by ranking stakeholders 
and construct “legitimacy within the field, which actors use to attempt to shape and 
reform the field as it develops”, thereby “potentially altering the definition and 
distribution of symbolic capital in the field” (Wedlin, 2011:200). These measurement 
devices can be audits, accreditations, awards, certificates, rankings or ratings. While 
Wedlin acknowledges the existence of competing templates, stemming for example 
from accreditations, she simply states that “both systems compete with and support each 
other” (2007: 28). Nevertheless, she only mentions accreditations as one of the many 
competing producers of templates, but fails to explain the role of competing templates 
from other social evaluators, as well as the templates that exist independently of social 
evaluators in the field. In addition, the mechanism through which a template prevails 
over others, and what role ranking field actors play in this process remains unclear.  
As a multitude of methodologically different rankings and other measurement 
devices like audits, certifications or awards impose their authority on a field 
simultaneously, conflicting demands on field actors are created (see also D'Aunno, 
Sutton, & Price, 1991; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Haunschild and Miner (1997: 496) find 
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that “if populations enact multiple imitation processes at the same time […] imitation 
may not produce simple homogeneity but may be a source of variation”. Thus, 
conflicting demands can result in a situation where not one, but several templates come 
into existence from a ranking. For instance, according to Sauder and Espeland (2006), 
the existence of multiple rankings, as opposed to a dominant one, can weaken the 
impact of rankings on a field by introducing complexity, thereby weakening the impact 
of small changes in rank and increasing reputational flexibility for the ranked. This can 
also undermine the idea of validity of rankings in general. Thus, the competition of 
other measurement devices for definitional authority in the field leads to a situation 
where competing, rather than converging templates, come into existence in the ranking 
field.  
Wedlin (2006, 2007) shows the process through which ranking agents create 
templates that redefine what is legitimate in an organisational field. However, if 
rankings are the result of a collaborative process where different actors in the ranking 
field work together, it is essential to understand the differing models of legitimacy and 
status that ranking agents, actors and stakeholders who participate in the ranking 
process hold. This is because this process results in multiple templates that define what 
or what not is legitimate or status-enhancing in the field. Rankings are only one possible 
measurement device that creates templates on the base of which institutional pressures 
are negotiated. In particular, there are five measurement devices that can be used by 
field actors to build templates: accreditations, audits, awards, certificates and metrics. 
Building on Bitektine’s (2011) research on social judgement formation, I propose that 
the construction of templates emanating from rankings is contingent on the competition 
with other measurement devices that act as institutionalised suppliers of social 
judgement. Under conditions of bounded rationality and social influence, actors use 
templates to form a social judgement about desirable attributes of actors in the field. 
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This process includes the full or partial evaluation of any combination of the cognitive 
legitimacy, the socio-political legitimacy, the status and the reputation of the focal 
organisation. In the following, I will introduce the concept of legitimacy, reputation and 
status devices, and explain their role in the formation of templates of organising. 
 
Legitimacy devices. Often, the first step of social judgement formation is the 
assessment of the cognitive legitimacy of an organisation, making the organisation 
understandable and taken for granted for its audiences, thus permitting its cognitive 
typification into an existing category (Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Meyer & Rowan, 
1977; Suchman, 1995). This type of external legitimacy, i.e. the visible endorsement of 
an organisation by powerful external collective actors, represents a strong source of 
institutional support, above all for emerging organisations (Singh, Tucker & House, 
1986: 176). This evaluation process is dichotomous in the sense that it will yield the 
confirmation of adherence or non-adherence to an existing category whose features are 
already known and whose legitimacy has already been evaluated. In the case of non-
adherence, the search for other evaluation mechanisms will ensue (Bitektine, 2011: 
159). For example, the first step in evaluating the cognitive legitimacy of an 
organisation can be whether it is for-profit or not-for-profit, public or private, 
independent or part of a larger entity. Furthermore, there are other dichotomous 
variables that are used to evaluate organisations. Accreditations and audits produce 
templates that indicate a certain minimum standard of adherence to a category in the 
field. For the audience, they create templates that actors can use to assess whether they 
can regard organisations as legitimate players or not. Thus, they are making 
organisations comparable to each other. Examples of issuers of accreditations that act as 
a source of strong institutional pressures on organisational actors are the Joint 
Commission of Accreditation, Health Care and Certification, which accredits hospitals 
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(Scott 1987: 502) or the Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business 
(hereafter: AACSB), which accredits business schools (Durand & McGuire, 2005; 
Trank & Washington, 2009).  
In a socio-political legitimacy judgement, observed organisational features and 
performance are compared to the prevailing social norms. The evaluator judges whether 
the organisation, its form, its processes and its outcomes are socially acceptable, and 
hence should be dealt with, ignored or fought (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Meyer & Rowan, 
1977; Scott & Meyer, 1991; Suchman, 1995). Templates that define the socio-political 
legitimacy of an organisation are constructed by making reference to societal purposes 
(creation of employment, creation of wealth and know-how), inclusion (equality and 
diversity), community and environmental engagement, organisational structure and 
governance. An example of a social-political legitimacy device is the consumer 
watchdog organisation (Rao, 1998). Often, socio-political legitimacy is conferred by the 
media, but also by reference to institutionalised and non-institutionalised rules, 
regulations, and laws (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994). 
 
Reputation devices. Building on past experiences, stakeholders will use 
reputation judgements in order to identify unique organisational features that distinguish 
the focal organisation from its peers and to predict its future behaviour (Deephouse & 
Carter, 2005; Weigelt & Camerer, 1988; Whetten & Mackey, 2002). Here, it is 
important to distinguish the concept of reputation from the concept of prestige. Brewer, 
Gates and Goldman conceptualise prestige as an “intangible, durable, and very valuable 
asset that, unlike reputation, does not go up or down rapidly” (2002: 30). They conclude 
that prestige is measured in absolute terms, defined by insiders like organisational 
members, depreciates slowly, and is a part of a zero-sum game for social standing, 
while reputation is measured in absolute terms, defined by outsiders like customers, 
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depreciates rapidly, and triggers positive-sum games (Brewer, Gates & Goldman, 2002: 
36). Certificates, awards, references to organisational history, number and background 
of organisational members (internationality, diversity), partnerships or performance and 
resource metrics (e.g. cash, sales, profit, placement rates) produce templates that define 
reputation and that provide organisations with features that distinguish them from their 
peer group. An example of a reputation device that acts as a source of institutional 
pressures is the ISO 9000 quality certificate (Guler, Guillen & MacPherson, 2002). 
 
Status devices. A status judgement evaluates the performance of an organisation 
compared to a peer group with similar features on a set of relevant dimensions, 
discriminating between higher and lower ranks that generate privilege or discrimination 
for actors (Podolny, 1993; Washington & Zajac, 2005; Wejnert, 2002). Rankings or 
ratings create templates that provide actors with a comparison in a discriminating, 
evaluative and hierarchical way. Examples of status devices are the previously 
mentioned rankings, as well as credit ratings, the Rabally city rating system, motion 
picture rating systems or the Research Excellence Framework in the UK. The role of 
equity ratings (Fleischer, 2009) and wine quality ratings (Benjamin & Podolny, 1999) 
have received particular attention in the organisational literature. 
 
Interaction between measurement devices. The previously mentioned 
measurement devices do not exist independently, but build on each other in the creation 
of templates. The case of accreditations is especially interesting, as accreditations are 
often closely connected to rankings. Although accreditations have been in existence for 
many decades (see Stettler, 1965), the number of accreditation schemes is still 
expanding worldwide (Vroeijenstijn, 2003). Hence, scholars have identified the 
increasingly important role of accreditations as tools of social legitimation and status 
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evaluation. Research on accreditations has specifically investigated the process of 
legitimation of the accreditation agents like the AACSB in the face of increasing 
competition from other accreditation agents (Durand & McGuire, 2005) and the 
repercussions of the rise of an ‘accreditation market’ (Stensaker & Harvey, 2006). 
Rankings and accreditations also show overlaps in practice. For example, a condition 
for participation in the FT MBA rankings is to be accredited by either AACSB or 
EQUIS (European Quality Improvement System) (Financial Times, 2014a). Given this 
parallel, and sometimes conditional existence of accreditations and rankings, other 
studies have used the literature on reputation to shed light on the distinction between 
rankings and accreditations.  
Building on Deephouse and Carter’s discussion of the differences between 
legitimacy and reputation (2005), Bartlett, Pallas and Frostenson define rankings as 
“mainly based on the ‘relative standing or desirability’ of an organization, whereas 
accreditation focuses on ‘meeting and adhering to the expectation of a social system’s 
norms, values, rules and meanings” (2013: 533). They thus propose that “rankings and 
accreditations work differently in their ability to discriminate between organizations 
sharing joint social contexts (ranking) and the extent to which organizations are 
perceived as following normative prescriptions and constraints (accreditations)” 
(Bartlett, Pallas & Frostenson, 2013: 537). However, they point out that the fact that 
several different reputation and status agents engage in competitive formation of 
reputation at the same time “creates effects in its own right” (Bartlett, Pallas & 
Frostenson, 2013: 539). Thus, accreditations and rankings do not simply co-exist, but 
compete for definitional authority (Espeland, 1997; Espeland & Stevens, 1998, 2008; 
Porter, 1995) in the field they are evaluating. As actors can strategically choose a 
ranking or other measurement device to advance their interpretation of a template (see 
previous section), this leads to a situation where competing rather than converging 
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templates come into existence through accreditations and rankings. Thus, the parallel 
competition of rankings and accreditations is likely to have a performance impact on 
ranking actors in its own right.  
Given the potential impact of other measurement devices in the field, I thus 
propose that rankings cannot be perceived as measurement devices that deliver social 
judgments about field actors in an exclusive and isolated manner. Others have 
emphasised the role of the proliferation of accreditations in the emergence of rankings, 
conceptualising them as “interwoven templates” (Hedmo, Sahlin-Andersson & Wedlin, 
2006) that “both compete with and support each other” (Wedlin, 2007: 28). However, to 
what extent templates emanating from both measurement devices are interwoven, and 
how, has not been empirically verified. Conceptually, studies have failed to construct a 
comprehensive theoretical framework that can explain the dynamic interaction between 
measurement devices in the creation of templates. 
To summarise, given the existence of competing templates and the agency of 
ranking actors, rankings produce a multitude of often contradictory and ambiguous 
templates. In addition, the use of templates is contingent on specific empirical contexts, 
leaving it unclear under what conditions what kind of codification and enactment of the 
template is likely to occur. While Wedlin admits that pressures from different templates 
co-exist in the ranking field, and that this makes it possible that both similarities and 
differences between ranking actors persist or are widened (2007: 36), she does not 
explain how and under what circumstances this process occurs.  
As using some measurement devices more than others may come at the cost of 
similarity and lack of differentiation from competitors, I propose that ranking actors will 
use templates selectively to find a balance between conformity and differentiation. In 
order to understand how ranking actors select templates or parts thereof, I will now 
define the rationality assumptions that underlie the concept of the ranking template and 
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frame. I will assume that using information from a ranking is a non-routine activity and 
that ranking actors are self-interested and subject to cognitive limitations during this 
process. Given the multitude and ambiguous nature of templates, ranking actors are 
subject to time, search and calculation limitations when using information from a 
ranking. Ranking actors respond to this problem by satisficing rather than optimising 
(Simon, 1997 [1947]), i.e. they will use the information from the ranking in way that is 
‘good enough’ rather than optimal. In other words, ranking actors are “intendedly 
rational, but only boundedly so” (Simon, 1997 [1947]: 88). In addition, ranking actors 
work under the assumption that ranking agents are also self-interested and subject to 
cognitive limitations. However, ranking agents are also constructing the ranking under 
the assumption that ranking actors are boundedly rational, and use the ranking as a tool 
to reduce the informational complexity they are facing.  
While the concept of bounded rationality has been applied differently in 
different disciplines, the previously mentioned operationalisation is close to the one 
adopted in much of the organisation theory literature, particularly the one on 
organisational institutionalism (Immergut, 1998) and learning (Simon, 1991). Thus, 
given that ranking actors are boundedly rational, and that there are is always a multitude 
of templates of organising in a field, it is unclear which ones ranking actors strategically 
choose to comply with, and under what conditions this choice has the potential to 
impact on the field. I will explore this theme in more detail in chapter III. 
 
In conclusion, the existence of competing templates and the competition of 
measurement devices make the emergence of a unitary ranking template that all ranking 
actors can act upon unlikely, given that they are boundedly rational. Rather than 
producing one template that ranking field actors could use for reacting to rankings or 
positioning themselves in the organisational field, ranking agents are subject to bounded 
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rationality and produce a multitude of competing templates. This contrasts with the 
previous literature that is mainly based on the premise that the appearance of a ranking 
leads to the creation of a ‘one ranking’ template. Additionally, given that ranking actors 
are boundedly rational, ranking templates need to be understood in the environment of 
the ranking field in which they are produced. As section 4 will show, the extent to 
which particular ranking templates impact on ranking fields depends on the conditions 
prevalent within the field.  
 
 
4 Conditions of ranking impact 
Ranking studies have so far focused on the impact of rankings in specific 
organisational fields like American law schools (Sauder, 2008) or European business 
schools (Wedlin, 2006, 2007, 2011). While rankings do exist in other fields, for 
example in the field of multinational corporations (Ghoshal & Bartlett, 1990), where 
they rank corporations according to global brands (Interbrand, 2014), sustainability 
(Corporate Knights, 2014), or revenue (Fortune, 2014), many impactful rankings have 
emerged in the higher education field. In business education in particular, the influence 
of rankings on ranking actors and stakeholders has increased considerably in recent 
years (see Sauder & Fine, 2008). Therefore, on the one hand, I will propose that 
different fields provide different conditions for ranking impact. On the other hand, I 
will argue that the emergence of rankings also has an impact on field conditions. The 
most important of these conditions is the degree of informational complexity (Driver & 
Streufert, 1969) in the field.  
As Simon points out, bounded rationality is based on “the two blades [of] the 
structure of task environments and the computational capabilities of the actor” (1990: 
7). While the computational capabilities were discussed in section 3, and will be further 
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explored in chapter III, this section will focus on the structure of the task environment, 
and its qualities in terms of informational complexity. As environmental complexity 
evolves in terms of information, both ranking agents and ranking actors have to adapt 
their strategies vis-à-vis the ranking. For ranking actors and agents, rationality is set to 
be more bounded the more informational complexity there is. However, absence of 
informational complexity removes the conditions under which rankings can be 
meaningfully constructed. Rankings will be of it little use in environments where 
informational complexity is too big to be meaningfully reduced. This discussion is thus 
relevant to both the concept of the ranking template and the ranking frame (to be 
discussed in chapter III), as the amount of informational complexity in a ranking field is 
set to change how both are constructed.  
 
Field conditions and ranking impact. In order to reduce uncertainty from 
informational complexity, actors are likely to orient themselves towards models of 
organising of other actors (Haunschild & Miner, 1997). According to Blank (2007), 
informational complexity arises above all in markets for post-experience goods, for 
example in education, where quality “cannot be fully assessed by an individual 
consumer even after it is consumed” (Gormley & Weimer, 1999: 24). This leads to a 
situation where price information is not useful to determine value because important 
qualities of the good or service cannot be assessed monetarily, for example in the non-
profit field (Steinberg, 2006: 128). This is exacerbated if a low frequency of purchase of 
the good or service leads to a lack of information about the product by the audience, or 
if erroneous purchases are difficult to correct, for example, because they are once-in-a-
lifetime investments (Blank, 2007: 194). Rankings are thus likely to emerge in fields 
where informational complexity is high (Gormley & Weimer, 1999).  
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Informational complexity is related to the issue of status orders. Podolny (1994) 
argues that in conditions of informational complexity, status matters most if the quality 
of a product cannot be evaluated easily before the exchange. Building on Podolny’s 
work, Stuart, Hoang and Hybels (1999) argue that whenever informational complexity 
is greater, depending on how resource consuming the evaluation of the ranking actor is, 
consumers are more likely to resort to status valuations. Therefore, if informational 
complexity is lower, status considerations should be less salient in the sense that the 
more precisely actors know where they are positioned in relation to their peers, the less 
they need to worry about being miscategorised by other actors. In other words, status 
anxiety, defined by Jensen (2006: 98) as the “concern about being devalued because 
other actors question the quality of one’s partners”, should be less prominent. In these 
situations, social measurement devices provide status judgement of field actor in a 
discriminating, evaluative and hierarchical way (Benjamin & Podolny, 1999; Bitektine, 
2011; Podolny, 1993; 1994; Washington & Zajac, 2005; Wejnert, 2002). However, 
Sauder and Fine (2008) suggest that rather than stabilising status hierarchies, rankings 
also have the effect of providing new opportunities for change for low-status actors by 
increasing transparency and levelling status differences in the field:  
“[The rankings have created] a certain degree of transparency. […] And I think it 
actually has done a lot for the non-Ivy schools, the non-big schools. You always 
know the top ten schools—the ones with very big names and very big 
endowments; you don’t need the rankings to know those. But I think it has really 
has opened the field for forty or fifty schools, and now as global markets are 
opening, it allows schools to receive attention.” (Dean of a ranked school, cited in 
Sauder & Fine, 2008: 708). 
This is consistent with the concept of middle-status conformity (Phillips & 
Zuckerman, 2001), which suggests that not all field actors will be affected equally by 
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considerations of status, but that pressures to conform to status expectations will be 
typically highest for middle-status actors. The main structural scope condition for 
middle-status conformity is a significant stability in the status order so that low-status 
actors are relatively permanent outsiders and high-status actors are secure enough to 
deviate from status conformity expectations (Phillips & Zuckerman, 2001). In 
institutional terms, features of a stable status hierarchy are a relatively high degree of 
structuration (Barley & Tolbert, 1997), an acknowledged centre and periphery, and a 
shared consciousness among field participants that they are part of the same wider 
endeavour (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Field-level intermediaries like rankings can 
play a role in the emergence of stable status orders or structurated fields as they can 
“provide the ideation and structuration processes needed for organizational field 
evolution” (Washington; 2004: 396). Thus, on the one hand, rankings can be the 
“sharply defined interorganisational structures of domination and patterns of coalition” 
(DiMaggio & Powell 1983: 148) or “diffusion structure[s] for new models and norms” 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983: 156) whose construction helps actors to form a field if it 
has not yet reached a stable status order and structure. On the other hand, a highly 
structurated field with a rigid status order is only going to benefit from the introduction 
of a ranking if it adds information to the field or changes the status order, for example 
by challenging it or making it more complex.  
Furthermore, high demand for products can also create a demand for third party 
product information from social evaluators (Blank, 2007: 194). Hence, social judgement 
formation and the emergence of institutionalised suppliers of social judgement like 
rankings are also related to resource conflicts prevailing in the field. In particular, 
Bitektine emphasises that “[...] in the process of social judgment formation, the high 
economic and social stakes for the evaluator […] [and] the availability of resources 
(such as time and money) would promote an extensive evaluation […]” (2011: 170). 
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Thus, if resource conflicts are more intensive in a field, there will be a greater need to 
make accurate evaluations through the construction of social measurement devices like 
rankings. 
In conclusion, rankings are constructed in fields to act as reducers of 
informational complexity, thereby reducing uncertainty for both producers and 
consumers and leading to a potential increase in consumption of the evaluated good. 
This will be more likely to occur in fields for post-experience goods with low to 
intermediate rigidity in terms of status order and field structuration, high levels of 
resource conflicts and adequate levels of informational complexity. In the following 
section, I will focus on the latter.  
 
The ranking zone. In some fields, above all emerging ones, goods or services 
are too different to allow for a meaningful comparison. As a certain degree of similarity 
is necessary to establish comparisons under conditions of bounded rationality, too much 
informational complexity makes it impossible to compile a ranking that can 
authoritatively judge the field. Contrastingly, there are fields where few goods exists, or 
where search goods, which can be easily evaluated and compared before purchase, 
prevail (Nelson, 1970). These fields have little need for the reduction of information, 
given that boundedly rational actors are able to carry out evaluations without further 
assistance. Hence, too little informational complexity makes rankings as reducers of 
complexity less useful. For example, Kostova and Zaheer described how the legitimacy 
of organisations can be influenced by the complexity of the legitimating environment 
(1999). On an individual level, Driver and Streufert showed how information-
processing systems respond to complexity of informational input in a curvilinear 
fashion (1969). On the one hand, the relationship between the bounded rationality of the 
ranking actor and the informational complexity of the ranking field in which they 
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operate is thus relevant for understanding how rankings impact on a ranking field. On 
the other hand, ranking agents are not only constrained by their own limitations in terms 
of bounded rationality, but they also have to take into account the limited ability of 
ranking actors to process information when constructing a ranking.  
In the following, I will show how the probability of ranking impact interacts 
with the informational complexity of the field. As we can see in figure 2, I propose that 
there is a curvilinear relationship between informational complexity in the field and the 
probability of ranking impact. Ranking fields with low or high levels of informational 
complexity are less likely to provide favourable conditions for the impact of rankings.  
 
 
Figure 2: Model of the ranking zone 
 
As shown in figure 2, the ranking field can be divided into one ranking zone and 
two non-ranking zones. In non-ranking zone 1, informational complexity is small. Here, 
ranking actors are too similar to be compared, which means that adding a ranking will 
not reduce informational complexity significantly because it will not add significantly 
new information. In that zone, the probability that a ranking will impact on ranking 
actors is small. An example would be discounters like Aldi and Lidl, whose business 
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model is to offer identical product ranges and store layouts in any particular country. 
While an internal ranking of attributes on which stores vary, e.g. revenue, number of 
customers, or loss would provide for new and useful information, a list that ranks 
features of each store would not, as differences between them are negligible.  
As informational complexity increases, the ranking field enters the ranking zone. 
In that zone, there are a sufficient number of ranking actors, and these actors are 
sufficiently different to make a comparison meaningful. The probability of ranking 
impact thus increases with increasing informational complexity, until an apex of the 
probability of ranking impact is reached. This apex marks perfect conditions of 
informational complexity, i.e. an intermediate level of number and variance in terms of 
ranking actors. The higher education field, and specifically the business education field 
are close to that apex, as it offers both a strong normative drive towards a specific 
model of organising, i.e. the American research-focused international business school 
(Wedlin, 2006), while leaving considerable room for a variety of other local and 
differentiated models of organising. Rankings will be most useful at this apex, as they 
can meaningfully reduce information when informational complexity is neither too low 
nor too high. After this apex is surpassed, the probability of ranking impact declines 
with increasing levels of informational complexity. This means that ranking actors are 
becoming too numerous or too different to be meaningfully compared. Ranking impact 
thus decreases. As previously mentioned, higher education fields usually fall into the 
ranking zone. This intermediate level of informational complexity implies the existence 
of a priori isomorphic pressures (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) in the organisational field 
that have reduced informational complexity and made goods similar enough to be 
compared. A relatively high level of isomorphic pressures may thus be a necessary 
condition for a ranking to operate in the ranking zone. The ranking zone is thus defined 
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as the state of a ranking field in terms of informational complexity under which 
rankings can emerge, given the bounded rationality of ranking actors and agents.  
In non-ranking zone 2, informational complexity is so high that a meaningful 
reduction of information cannot be carried out. Hence, the probability of ranking impact 
declines and reaches a minimum as informational complexity is maximised. An 
example of a field in ranking zone 2 would be the field for newly founded start-ups. As 
business models, organisational structures, production processes and revenue streams 
are either vastly different or non-existent, informational complexity is high and ranking 
newly founded start-ups will likely not deliver meaningful and new information to field 
actors. In that zone, rankings have a low probability of impacting on the ranking field.    
 
Impact of rankings on fields. The previously mentioned points imply that 
informational complexity affects how rankings impact on ranking fields. However, it is 
also possible that rankings affect informational complexity in the field. As we can see in 
figure 3, through the reduction of informational complexity, the ranking shifts the 
boundary of the ranking zone. Consequently, the ranking zone where the ranking has a 
high probability of impacting the ranking field becomes smaller.  
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Figure 3: Model of change in the ranking zone 
 
I will draw on the discussion in the previous sections of whether rankings cause 
ranking actors to become more similar or more different from each other to sketch out 
two possible effects of the narrowing of the ranking zone.  
Firstly, as overall informational complexity in the ranking field is reduced 
through the ranking, a common standard of what is defined as legitimate or high in 
status, quality and performance emerges. Consequently, boundedly rational ranking 
actors will feel less of a need to distinguish themselves from each other. This causes 
ranking actors to converge with each other, thereby becoming more comparable, and 
hence more similar to each other. As similarity increases, there is less need for a reducer 
of informational complexity. This would mean that the more rankings impact on a 
ranking field, the less they will become useful to boundedly rational ranking actors over 
time. Therefore, as reducers of information, rankings may carry the seed of their own 
demise. If rankings homogenise fields, they should become redundant because they 
reduce variance. Hence, over time, the homogenisation assumption (see section 2 in this 
chapter) is set to become inconsistent with the impact of rankings, given that ranking 
actors are boundedly rational. 
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Secondly, it is also possible to imagine a different effect. Rankings only reduce 
informational complexity on some dimensions, above all the ones they are measuring. 
All field actors need to comply with pressures of conformity for legitimacy purposes 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), but also distinguish themselves on others to maintain 
competitiveness. Specifically, Laurila and Lilja (2002) suggest that firms actually need 
to deviate from institutional legitimacy pressures in order to maintain competitiveness at 
the firm level. Being strategically different on some ranking criteria while complying 
with others is thus an option for ranking actors. For example, Grewal, Dearden and 
Llilien (2008) suggest that competition takes place primarily among similarly ranked 
ranking actors. In a study of the USNWR rankings, they show that competition in the 
ranking field takes place on different levels, in a way that how lower ranked universities 
compete is inherently different from the way higher ranked universities do. On the one 
hand, for better ranked universities with a lagged rank of 10, financial resources, 
graduation and retention sub-ranks are most important to keep their ranking. On the 
other hand, for lowly ranked universities with a lagged ranked of 40, academic 
reputation, graduation, and retention are most critical sub-ranks for overall ranking 
performance. They conclude that “a highly ranked university gets more leverage from 
growing financial resources, while lower ranked universities get more leverage from 
improvements in academic reputation” (Grewal, Dearden & Llilien, 2008: 237).  
Therefore, satisficing rather than optimising ranking actors will converge with 
each other on some criteria, while diverging on others. Overall, this will result in 
ranking actors becoming more similar to each other on some dimensions, while 
becoming more different from each other on others as it becomes more beneficial to 
deviate from what is perceived as a common standard of performance. As ranking 
actors become both more similar to and more different from each other, overall 
informational complexity in the field increases. This results in more need for a reducer 
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of informational complexity for boundedly rational ranking actors. This would mean 
that the more rankings impact on a ranking field, the more they will become useful over 
time. Hence, as reducers of information, rankings can create the conditions under which 
they are more likely to impact on a field. Apart from that, the reduction of informational 
complexity has consequences for the competition of ranking agents. If a ranking agent 
manages to reduce informational complexity in the ranking field, the competitive space 
for other ranking agents is reduced. Thus, ranking agents do not only compete for 
legitimacy with ranking actors and stakeholders, but also for a part of the ranking field 
where they can reduce information. However, through the creation of ranking templates, 
the ranking agent limits the discretion with which ranking actors can respond to the 
ranking over time. The search and calculation limitations of ranking actors thus interact 
with the degree of informational complexity of the ranking field in determining ranking 
impact.  
 
Ranking impact and ranking actor discretion. The development of the impact 
of a ranking over time plays a role in determining the discretion of ranking actors in 
responding to the ranking. Teichler (2011) contrasts the appearance of rankings in the 
higher education field in the 1920s with the fact that rankings only started achieving 
prominence in 1980s, with the more pronounced effects of rankings only becoming 
visible in the early 2000s. Yet, the literature on rankings has so far ignored the temporal 
dimension of the ranking process. This is surprising, given the historical and dynamic 
nature of institutional change (Seo & Creed, 2002). Ranking actors can however also 
learn over time about how to react to rankings (Locke, 2011). The stage of development 
of the ranking, the ranking agents, ranking actors, and the ranking field will play a role 
in how ranking actors respond to the ranking. For example, on the one hand, ranking 
actors that are newcomers to the ranking field lack legitimacy and status and could thus 
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become more susceptible to ranking pressures in comparison to older ranking actors 
with other established sources of legitimacy and status. On the other hand, established 
actors that are in the process of losing legitimacy or status will be prone to look to 
rankings as tools to hold on to, or improve, their standing. Like any entrepreneurial 
venture, ranking agents who try to establish a new ranking will need to pass a 
legitimacy threshold (Bitektine, 2008; Navis & Glynn, 2010; Zimmermann & Zeitz, 
2002) before gaining acceptance from ranking actors and stakeholders. This building of 
legitimacy occurs over time, and can be easily disrupted. For example, volatile rankings 
that allow for sharp increases and decreases in rank over time face increased scrutiny 
from ranking stakeholders (for an example of a critique of the Economist MBA 
rankings see Byrne, 2013). Hence, the legitimisation of a ranking in the ranking field 
involves a dynamic interaction between ranking agent and actors. As we can see in 
figure 4, four ideal-typical phases can be distinguished in this process.  
 
 
Figure 4: Model of ranking institutionalisation 
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Firstly, as a ranking is introduced, its authority to judge field actors is likely to 
be contested (Sauder, 2008). In this phase, rankings are not used or acknowledged by 
most field actors, and consequently yield little power to impact on ranking actors.  
Secondly, as important field actors are co-opted into the ranking process, 
contestation of the ranking decreases, with the ranking being increasingly 
acknowledged and used by the different field actors. The ranking thus becomes 
institutionalised as part of the organisational field. As ranking actors are trying to 
maintain legitimacy and their position in the status order, they have less discretion in 
responding to the ranking.  
Thirdly, as ranking actors become more similar to each other through a process 
of attrition, i.e. an increase in mean and decrease in variance of the performance 
measures that make up the ranking (Meyer & Gupta, 1994; Meyer, 2002), the ability of 
the ranking to differentiate among ranking actors diminishes. Nevertheless, ranking 
actors will continue to differentiate themselves both technically (White, 1986) and 
institutionally (Laurila & Lilja, 2002) from other actors, and ranking actor discretion 
increases. 
Fourthly, this process is maintained until the ranking agent reacts to the 
decreasing ability of their ranking to discriminate among field actors by changing or 
adapting the performance measures of the ranking (Meyer & Gupta, 1994). If the 
ranking is successfully updated, the cycle starts again in the ranking institutionalisation 
phase. If the updated measures are not accepted by field actors, for example, because 
they result in a situation where the ranking results diverge from the established field 
order, the impact from the ranking will decline and eventually disappear. The ranking 
thus becomes deinstitutionalised and other performance measures or templates of 
organising emerge. To summarise, as ranking agents become increasingly 
institutionalised, ranking actors will first have more and then less discretion to deviate 
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from ranking templates, and gain response discretion again as the ranking becomes 
deinstitutionalised.  
 
In conclusion, how ranking templates are created and compete with a multitude 
of templates for impact on the ranking field is moderated by the conditions in the 
ranking field and the degree of institutionalisation of the ranking. This process is based 
on a dynamic interaction between ranking templates and field conditions. As conditions 
of informational complexity change, the bounded rationality of ranking actors 
determines the way they use ranking templates. In Chapter III, I will show what role 
ranking actors and ranking frames play in that process.  
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III  THE CONSTRUCTION OF RANKING FRAMES 
 
 
The concept of the ranking template explains how ranking agents produce 
various templates of organising through the publication of a ranking. However, it cannot  
explain how boundedly rational ranking actors use these templates. I will thus introduce 
the concept of the ranking frame to explain how ranking actors produce ‘their ranking’ 
based on their own cognition and strategic preferences, ranking templates, and other 
templates that exist in the field. In the following, I will argue that in order to understand 
the impact of rankings, we have to understand how ranking actors ‘see’ and 
consequently use rankings. In this context, it is important to examine the differences 
between rankings and other measurement devices. 
As mentioned in the introduction, rankings are aggregate measures. This means 
that they are not restricted to one particular metric, but combine various measures, often 
from different scales and data sources. This is important, as the combination of 
measures requires a dynamic process of negotiating, choosing and weighting variables 
between ranking actors and agents. In addition, rankings are transitive measures, 
meaning that they order ranking actors, assigning a relative position in a hierarchy to 
each ranking actor. Rankings thus make all ranking actors of a field directly comparable 
to each other. Hence, rankings are not based on a definition of an absolute standard (e.g. 
a scale of 1 to 10) of what is high or low performance. This implies that ranking actors 
and agents do not need to constantly renegotiate and redefine what exactly constitutes 
high or low performance, as a part of that process is inherent in the ranking process 
itself. Many studies (e.g. Geary, Marriott & Rowlinson, 2004; Özbilgin, 2009) have 
used the terms ‘ratings’, ‘rankings’, ‘performance measures’ and ‘metrics’ 
interchangeably. Ratings are however not relative, but absolute performance measures, 
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as they require the definition of absolute categories, and a subsequent ordering of 
ranking actors that is not necessarily hierarchical or continuous. As I will argue in this 
chapter, the aggregate, transitive and relative nature of rankings is consequential for 
understanding how ranking actors perceive and act upon rankings through the 
construction of frames.  
As explained in chapter II, ranking actors are “intendedly rational, but only 
boundedly so” (Simon, 1997 [1947]: 88), meaning that they are subject to time, search 
and calculation limitations when using information from a ranking. I will argue in the 
following that given that ranking actors are boundedly rational, they will develop 
cognitive and strategic frames that help them process information from the ranking, and 
position themselves strategically in the ranking field. On the one hand, each ranking 
actor will thus use different ranking templates and consequently different information 
from a ranking. The more informational complexity increases beyond the apex of the 
probability of ranking impact, the more difficult, but also the more useful it will be for 
boundedly rational ranking actors to construct a ranking frame. On the other hand, the 
more informational complexity decreases below the apex of probability of ranking 
impact, the less difficult, but also the less useful it will be for boundedly rational 
ranking actors to construct a ranking frame. As each ranking actor is subject to different 
information, ranking actors are likely to develop different frames from a ranking. 
Therefore, the ranking is not the frame, but sets the boundaries for possible frames. 
Through their production of ranking templates, ranking agents set the boundaries for 
frame production. I will now outline the process of how ranking actors develop these 
frames. 
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1 The pre-ranking field 
Before the arrival of a ranking, ranking actors to-be are likely to have a general 
cognitive notion of what is to become the ranking field. The pre-ranking field is subject 
to technical and legitimacy pressures (Beckert, 1999) that are a priori independent of the 
process of social evaluation. Given ecological and competitive dynamics (Dacin, 1997) 
that are permeating the pre-ranking field, templates other than ranking templates are 
likely to be dominant. These are pre-existing templates and the templates produced by 
other measurement devices and stakeholders. Given these templates, there is a 
generalised notion, albeit an imprecise and undefined one, on what the field is and 
where its boundaries are. Notions of the competitive positioning, i.e. what constitutes 
low or high legitimacy, status, quality or performance in the pre-ranking field are thus 
limited to broad categories that are not publicly codified or generally acknowledged by 
field actors. Therefore, what commands legitimacy and status in the field is mostly 
limited to the judgement of experts as well as field actors themselves. This provides 
them a leeway in laying claim to categories such as ‘elite’, ‘best’, ‘excellent’ and 
‘leading’ (Sauder, 2006). Each ranking actor to-be will thus hold a coarse notion of their 
own position in the field, as well as a notion of the position of competitors or peers, 
given competitive positioning and organisational features like geography, products or 
organisational forms. However, as this advances an imprecise representation of the ad-
hoc distribution of legitimacy, reputation, status and prestige within the field, there is 
little indication for actors of how they can change their position. The arrival of the 
ranking is bound to change this situation.  
    
  
2 Preliminary ranking frames 
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As ranking actors to-be become aware of the possibility of the entry of a ranking 
into the field, they build a preliminary frame. This frame can be based on other 
rankings, but also other existing templates or templates from other measurement 
devices. However, frames based on other rankings are going to be most consequential, 
as they provide for a direct point of comparison. Bromiley (2005) notes that under 
conditions of bounded rationality, organisations set aspiration levels based on their past 
performance, as well as, the performance of peers. Since past performance or the 
performance of peers are difficult to assess in the pre-ranking field, the aspiration levels 
are imprecise. However, they are going to include a range of ranks, sub-ranks or criteria 
performances that ranking actors would see as either falling below aspirations, meeting 
aspirations, or exceeding aspirations. As we can see in figure 5, aspirations have content 
dimensions as well as levels (Bromiley, 2005: 26-31). Ranking actors thus construct the 
preliminary frames based on their own content and level of aspirations, as well as an 
assessment of the position of their peers. For example, an actor can outperform their 
peer in terms of overall performance, as defined by the templates prevalent before the 
arrival of the ranking. In the absence of other frames or templates, ranking actors are 
going to use the actual or presumed ranking position of their closest competitors as a 
point of comparison for themselves. In particular, the first preliminary ranking frame 
serves as anchor (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) for the assessment of the first and 
subsequent rankings.  
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Figure 5: Model of the preliminary ranking frame 
 
In the case of figure 5, while the actor has slightly higher aspirations than the 
peer, both the actor and the peer are on a performance level that meets their 
expectations. Since both perform within their aspirations, that situation will not trigger 
attempts to change performance or aspiration levels. However, discrepancies between 
actors and peers in terms of their performance and aspirations can become evident in the 
different aspiration dimensions. On criterion 1, actor and peer both perform on a par, 
while performing within their aspirations. However, on criterion 2, the actor 
outperforms the peer considerably, while at the same time exceeding its own 
expectations. On dimension 3, the peer outperforms the actor, but both perform below 
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their aspiration levels. In the following, I will explain how this kind of situation 
contributes to the building of ranking frames.  
3 Ranking frames 
The aspiration levels are put to the test once the ranking enters the field and 
ranking actors can see the results of the processing of the ranking algorithm, i.e. the 
ranking criteria and weightings that transform data inputs into the ranking matrix. 
Assuming that all ranking actors have a discrepancy between actual and aspired 
performance on at least one criterion, they will use the information from the ranking to 
contrast that discrepancy, compare their performance with the presumed aspired and 
actual performance of competitors or peers, and strategise ways of closing those gaps. 
All ranking actors thus have their own set of gaps. As ranking actors cannot know the 
precise aspirations of their peers, they have to use other existing templates, and what 
they presume to be the ranking template that the peer is using, to create an 
understanding of the ranking frames of the competitor. Given the vague nature of 
performances and aspirations, ranking actors thus have considerable leeway in 
producing their ranking frames. However, in order to maintain legitimacy, ranking 
actors take into account existing templates as well as ranking templates for the 
construction of their frames. Therefore, through the production of ranking templates, the 
ranking agent sets the boundaries inside which ranking actors can construct their 
ranking frames.  
Ranking frames are based on “mental templates that individuals impose on an 
information environment to give it form and meaning” (Walsh, 1995: 281), i.e. the 
cognitive models that ranking actors are using to assess the ranking field. Through 
ranking frames, organisations ‘see’ their past and current performance. That assessment 
is inextricably linked to the building of a strategy, a plan or a set of goals with respect to 
the aspired performance. Ranking frames are used for “developing subjective 
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representations of the environment that, in turn, drive strategic decisions and subsequent 
firm action” (Nadkarni & Barr, 2008: 1395). They are thus tools for strategising, 
defined by Jarzabkowski, Balogun and Seidl as the “doing of strategy” (2007:8), i.e. the 
processes through which praxis, practices and practitioners jointly form the strategy of 
an organisation. Therefore, I propose that the ranking field is the place where ranking 
actors use ranking frames to strategise what they see and aspire to see as “the ranking” 
based on the templates from ranking agents and other templates from ranking 
stakeholders (see figure 1 in chapter I). This assumes that ranking actors are boundedly 
rational, i.e. they do not know what competitors are doing exactly, but have an idea of 
the actions of other actors. It also assumes that all ranking actors are trying to improve 
their rank. Accordingly, the ranking frame is defined as the notion of ranking actors 
about their actual and aspired ranking performance and a strategy to align the two, 
given their past performances and aspirations, ranking and other templates, as well as 
the current and past performances and aspirations of their competitors. 
 
The concept of the ranking frame builds on the ideas of Goffman (1974) and 
Daft and Weick (1984) who defined frames as guides to interpretation that shape how 
actors understand their environment. In particular, they underlined the importance of 
cognitive and symbolic structures in the assessment of organisational realities. 
Emphasising the role of organisational actors in the use and construction of frames, 
Benford and Snow define framing as “an active processual phenomenon that implies 
agency and contention at the level of reality construction” (2000: 613). Kaplan shows 
how individual actors try to impose their cognitive frames onto their organisation’s 
predominant collective frames through framing contests (2008). She proposes that 
“frames shape how actors recognize what is going on” [and] “engage in framing 
activities in an attempt to mobilize others around a particular point of view” (2008: 
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730). Kaplan’s concept of the frame and framing contests are useful for emphasising the 
microfoundations of the competitive creation of frames between individual 
organisational actors. For the purpose of this thesis, I will not investigate the 
contestation of frames between individual actors in an organisation, but how ranking 
actors as organisations form ranking frames using ranking templates, other templates, 
their own set of performances and aspirations,  and the ones of their competitors.  
For conceptual clarity, I will now contrast the concept of the ranking frame with 
the notions of the archetype, template and institutional logics. Ranking frames are 
similar to archetypes because they are sets of structures and systems that reflect an 
interpretive scheme that is composed of ideas, beliefs and values (Greenwood & 
Hinings, 1993). Given that different archetypes co-exist within a field, change is not 
holistic, but differs on the basis of the impacted levels, i.e. systems, structures or 
interpretive schemes (Liguori, 2012). Incremental change takes place along the lines of 
an existing archetype, whereas radical change occurs when a shift in both structures, 
systems and interpretive schemes from an existing archetype to a new one takes place 
(Greenwood & Hinings, 1996). Hence, ranking frames are different from the concept of 
the archetype as well as the one of templates of organising (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; 
Greenwood & Hinings, 1996; Wedlin, 2006, 2007), because they account for an 
interaction of actor and field-level dynamics. They are thus not a single interpretative 
scheme that is prevalent in the organisational environment (usually two in the literature 
on archetypes), but a set of notions that ranking actors hold and act upon, given the field 
conditions they are facing. Therefore, this concept bridges meso and macro-level 
explanations between actors and fields, and differs from the macro-level concept of 
institutional logics that represent “symbolic systems, ways of ordering reality, and 
thereby rendering experience of time and space meaningful” that actors draw from their 
social environment to trigger change (Friedland & Alford, 1991: 243).  
70 
 
 
I will now explain how ranking frames both represent and shape the cognitive 
and strategic view that ranking actors hold of the ranking field. Ranking actors segment 
ranking fields in four ways. Horizontal segmentation is the segmentation of the ranking 
field into the overall ranking outcome as well as the ranking criteria. Vertical 
segmentation takes place between ranking actors, who are segmented according to their 
ranking performance. This includes segmentation into published and non-published 
parts of the ranking, as well as segmentation between ranking actors that are part of the 
ranking field, and those that are not. In addition, peer clusters emerge around the 
interaction of ranking pressures with the historical, geographical or sector-specific 
relationships of the ranking actors. As explained beforehand, the cognitive and strategic 
notions that ranking actors hold about the ranking field build on the existence of other 
templates.  
 
Horizontal segments. As rankings are the result of an aggregation of multiple 
performance measures, a horizontal segmentation of the ranking field takes place on the 
criteria that make up the ranking. If these criteria are published, sub-rankings that rank 
ranking actors on the criteria emerge besides the overall ranking. This is consequential 
for the ranking actors, as most will perform highly on some criteria, while 
underperforming on others, as chapter VII will show. Therefore, depending on ranking 
performance and the technical and legitimacy pressures on the ranking actors a priori 
independent of the ranking, each ranking actor accords different importance to different 
criteria. Taking the example of the FT rankings, knowing that they cannot perform well 
in the overall ranking due to their lack of resources, some schools will place more 
importance on their value for money rank. I thus propose that, depending on their 
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ranking frame, ranking actors will focus on changing their performance on specific 
ranking criteria.    
 
 
Vertical segments. Vertical segmentation takes place between ranking actors, 
who are segmented according to their ranking performance. This distinction between 
different vertical ranking segments has important implications for the construction of 
ranking frames, as well as the behaviour of ranking actors. For example, as those “who 
best conform and perform to the ranking criteria achieve high rankings and reap 
tremendous rewards” (Gioia & Corley, 2002: 110), the first-ranked is its own category, 
and the performance of all other ranking actors is compared to them. Although the 
difference between number one and number two might be minuscule in statistical or 
substantive terms, the status and legitimacy benefits are considerably higher for the 
ranking actor leading the ranking. In this context, prestige dynamics will play an 
important role, as ranking agents need to make sure ranking results do not conflict with 
existing, universally accepted and persistent notions of social standing (see chapter II). 
For example, any business school ranking that would not give prestigious schools like 
Harvard, Wharton, Stanford or Chicago a high ranking would immediately be subject to 
criticism and scrutiny. Due to the quantitative nature of a process that ranks all 
organisations forcibly, various segments pervade the ranking field, conferring 
reputational and status advantages to ranking actors who are in the ‘top 10’, ‘top 25’ or 
‘top 50’ (Sauder, 2006; Sauder & Espeland, 2009). The difference between being 
ranked 9
th
 and 10
th
 might be as small as the difference between 10
th
 and 11
th
; however, 
this difference can have a consequence for the ranking actor (Locke, 2011). It is 
therefore likely that ranking actors that are changing ranking segments are going to 
change their ranking frame, depending on their levels and content of aspirations. I thus 
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propose that ranking actors change their ranking frame when changing ranking 
segments.  
 
 
Field boundary work. Vertical segmentation implies a differentiation between 
the ranking and non-ranking field. For the creation of a ranking, the first decision 
ranking agents have to take is on the kind of organisations to assess. This implies a 
decision on what kind of organisations are similar and dissimilar, and thus what kind of 
organisations should be included in or excluded from the ranking. For example, the FT 
rankings were created with the explicit goal of providing for a comparison of ‘global’ 
MBA programmes across North American and European business schools (Bradshaw, 
2007), whereas the BusinessWeek MBA rankings assess American and non-American 
schools separately. The FT’s decision implies that North American and European are 
similar enough for comparison, whereas the BusinessWeek’s decision implies that they 
are not. Thus, the ranking process is inherently linked to the process of the definition of 
the boundaries of fields, with rankings being an arena where organisations “participate 
in debates and struggles about what constitutes the field” (Wedlin, 2006:5). In a similar 
vein, she proposes that rankings are arenas for boundary work and field structuration 
(Wedlin, 2011). Hence, through the ranking process, rankings do give a seemingly clear 
answer to the question of which organisations form a part of the field, what confers 
legitimacy and status in the field, how field actors perform in relation to each other and 
where clusters of similarity and dissimilarity lie. Yet, Wedlin (2007) proposes that 
“isomorphic pressures are limited to those organizations that identify with the business 
school template and participate in rankings” (2007: 36). This ignores the wider impact 
that rankings have on organisations within and without the ranking field. In particular, 
segmentation extends beyond the published ranking field. Typically, to compensate for 
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unresponsive ranking actors, ranking agents include more organisations in the ranking 
process than required to publish the ranking. Yet, usually, arbitrary cut-off points are 
chosen for the published rankings, for example, ranking “the best 100” or “500” 
organisations. These cut-off points gain particular significance for ranking actors, as 
inclusion or exclusion can decide whether others will perceive them to be part of the 
ranking field, or not, with consequences for their legitimacy and status. This distinction 
is particularly important, as previous studies have assumed stable field boundaries (e.g. 
Sauder, 2008), and thus not investigated the impact of the construction and enforcement 
of field boundaries on ranking actors. I thus propose that ranking actors change their 
ranking frame when they become part of the published ranking field, or leave it.  
As can be seen in figure 6, this leaves the ranking field with four additional 
segments of ranking actors. The first one is the third quartile, which is composed of 
ranking actors who are part of the published ranking, and who are not at immediate risk 
of falling below the threshold for inclusion in the future rankings. The second is the 
fourth quartile, which is composed of ranking actors who are part of the published 
ranking and who are at risk of falling below the threshold for publication. The third is 
the first non-published quartile, which is composed of ranking actors who are not part of 
the published ranking, but who are at risk of inclusion in future published ranking 
outcomes. The last segment is the second non-published quartile, which is composed of 
ranking actors who are not part of the published ranking, and who are not at immediate 
risk of inclusion in future published ranking outcomes. The further away ranking actors 
are from the field boundaries, the less the ranking frame will feature an exclusion from 
the ranking. This effect can be compounded the longer ranking actors are part of the 
ranking (Bowman & Bastedo 2010; Sauder & Lancaster 2006). However, the closer 
ranking actors are getting to field boundaries, the more this signals to them that their 
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previous ranking frame needs adjustment. I thus propose that ranking actors change 
ranking frames when they approach segment or field boundaries. 
 
 
Peer clusters. Adding to the horizontal and vertical segmentation dimension of 
the ranking frame, the fourth way of segmenting the ranking field is into peer clusters. 
These are composed of ranking actors who are exposed to similar historical, 
geographical, sector-specific technical or legitimacy pressures. For instance, Engwall 
and Danell show how UK business schools have followed historically and 
geographically contingent paths of development (2011). A ranking will thus not 
immediately change a competitive relationship that is imbued with historical legacy. For 
example, the fact that University of Oxford and Cambridge perform 2
nd
 and 7
th
 in the 
Times Higher Education World University Rankings 2013-2014 might be less important 
to them than the fact that Oxford performs better than Cambridge, and that both 
outperform all other universities in the United Kingdom. In this case, Oxford and 
Cambridge build a ranking cluster, while being part of a bigger cluster of UK 
universities. I thus propose that clusters of ranking actors will emerge in the ranking 
field over time.  
Ranking actors assess and strategise their position based on ranking and other 
templates. However, the main reference point of the strategising activity is the position 
of peers that arises from historical, geographical or sector-specific technical or 
legitimacy pressures. For example, as can be seen in figure 6, a ranking actor is ranked 
in the top 25, just below its main peer 1 but ahead of its peer 2, who is ranked in the top 
50. Given the horizontal segmentation, the ranking frame of the actor thus suggests an 
increase in the distance to its peer 2, while surpassing peer 1 by entering the top 10. 
Strategic goals that are part of the ranking frame are represented as arrows. In terms of 
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vertical segmentation, the picture is different. On criterion 1, the ranking frame suggests 
to increase the distance to peer 1 to remain in the top 50 segment. As the ranking actor 
does not directly compete with peer 2 on criterion 1, its ranking frame does not require 
action vis-à-vis peer 2. On criterion two, the ranking frame is to maintain parity in the 
position with peer 2, while no action is suggested vis-à-vis peer 1. On criterion three, 
the strategic goal is to surpass both peer 1 and peer 2 to improve the actor’s position 
from the fourth quartile to the top 50. Ranking actors might also solely target the overall 
ranking or specific criteria. However, as the criteria and overall ranking are not 
independent of each other, this is unlikely. Here, it is important to bear in mind that a 
ranking is a relative performance measure, i.e. even when the absolute performance of a 
ranking actor increases, its ranking position might decrease. The focus on ranking 
positions is therefore relevant to the strategising exercise.  
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Figure 6: Model of the frame of a ranking field with 100 published ranking actors 
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Therefore, ranking clusters can be more meaningful to ranking actors in terms of 
their legitimacy, status and competitive position than their criteria-specific or overall 
ranking positions. Above all, regional logics of competition can affect responses of 
actors to institutional pressures (Greenwood, Diaz, Li & Lorente, 2010), and impact on 
how ranking actors respond to the pressures of a ranking. This is supported by 
McNamara, Deephouse and Luce (2003), who found that firms use groups of 
competitors as reference points and that performance differences within strategic groups 
are significantly greater than across groups. Given the nature of the competition of 
higher education institutions, cluster-specific performance differences should be, at least 
partially, explained by school-level characteristics such as geographic location, 
institutional control, operating budget, faculty or student demographics. I therefore 
propose that while overall ranking performance is becoming more homogeneous, 
differentiation is taking place on the cluster-level, resulting in increased cluster-specific 
variance.  
However, as discussed earlier, Meyer (2002) proposes that over time, 
performance measures will ‘run down’, meaning that they will “lose variability and 
hence the capacity to discriminate good from bad performance” (Meyer & Gupta, 1994: 
330). I thus propose that while this process takes place, decreasing variance will result 
in a merging of some of the clusters, leading to a decrease in the number of clusters.  
Nevertheless, Meyer and Gupta (1994) also observed that some performance 
measures ‘run down’ more quickly than others do. Specifically, Meyer (2002) discussed 
the external environment, changes in measures and consensus about performance as 
possible moderators of the degrading process. However, he did not explore the 
discretion that performance measurement actors have when responding to being 
measured, as another mechanism that can explain differential degrading. In the context 
of rankings, it is likely that ranking actors will have more discretion over some 
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performance criteria than others. I thus propose that criteria over which ranking actors 
have more discretion will wear down quicker than others do, thereby affecting the 
emergence of clusters in the ranking field. Response discretion to criteria implies that 
ranking actors have the possibility to adjust their ranking frame over time. This will be 
the focus of the following section.  
 
 
4 Ranking frame adjustment 
There are two mechanisms that play a role in how ranking actors can adjust 
ranking frames over time.  
 
Anchoring. Firstly, due to anchoring effects (Tversky & Kahnemann, 1974), i.e. 
the use of initial values as a reference point for future values, the initial ranking will be 
most consequential for ranking actors, as performance results will be assessed in 
reference to the earliest point. For example, a school that ranks very highly in the 
beginning of the ranking, yet deteriorates to a low rank over time, will be perceived 
very differently than a school that consistently ranks lowly. I thus propose that the 
initial rank of a ranking actor will have a lasting effect on its ranking frame. This is in 
line with Bastedo and Bowman (2010), who showed that first, but not second-year 
rankings had lasting effects on reputational peer assessments. However, given the short 
time frame of their study of three years, I propose that the anchoring point of ranking 
actors changes over longer periods. For example, a ranking actor that has a constantly 
high or low performance over an extended period is likely to adjust its ranking frame to 
that performance, even if it contradicts its initial anchoring point. I thus propose that 
anchoring points change over time when ranking actors show constant performance on a 
different level over an extended period. 
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Loss aversion. Secondly, prospect theory (Kahnemann & Tversky, 1979) 
suggests that deteriorations in rank or criteria performance will be more consequential 
than gains. For example, a ranking actor that falls by five ranks will be proportionally 
more scrutinised than a ranking actor that gains five ranks. This effect can be made 
more severe if the deterioration in rank removes the ranking actor from its anchoring 
point, and when the change in rank implies a change in segment. I thus propose that 
ranking actors are more likely to change their ranking frame following a fall in rank 
than a rise in rank.  
The effect of the anchoring and loss aversion mechanisms are moderated by the 
performance of competing peers, and play a role in how ranking actors deal with 
discrepancies between actual and aspired ranking performance.  
 
Adjustment of aspiration levels. Even though notions of the aspiration levels 
may be vague, a great discrepancy between the ranking and aspiration levels will trigger 
attempts by ranking actors to cognitively, and strategically, reconcile their actual and 
aspired position. Bromiley proposes that ranking actors can engage in a search that ends 
with either the achievement of the aspired performance or a change in the aspiration 
level (2005: 26-31). In the following, I will argue that ranking actors have six other 
ways of dealing with discrepancies in aspired and actual ranking performance. These 
are reinterpretation, learning, lobbying, mergers and alliances, challenge, and exit. 
 
Reinterpretation. Scheid-Cook (1992) shows how actors define and create 
institutional demands, and enact environmental pressures with a certain amount of 
discretion. She proposes that actors will comply with pressures only to the degree 
necessary to maintain organisational legitimacy. This leaves the possibility that actors 
exercise discretion in responding to ranking templates. This is also confirmed by 
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Morphew and Swanson, who note that “from a macro point of view, [ranking actors] 
have relatively little control over their rankings, whereas, from a micro perspective, 
smaller, yet important changes may be possible as a function of concentrated changed 
behaviour” (2011: 189). Given that not a single, but multiple templates of organising 
exist in a field, Brunsson (1982, 1986) proposes that actors react to inconsistent, 
contradicting and conflicting demands by saying one thing, deciding on something else 
and acting altogether differently. “Active organizational resistance”, “passive 
conformity” or “proactive manipulation” (Oliver, 1991: 145) are thus options for 
ranking actors in dealing with rankings, apart from the strategies of ceremonial 
performance and gaming that have been already been explored in detail in the literature 
(see Espeland & Sauder, 2007).  
For example, apart from the main ranking outcome, most rankings feature 
several sub-rankings. The FT ranking has one main ranking outcome, which is the 
overall placement of the MBA programme of the business school. Additionally, among 
the 22 criteria that are used to construct the ranking, there are ten that are published to 
create more specific sub-rankings: the “3 year average rank”, the “value for money 
rank”, the “career progress rank”, the “aims achieved rank”, the “placement success 
rank”, the “alumni recommend rank”, the “international mobility rank”, the 
“international experience rank”, the “FT doctoral rank” and the “FT research rank” 
(Financial Times, 2014a). An investigation of the websites of the business schools 
ranked by the FT (see chapter VI) reveals that ranking actors are using sub-rankings 
selectively, emphasising performance in some sub-rankings, and sometimes even 
omitting the overall ranking result. Even if sub-rankings are not published, ranking 
actors can create their own sub-rankings based on self-chosen categories, e.g. “best 
public school in the Northwest”. The exploitation of commensuration ambiguities 
discussed in chapter II also facilitates that process of reinterpretation. This suggests that 
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in order to deal with discrepancies in aspired and actual performance, ranking actors 
actively reinterpret the ranking and change their ranking frame, i.e. how they ‘see’ the 
ranking. 
 
Learning. The performance measurement literature has discussed performance 
measures like ratings (Bowker & Star, 2000; Gormley & Weimer, 1999); financial and 
efficiency measures (Meyer & Gupta, 1994; Meyer, 2002), organisational performance 
measures (Neely, 1998, 2005), accounting and cost measures (Christensen & Demski, 
2003) with a specific focus on the Balanced Scorecard (Kaplan & Atkinson, 1998; 
Kaplan & Norton, 2001) and audit technologies (Power, 1997). Although rankings have 
been an emerging topic of study in various literatures of organisation theory in recent 
years (e.g. Espeland & Sauder, 2007; Martins, 2005; Rindova, Williamson, Petkova & 
Sever, 2005; Sauder, 2008; Sauder & Espeland, 2009), they are a case of a compilation 
of performance measures that so far have been largely ignored by the performance 
measurement literature. This is surprising, as rankings stem from a rich and emerging 
empirical context in a variety of social fields (Sauder, 2008; Wedlin, 2006). The 
performance literature proposes learning as the main mechanism through which 
organisations can respond to performance measures (Meyer & Gupta, 1994; Meyer, 
2002). In the following, I will give examples of how ranking actors change their 
ranking frame through learning mechanisms. 
Ranking actors can respond to ranking results with “positive learning” (Meyer, 
2002). For example, as rankings gain prominence, business schools are becoming more 
aware of the importance of quality education and research. As rankings are assumed to 
reflect actual quality, business schools try to improve the quality of their teaching and 
research to achieve a better overall performance, which has a positive impact on 
ranking performance. This can entail a process of copying from competitors, doing 
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organisational experiments, grafting, i.e. acquisition of other organisational members, 
or searching for and noticing cues in the environment (Huber, 1991). For instance, 
business schools could copy fundraising practices from competitors, acquire star faculty 
or opportunistically learn from the failures of others.    
However, the process of learning need not necessarily be positive, but can also 
result in “perverse learning” (Meyer, 2002). For example, some business schools accept 
that ranking criteria like “Employment of graduates after three months”, “Percentage of 
faculty with Doctorate” or “International Students” are not truthful indicators of the 
quality of MBA programmes. However, as they are rewarded for performance on 
indicators rather than the underlying concept of quality, business schools will try to 
improve their performance on these measures. Business schools might thus dismiss 
experienced teaching staff without a PhD and replace them with inexperienced teaching 
staff with more research credentials; hire graduates who did not find a job within three 
months of graduating into temporary research assistance positions to increase their 
performance on the employment criterion; or admit less qualified international students 
over more qualified national students (see also Sauder & Espeland, 2009).  
Learning outcomes, whether positive or perverse, depend on the amount of 
influence that ranking actors have on outcome measures. Ranking actors thus need to 
make a strategic choice on which criteria to improve performance. In the case of higher 
education institutions, “university administrators and faculty favour performance 
measures that reflect the quality of the educational experience in a manner that 
elucidates their own specific institutional mission(s)” (Alexander, 2000:426). 
Therefore, whether and to what extent performance measures or criteria can be changed 
depends on the internal structure of the institution, as well as conditions like the 
existence of resource conflicts or status hierarchies prevalent in the ranking field (see 
chapter II). For example, while teaching more female students should not require 
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changes in the structure of a school, recruiting female students might be more difficult, 
as most applicants to MBA programmes are still male (Graduate Management 
Admission Council, 2013). Ranking actors are thus likely to work on changing the parts 
of the ranking frame over which they have more control; meaning that a change in the 
criterion is more likely to deliver an increase in rank with a relatively low associated 
cost and risk.  
 
Lobbying. Another way of changing the ranking frame indirectly is by changing 
the basis on which it is constructed. Ranking actors can lobby the ranking agent to have 
the criteria or calculation methods that favour certain ranking actors included or 
changed. This is an important issue for the ranking agent, as especially prestigious or 
high-status ranking actors have the possibility to end the collaboration with the ranking 
agent. As non-participation or withdrawal of prestigious actors signals lack of 
credibility of the ranking and the ranking agent, more prestigious ranking actors will be 
better positioned to exert pressure in that way. For example, Harvard Business School 
(HBS) refused to participate in a first version of the FT rankings in 1998. A business 
school ranking that does not place Harvard Business School close to the top of the 
ranking will likely lack credibility and open itself to scrutiny. The reaction of the FT 
was to redesign the ranking in consultation with HBS, resulting in the first ranking in 
1999 (Wedlin, 2006). HBS gained the first position in both the 1999 and 2000 editions 
of the FT ranking.  
Importantly, after an initial period of change and adjustment between 1999 and 
2001, the ranking criteria of the FT ranking have barely changed, with the only 
exception of the language criterion decreasing from a 2% to a 1% weighting and the 
international experience criterion increasing from a 2% to a 3% weighting in 2012. This 
indicates that after the negotiation with important ranking actors like HBS was 
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successfully concluded, the ranking agent refrained from changing the methodology 
substantively, presumably to avoid raising questions of the legitimacy of the ranking 
process. Nevertheless, there have been numerous changes in the methodology to 
calculate the criteria. For example, the most recent change was in the calculation of the 
‘Employed After Three Months’ criterion. It changed to the percentage of the most 
recent MBA class that had found a job within three months of completing their studies, 
rather than graduation (Financial Times, 2014a). Lobbying is thus an important 
mechanism to adjust ranking frames, especially for powerful ranking actors. 
 
Mergers and alliances. A more radical way of changing the ranking frame is by 
changing the performance, aspirations and templates it is based on. Following the 
emergence of rankings comparing universities across the world, countries like Finland 
and Portugal, which have been faring below their own aspirations, have been launching 
programmes to reorganise and merge institutes of higher education (Staley, 2014). A 
particular poignant example is France. In 2011, following the country’s low 
performance in the Shanghai Jiao Tong Academic Ranking of World Universities, the 
French government started a funding programme of 7.7 billion Euros to incentivise 
universities, ‘Grandes Ecoles’ business and engineering schools, as well as research 
institutes, to merge into a ‘Sorbonne league’ to rival the American ‘Ivy league’ (Grove, 
2011).  
In addition, alliances are also a way of changing the performances, aspirations 
and frames of a ranked organisation. For instance, many Executive MBA programmes 
are the product of alliances between several business schools. For example, the five 
most highly ranked programmes in the Financial Times Executive MBA ranking 2014 
are the result of an alliance of two or more business schools, all of them across 
continents. As compared to mergers, alliances are more flexible, and can be started and 
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dissolved with comparative ease once performance ceases to match aspirations for one 
of the partners. 
 
 
Challenge. To change their ranking frame, rather than changing their 
performance or aspirations, ranking actors can challenge the ranking that exposes the 
discrepancy. These often take the form of publicised letters of high-level academics to 
ranking agencies and stakeholders, including calls to boycott rankings (Sauder, 2008). 
This strategy has the advantage of not requiring ranking actors to change aspiration 
levels or performance. However, the evidence indicates that boycotts, for example of 
the American USNWR law school rankings (Sauder, 2008), the Canadian MacLean 
university rankings (see Samarasekera, 2007) or the German Handelsblatt business 
research rankings (Storbeck, 2012), have largely been unsuccessful.  
Another way of challenging a ranking is by organising the publication of a 
competing ranking. For example, the French Ecoles de Mines Paris Tech ranking, as 
well as the Russian ReitOR rankings, have been created with the support of national 
universities and governments with a view to challenging existing American and British-
based rankings (Rauhvargers, 2011). Unsurprisingly, French and Russian institutions 
rank usually considerably higher in those respective rankings.  
 
Exit. Finally, if aspiration levels do not match performance over an extended 
period, ranking actors can change their ranking frame by exiting the ranking process. 
Ranking actors can then choose to build a ranking frame based on templates from other 
rankings, or other measurement devices. For example, as business schools are ranked, 
but perform poorly, they are becoming increasingly scrutinised for their poor 
performance, and eventually drop out of the first 100 ranked schools. As participation in 
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the FT rankings is voluntary, poor performers can opt out of the ranking process, citing 
methodological or ethical issues as cause of their decision. However, not all rankings 
require data from the ranking actors. An example for this are the Shanghai Jiao Tong 
Academic Ranking of World Universities, which only relies on publicly available - 
mainly bibliometric - data.  
 
In conclusion, as I have illustrated in this chapter, there is a need for a more 
fine-grained approach to the question of ranking impact on ranking actors. Assumptions 
about the ‘one’ ranking frame with a simple cause-effect relationship between the 
emergence of rankings and change, and homogenisation processes in organisational 
fields, have led to a one-dimensional conceptualisation of the impact of rankings on 
organisations. In particular, this chapter has sought to build the understanding of the 
collaborative nature of the construction of ranking frames between ranking actors, 
agents and stakeholders. I have introduced the concept of the ranking frame that 
explains the cognitive bases on which ranking actors strategically respond to ranking 
templates produced by ranking agents. This concept contrasts the previous literature that 
has conceptualised ranking actors as those whose agency is either limited to gaming or 
conforming to ranking templates produced by ranking actors. Rather, the concept of the 
ranking frame sheds light on the differential impact of rankings on ranking field actors 
through horizontal and vertical segments, as well as clusters, in the ranking field. In 
addition, I have introduced reinterpretation, learning, lobbying, mergers and alliances, 
challenge, and exit as the mechanisms through which ranking actors can deal with 
discrepancies between actual and aspired performance.  
As I will show in chapters VII through IX, the concept of the ranking frame is 
particularly useful to assess the effects of rankings on ranking actors, and the dynamics 
between ranking actors and agents. In particular, I will give a detailed description of the 
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vertical and horizontal segments, as well as the clusters of the FT Global MBA ranking 
field. In order to elucidate the dynamics in the ranking field, I will analyse the 
development of the ranking using the example of three different ranking actors with 
different ranking trajectories. Based on this analysis, I will conduct a cluster analysis 
and give a detailed explanation of the compilation, structure and development of the 
resulting clusters. The definitions of the ranking, ranking actors, agents, stakeholders 
and the ranking field proposed in table 1 (see Chapter I) will be particularly relevant to 
these chapters, as will be the definition of ranking frames, as the notions of ranking 
actors about their actual and aspired ranking performance and a strategy to align the 
two. 
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IV DATA SETS 
 
 
In this chapter, I will introduce the empirical context of the study. In particular, I 
will discuss the data issues of earlier studies, and the consequent choice of the data set 
for this study. I will then give a detailed description of the Financial Times Global 
MBA rankings.  
 
 
1 Data issues of earlier studies 
As mentioned in chapter II, most of the ranking literature has almost entirely 
relied on qualitative methods to investigate the impact of rankings on organisational 
fields and actors. Notably, virtually all empirical studies of ranking impact on 
organisations and organisational fields have heavily relied on the use of small-N 
interview data, in particular of organisational actors affected by rankings, as well as 
records like organisational press releases, communication with former and future 
organisational members, newspaper articles and internal documents and memos (e.g. 
Elsbach & Kramer, 1996; Espeland & Sauder, 2007; Sauder, 2006; 2008; Sauder & 
Espeland, 2006; Sauder & Espeland, 2009; Sauder & Fine, 2008; Wedlin, 2006, 2007, 
2011). Most of the interviews have been with academics, administrators, career services 
staff, deans, prospective students and employers, in particular of European business or 
American law schools. Few studies, like Higher Education Funding Council for 
England (2008), Martins (2005) and Sauder and Lancaster (2006) have used large-N 
quantitative surveys of the perceptions of organisational members impacted by 
rankings.  
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Relying on the perceptions of organisational members or field members 
impacted by rankings is helpful for understanding how rankings have shaped the 
discursive space and consequently perceptions and identities of field members. This 
approach however ignores the possibility that rather than having a causal effect on 
ranking field actors, rankings serve as focal points of attention in organisational fields 
around which ranking frames are constructed (see chapter III). Yet, if ranking actors 
react to ranking pressures, they should do so first and foremost on the criteria published 
by the ranking agents. Ranking agents such as Bloomberg Businessweek or the FT 
publish rich data sets that include the published data on the performance criteria of 
ranking actors on dimensions such as percentage of faculty with doctorates or salary. 
Yet, few studies have used these data (for exceptions see Grewal, Dearden & Llilien, 
2008; Rindova, Williamson, Petkova & Sever, 2005) to explain the dynamics of the 
ranking process. One important limitation of these studies is however that they do not 
take into account the importance of horizontal and vertical field segments, clusters and 
boundaries. In addition, these studies only used the data published by ranking agents, 
which ignores the impact of the rankings on the entire ranking field, including non-
published ranking actors. Studies on the impact of rankings on organisations should 
thus take into account both published and non-published data on ranking actors. I will 
thus explain the choice of the data set for this study.  
 
 
2 Choice of the data set 
There were several reasons for using the FT Global MBA ranking data set. As 
explained beforehand, rankings have not equally impacted all organisational fields in 
which they emerged, and fields for post-experience goods with intermediate levels of 
informational complexity and isomorphic pressures, low to intermediate rigidity in 
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terms of status order and field structuration, and high levels of resource conflicts 
provide good conditions for the impact of rankings. Education and research are post-
experience goods. I thus chose higher education as field of investigation. Within the 
higher education field, the business school field shows an intermediate level of 
informational complexity, a relatively high rigidity in terms of status order and field 
structuration, as well as high levels of resource conflicts, thus fulfilling most of the 
conditions that favour the impact of rankings.  
The business school field has been a rich field for the investigation of rankings 
for previous studies (Devinney, Dowling & Perm-Ajchariyawong, 2008; Elsbach & 
Kramer, 1996; Gioia & Corley, 2002; Martins, 2005; Rindova, Williamson, Petkova & 
Sever, 2005; Sauder & Fine, 2008; Wedlin, 2006, 2007, 2011). I thus examined the 
available data published by ranking agents that rank business schools or business and 
management departments of universities. These included the Academic Ranking of 
World Universities, America Economia, Bloomberg Businessweek, Business Insider, 
Centrum Fur Hochschulforschung, CNN Expansion, Complete University Guide, 
Economist, EdUniversal, Financial Times, Forbes, Guardian, Handelsblatt, L’Etudiant, 
Le Figaro, Le Point, US News & World Report, Poets & Quants, Quacquarelli 
Symonds, Sunday Times and Wall Street Journal.  
I selected the ranking according to the following six criteria.  
First, an investigation of business school rankings requires taking into account 
the methodology of the ranking, making a published and transparent ranking 
methodology necessary.  
Second, an investigation of the performance of schools on ranking criteria 
requires access to data on the actual, not aggregate performance on ranking criteria.  
Third, given the previously mentioned temporal quality of the construction of 
ranking frames, an investigation requires longitudinal data.  
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Fourth, in order to explain differences in responses to rankings across national 
subfields, the ranking needs to be cross-national or cross-disciplinary in scope.  
Fifth, in order to have an impact on ranking actors, ranking actors need to be 
aware of the ranking.  
Sixth, the ranking needs to include published and non-published data to provide 
for an investigation of the whole ranking field (see chapter III), requiring access to non-
published data of the ranking agent.  
 
The various Financial Times business education rankings (Masters in 
Management, Masters in Finance, Executive MBA, Global MBA) were the only data 
sets that satisfied all criteria. The London School of Economics and Political Science 
features various business related programmes, but not a full-time MBA programme. In 
order to avoid concerns about conflicts of interest, the Financial Times was thus 
approached for access to the Financial Times Global MBA ranking data. Before I 
describe the data set to which the Financial Times granted access, I will give some 
background to the Financial Times Global MBA rankings.  
 
 
3 The Financial Times Global MBA rankings 
The FT introduced the FT Global MBA rankings as part of the introduction of a 
dedicated section on business education in 1999. Ever since then, the FT rankings have 
appeared annually. Since 2001, the FT ranks about 150 business schools from around 
the world (see chapter V), publishing a list of the 100 “best management programmes” 
(Financial Times, 2014b). After an initial phase of experimentation in 1999 and 2000, 
where the ranking methodology including criteria weighting was not published fully, 
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the ranking criteria (although not their composition and calculation, see chapter III) 
have barely changed.  
I gained access to the data of published ranking actors between 2001 and 2014, 
and the non-published ranking actors that participated in the FT MBA rankings between 
2006 and 2014. Table 2 gives an overview of the available data on each criterion. 
 
Criterion Code 
Data 
available 
Unit Definition in 2014 
Employed at 
Three 
Months 
Emp3M 
Published 
and non-
published 
Percentage 
"Percentage of the most recent graduating class who had 
found employment or accepted a job offer within three 
months of completing their studies." 
Employment 
Data 
EmpDat 
Published 
and non-
published 
Percentage 
"Percentage of the class for which the school was able to 
provide employment data, and is used to calculate the 
school’s final score in this category." 
Faculty with 
Doctorates 
FacDoc 
Published 
and non-
published 
Percentage "Percentage of full-time faculty with a doctoral degree." 
International 
Board 
IntBoa 
Published 
and non-
published 
Percentage 
"Percentage of the board whose citizenship differs from 
the country in which the school is based." 
International 
Faculty 
IntFac 
Published 
and non-
published 
Percentage 
"Calculated according to the diversity of faculty by 
citizenship and the percentage whose citizenship differs 
from their country of employment.” 
International 
Students 
IntStu 
Published 
and non-
published 
Percentage 
"Calculated according to the diversity of current MBA 
students by citizenship and the percentage whose 
citizenship differs from the country in which they 
study.” 
Women 
Board 
WomBoa 
Published 
and non-
published 
Percentage 
"Percentage of female members on the school advisory 
board. Schools with a 50:50 (male: female) composition 
receive the highest possible score." 
Women 
Faculty 
WomFac 
Published 
and non-
published 
Percentage 
"Percentage of female faculty. Schools with a 50:50 
(male: female) composition receive the highest possible 
score." 
Women 
Students 
WomStu 
Published 
and non-
published 
Percentage 
"Percentage of female students on the full-time MBA. 
Schools with a 50:50 (male: female) composition 
receive the highest possible score." 
Languages Lang 
Published 
and non-
published 
Languages 
“Number of extra languages required on completion of 
the MBA.” 
Salary 
Increase 
SlyInc 
Published 
only 
Percentage 
"Average difference in alumnus salary before the MBA 
to now. Half of this figure is calculated according to the 
absolute salary increase, and half according to the 
percentage increase relative to pre-MBA salary – the 
“salary percentage increase” figure published in the 
table." 
Table 2: FT Global MBA ranking criteria definitions between 2006 and 2014 (Source: FT website, 
accessed 30-01-2014) 
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Criterion Code 
Data 
available 
Unit Definition in 2014 
Weighted 
Salary 
SlyWgt 
Published 
only 
US$ PPP 
equivalent 
"Average alumnus salary three years after graduation, 
US$ PPP equivalent, with adjustment for variations 
between sectors. Includes data for the current year and 
the one or two preceding years where available." 
Aims 
Achieved 
AimAch 
Published 
only 
Ranks 
"The extent to which alumni fulfilled their stated goals 
or reasons for doing an MBA. Includes data for the 
current year and the one or two preceding years where 
available." 
Alumni 
Recommend 
AluRec 
Published 
only 
Ranks 
"Calculated according to selection by alumni of three 
schools from which they would recruit MBA 
graduates. Includes data for the current year and the 
one or two preceding years where available." 
Career 
Progress 
CarPro 
Published 
only 
Ranks 
"Calculated according to changes in the level of 
seniority and the size of company alumni are working 
in now, compared with before their MBA. Includes 
data for the current year and the one or two preceding 
years where available." 
FT Doctoral 
Rank  
DocRank 
Published 
only 
Ranks 
"Calculated according to the number of doctoral 
graduates from each business school during the past 
three years. Extra points are awarded if these graduates 
took up faculty positions at one of the top 50 full-time 
MBA schools of 2013." 
FT Research 
Rank 
ResRank 
Published 
only 
Ranks 
"Calculated according to the number of articles 
published by each school’s current full-time faculty 
members in 45 selected academic and practitioner 
journals between January 2011 and October 2013. The 
rank combines the absolute number of publications 
with the number weighted relative to the faculty’s 
size." 
International 
Experience 
IntExp 
Published 
only 
Ranks 
"Calculated according to whether the most recent 
graduating MBA class completed exchanges, research 
projects, study tours and company internships in 
countries other than where the school is based." 
International 
Mobility 
IntMob 
Published 
only 
Ranks 
"Calculated according to whether alumni worked in 
different countries pre-MBA, on graduation and three 
years after graduation." 
Placement 
Success 
PlaSuc 
Published 
only 
Ranks 
"Effectiveness of the school careers service in 
supporting student recruitment, as rated by their 
alumni. Includes data for the current year and the one 
or two preceding years where available." 
Value for 
Money 
ValMon 
Published 
only 
Ranks 
"Calculated using salary today, course length, fees and 
other costs, including lost income during the MBA." 
Table 2: FT Global MBA ranking criteria definitions between 2006 and 2014 (Source: FT website, 
accessed 30-01-2014) (continued) 
 
Those data have several advantages as compared to data sets used in previous 
studies. First, it includes novel data of both published ranking actors (the first 100 
ranked) and non-published ones. Second, it is longitudinal, as it features data over 
fourteen years between 2001 and 2014. Third, it is complete, as it includes published 
and non-published data on ten out of 21 criteria, for most of the years. Aggregate data, 
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which is only published in rank form, like Aims Achieved, Alumni Recommend, Career 
Progress, FT Doctoral Rank, FT Research Rank, International Experience, International 
Mobility, Placement Success and Value for Money was not requested, as ranks are not 
calculated for non-ranked ranking actors. Due to confidentiality issues, the FT did not 
share the non-published Salary Increase and Weighted Salary Data. Fourth, it includes 
real and not aggregate data. Fifth, the methodology is transparent and can be accessed 
for all years. Finally, the FT rankings have gained considerable attention in the business 
as well as academic communities as the only truly global ranking of MBA programmes 
(Dichev, 2008; Devinney, Dowling & Perm-Ajchariyawong, 2010; Free, Saltiero & 
Shearer, 2009; Wedlin, 2006, 2007, 2011), suggesting that ranking actors are aware of 
the FT ranking.  
 
Given that not all data were available for all years, criteria (specifically salary 
data) and type of ranking actors (published or non-published), I thus split the data into 
five different data sets. In table 3, the data sets are presented according to the number of 
ranking actors, whether the they include constant ranking actors in every year in order 
to control for entering and exiting actors, whether they include ranked and non-ranked 
actors, whether they include salary data, and according to how many years of 
observations it includes.  
 
Data set DS1 DS2 DS3 DS4 DS5 
Number of actors  114 200 131 62 52 
Constant actors yes no no yes yes 
Includes non-ranked yes yes no no no 
Includes salary data no no yes yes yes 
Years 2006-2014 2006-2014 2001-2014 2006-2014 2001-2014 
Table 3: Comparison of data sets 
 
As can be seen in table 3, none of the data sets is complete in the sense of the 
previously mentioned criteria. As they included a substantial number of ranking actors, 
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I retained data sets DS1, DS2 and DS3 for further analysis. While the DS2 and DS3 
data sets contain more variables and ranking actors, a comparison revealed that they are 
not fundamentally different from DS1 in terms of their probability distributions and 
measures of central tendency. Due to its relatively high number of ranked and non-
ranked actors and high number of repeat observations (t=9), I thus chose DS1 as the 
reference data set for further analysis. I will use the DS2 and DS3 data sets in order to 
triangulate results from the analysis of DS1 (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994). I am including 
some summary statistics for the 114 participating ranking actors in table 4 and 5. These 
will be analysed in detail in chapters V and VI. For an overview of the 114 schools see 
table 6. The DS2 data set consists of exactly 200 ranking actors that have participated in 
the FT MBA ranking process at least once between 2006 and 2014. For an overview of 
the 200 schools see table 7. I am including some summary statistics for the 200 
participating ranking actors of DS2 in table 8 and 9. 
 
I will now compare the DS1 and DS2 data sets in terms of their inclusion of 
ranking actors. The difference in representation of countries between the DS1 and DS2 
is marginal, i.e. 1% or less for most countries. Countries that are slightly 
underrepresented in DS1 are France (-2.2%), China (-2.2%), South Korea (-1.1%), 
Germany (-1.5%), India (-1.5%), and Portugal (-1.5%). For China, South Korea and 
India, this can be explained by the recent entry of Asian schools into the ranking 
process. France’s underrepresentation can be explained by its relatively high number of 
unsuccessful submissions. Germany and Portugal on the other hand have both entered 
the business school market as latecomers, and have a historically low number of 
internationally successful business schools, thus being underrepresented as well. 
Countries that are slightly overrepresented are the UK (2.2%) and Canada (2.3%), 
which corresponds with the preponderance of business schools from English-speaking 
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countries, and their long tradition of MBA programmes. The only country with a 
moderate overrepresentation in the DS1 data set is the US (13.5%), which can be 
explained by the overall dominance of US business schools in terms of ranking success. 
Despite being challenged in recent years in particular by European and Asian business 
schools (Collet & Vives, 2013), American schools still dominate the ranking: In 2014, 
50 US schools were ranked among the best 100. This is only a small decrease from 
2006, when 58 US schools made the FT MBA ranking, and an even smaller decrease 
from 2001, where 51 US schools achieved the same. Thus, overall, the DS1 data set 
overweighs high performing schools from English-speaking countries, and 
underweights continental European and Asian business schools. In the following 
chapter, I will use all three data sets to describe the vertical segments, horizontal 
segments and clusters of the ranking field.  
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VII RANKING FRAME ADJUSTMENT 
 
 
In this chapter, I will use three case studies of ranking actors with different 
ranking trajectories to analyse how ranking frames are adjusted over time. For this 
purpose, I will develop several indicators that will help to understand how ranking 
actors adjust ranking frames. I will triangulate the results from these analyses with 
evidence from public communication materials of ranking actors. For that purpose, I 
will also present evidence of the use of other templates and reference points that play a 
role in the adjustment of ranking frames, specifically history, geography and 
measurement devices like accreditations.  
Before presenting the empirical evidence, I will explain the theoretical 
underpinning of the case studies, provide reasons for the selection of cases, and lay out 
a structure for the analysis of each case. This includes the construction of two measures; 
the Marginal Improvement Indicator and the Ranking Frame Indicator.  
I am choosing the approach of an instrumental case study (Stake, 1978), using 
three business schools as well as two clusters of schools that participated in the FT 
MBA ranking between 2001 and 2014. These cases will serve to shed light on the 
impact of rankings on organisations. The use of case studies has a long-standing 
tradition in the organisational literature (Eisenhardt, 1989, 1991; Gibbert, Ruigrok, & 
Wicki, 2008). Case study research involves both the in-depth investigation of single 
cases on several levels of analysis, as well as the exploration and comparison of several 
cases (Yin, 1981, 1984). Case studies usually use multiple sources of evidence and data 
triangulation (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994), as well as both qualitative and quantitative data 
(Yin, 1994). Here, Stake (1995) points out that focusing on the comparison of cases can 
lead to a loss of complexity. Thus, I aim to provide a rich set of descriptions (Kidder, 
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1982) to construct individual meaning and generalise beyond the selected cases by 
comparing the outcomes of the single case studies (Firestone, 1993). 
 
 
1 Selection of cases 
The single cases were chosen according to three criteria. First, as the aim of the 
case study is the longitudinal exploration of a particular case, the data set was examined 
for cases in the DS2 data set in the period from 2001 to 2014. Second, the data set was 
examined for clear patterns of rises and falls in ranks, with an emphasis on identifying 
cases that show a fairly linear ranking trend, as well as cases that show changes in 
trends. Third, given that there is a preponderance of ranking actors from North 
American, Europe and Asia, one ranking actor from each continent was chosen. These 
cases are also complementary, as the decline in rank of American and European and in 
particular UK schools is mirrored by a rise in rank of Asian schools. The shortlisted 
cases were CEIBS, Chinese University of Hong Kong Business School, Indian Institute 
of Management Ahmedabad, University of Edinburgh Business School, Manchester 
Business School, Warwick Business School, Judge Business School, Said Business 
School, Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth College, Western University Ivey 
Business School and Cox School of Business. Based on availability of relevant data on 
rankings from the school websites, I further narrowed the cases down to three ranking 
actors. Thus, CEIBS, University of Edinburg Business School (hereafter: UEBS) and 
Western University Ivey Business School (hereafter: WUIBS) were retained for the case 
studies.  
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3 Case study I – CEIBS  
 
Background. Founded in 1994 in Shanghai, China, under an agreement between 
the Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China and the European 
Commission as the China Europe International Business School, CEIBS’s mission is to 
“educate responsible leaders versed in ‘China Depth, Global Breadth’ (CEIBS, 2014a). 
In 2014, CEIBS had 62 full-time faculty and claimed to be “the first business school in 
mainland China that offers a full-time MBA, an Executive MBA and a wide array of 
executive education programmes” (CEIBS, 2014a). CEIBS’s 18-months full-time MBA 
programme had a class intake of 192 students from 21 countries in 2013, of which 35% 
were overseas students (CEIBS, 2014a). This international dimension is emphasised by 
the school, which claims that this makes CEIBS “the most diverse group of any 
business school in Mainland China” (CEIBS, 2014a). This is also reflected in the choice 
of international partners. CEIBS offers an exchange programme with partners such as 
Schulich School of Business (Canada), HK-UST and CUHK (both Hong Kong), HEC 
and INSEAD (both France), Indian School of Business (India), SDA Bocconi (Italy), 
ESADE and IESE (both Spain), Rotterdam School of Management (Netherlands), LBS 
and MBS (both UK), as well as Haas, Anderson, Darden, Cox, Fuqua, Johnson, Kellog, 
Stern, McCombs, Ross, Tuck and Wharton (all USA) (CEIBS, 2014b). All of these 
partners also participate in the FT rankings, usually exhibiting mid to high-level ranking 
performance.  
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Ranking communication. CEIBS has a dedicated ‘Rankings and accreditations’ 
page, which it introduces by taking China, Asia and the world as reference points, 
pointing out that it is “the first Asia-based business school that has achieved top-tier 
global rankings” and “the leading international business school in Asia” (CEIBS, 
2014c). Furthermore, the school claims that it is “the first Asia-based business school 
that has achieved top-tier global rankings for its MBA, EMBA and Executive Education 
programmes, and is the first business school in mainland China that has earned an 
internationally recognized EQUIS accreditation” (CEIBS, 2014c). 
In the section “Top-tier global rankings” the school changes its emphasis to a 
temporal focus, pointing to the recent establishment of the school. It then claims that it 
is “the only Asian business school to have achieved global ranking”, whereas it had 
only claimed to be “the first” to achieve that in the previous paragraph (CEIBS, 2014c). 
It then takes the FT MBA top 25 schools as a reference point, suggesting that it sees 
itself as competing in the top segment of the ranking, and points to the stability in its 
ranking “for 10 consecutive years”: 
 “CEIBS is the only Asian business school to have achieved global (sic!) 
ranking for its MBA, EMBA and Executive Education programmes. 
Despite its young age of just 20 years, the CEIBS MBA Programme has 
ranked within the Top 25 by the Financial Times’ annual global business 
school survey for 10 consecutive years (2005-2014). The EMBA 
Programme is ranked #7 (2012).” (CEIBS, 2014c; emphasis added) 
 
CEIBS then goes on to display its performance on the Bloomberg Businessweek 
China, Forbes China, Forbes Magazine, Ed Universal, Quacquarelli Symmonds, and 
Poets & Quants rankings, but mainly the various rankings of the FT, and specifically the 
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MBA ranking. In terms of accreditations, CEIBS specifically mentions its AACSB and 
EQUIS (see chapter II) accreditations (CEIBS, 2014c). 
 
Ranking performance. As we can see in figure 43, CEIBS’s ranking 
performance is marked by a strong upwards tendency. Between 2002 and 2014, CEIBS 
gains 75 ranks. This tendency is however not linear. Most of the increase is achieved 
from 2002 to 2005, where the ranking increases from 92
nd
 to 22
nd
 place. While the 
highest ever ranking is reached in 2009 (8
th
), a sharp fall to 22
nd
 place follows after that. 
This is followed by another fall to 24
th
 in 2012. Only in 2013, this tendency is partially 
reversed, with another increase in rank by nine positions to 15
th
. 
 
 
Figure 43: CEIBS – Ranking performance 2002-2014 
 
Marginal Improvement Indicators. As we can see in table 14, CEIBS shows a 
comparatively low marginal performance improvement (red cells) in many indicators in 
most of the years, with a considerable amount of strong marginal performance 
deteriorations, for example in the 2004-05 period (IntFac=-16; WomFac=-7), 2002-03 
(FacDoc=-17), 2008-09 (Emp3M=-8; IntFac=-7). Many of these deteriorations are 
made up for in the year following the fall, suggesting that a fall in criterion performance 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Rank 92 90 53 22 21 11 11 8 22 17 24 15 17
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100
Ranking performance CEIBS 
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triggers strategic activity to make up for previous shortcomings. Notable exceptions are 
the 2005-06 and 2010-11 period, where seven indicators show a marginal performance 
improvement. Overall, CEIBS has more positive than negative MMIs on only three 
criteria: FacDoc, IntStu and SlyInc, suggesting that a school can increase its rank 
considerably by focusing on only a small range of criteria. Most of the quick increase in 
the ranking position is however explained through the high marginal performance 
improvement on SlyWgt of more than 30,000$ for three periods in a row between 2003 
and 2005. Some of this improvement is however again lost in 2005 in terms of SlyInc, 
as well as during the years 2009 until 2012 in terms of SlyWgt, in particular in 2010. As 
these two criteria count for 40% of all performance criteria in the ranking, this drop 
largely explains the sudden fall from 8
th
 to 22
nd
 in ranking position between 2009 and 
2010. Only when the marginal performance improvement is reversed in 2013, mainly in 
terms of IntFac, SlyWgt and SlyInc, the fall in rank is partially reversed, with CEIBS 
rising again to 15
th
. The high coefficients of variation (hereafter: CV) for IntStu (0.48 as 
compared to field CV of 0.07) and SlyWgt (0.38 as compared to 0.08) suggest that 
international and salary criteria have seen most of the strategic changes in the period in 
question in comparison to the field. However, despite the steep increase in rank, it is 
interesting to note that CEIBS actually has a preponderance of negative MIIs on most 
criteria over all periods. Only IntStu, FacDoc and SlyInc show more positive than 
negative MIIs. This indicates that, despite falling behind on most indicators in most 
periods, ranking actors can still increase their rank through a ranking frame that focuses 
on strong improvements on specific criteria and periods.  
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MII CEIBS 02-03 03-04 04-05 05-06 06-07 07-08 08-09 09-10 10-11 11-12 12-13 13-14 
Empl3M 8 -2 -2 4 -10 -9 2 -8 14 -2 2 -1 
IntFac -4 1 -16 8 4 -4 2 -7 1 -4 6 -2 
IntBoa -11 -2 1 -1 2 -4 0 -1 -4 2 -2 0 
IntStu 13 -5 7 -2 10 3 3 2 4 0 -3 -7 
WomBoa -1 -1 -1 -2 0 0 -1 1 6 0 0 0 
WomFac 1 5 -7 -3 -2 1 2 2 -2 0 -2 -2 
WomStu -4 1 -3 4 -7 5 -5 3 4 -7 0 11 
FacDoc -17 13 1 2 0 1 1 0 2 0 -2 0 
SlyWgt -4580 31409 36673 34797 5652 4166 -5475 -23829 -3476 -2735 3744 -473 
SlyInc 17 29 10 -23 10 -1 26 -43 22 -14 13 5 
Table 14: CEIBS – Change of criterion performance year-to-year, controlling for field changes (negative 
values in red, positive values in green) 
 
The performance of CEIBS and the field on each ranking criterion can be found 
in tables 15 and 16. 
 
CEIBS 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Emp3M 100 96 96 99 97 99 92 
EmpDat n/a n/a n/a n/a 88 92 87 
IntFac 71 69 71 54 64 68 65 
IntBoa 60 50 50 50 50 50 50 
IntStu 2 14 11 19 19 29 32 
WomBoa 0 10 10 10 10 10 10 
WomFac 12 13 18 12 9 8 9 
WomStu 39 33 33 30 36 30 35 
FacDoc 94 76 88 92 94 95 95 
Lang 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
SlyWgt 35,048 31,184 61,556 98,912 135,562 146,410 154,144 
SlyInc 160 177 194 191 154 159 157 
 
Year 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Mean CV 
Emp3M 92 75 92 94 95 93 94 0.07 
EmpDat 94 84 95 99 100 99 93 0.06 
IntFac 69 63 65 63 70 68 66 0.07 
IntBoa 50 50 50 50 50 50 51 0.05 
IntStu 37 37 42 43 42 34 28 0.48 
WomBoa 10 10 17 17 17 17 12 0.28 
WomFac 12 15 13 13 12 11 12 0.22 
WomStu 31 33 37 30 33 43 34 0.11 
FacDoc 96 96 96 98 98 98 94 0.06 
Lang 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.69 
SlyWgt 151,641 127,688 126,315 123,058 131,362 127,117 111,538 0.38 
SlyInc 179 133 155 150 157 156 163 0.10 
Table 15: CEIBS – Performance on all criteria 
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 Ranking Frame Indicator. As we can see in table 17, between 2003 and 2014, 
the RFI is positive and particularly high for IntStu (from 2% to 34% between 2002 and 
2014; see table 15), SlyWgt (from 35,048$ to 127,117$) and SlyInc (from 160% to 
156%). As the RFI takes into account the relative performance of the field, the RFI for 
SlyInc is positive and high despite a decrease in performance. As the ranking field 
average decreases from 144 to 98 for SlyInc (see table 16), a decline of only 4 points 
over 13 years shows the strategic emphasis that CEIBS has put on maintaining 
performance on this criterion relative to the ranking field. Contrastingly, WomFac (0 to 
17 between 2002 and 2014, IntBoa (60 to 50) and IntFac (71 to 68) have a negative RFI, 
falling behind as compared to the rising averages of the ranking field. This suggests that 
CEIBS’s ranking frame puts little strategic emphasis on changing the gender and 
international composition of its faculty or board. 
 
RFI CEIBS 03-05 05-09 09-14 03-14 
IntStu 757 66 -12 1157 
SlyWgt 181 40 -18 216 
SlyInc 35 7 -9 32 
WomBoa -29 -29 69 11 
WomStu -17 -9 36 5 
FacDoc -4 4 0 1 
Empl3M 5 -14 5 -4 
IntFac -27 19 -8 -21 
IntBoa -20 -7 -9 -34 
WomFac -9 -19 -23 -52 
Table 17: CEIBS – Ranking Frame Indicator over different periods 
 
 As we have seen in figure 43 above, however, the development of the ranking 
performance of CEIBS is not linear. I thus calculated different RFIs for the three 
periods of increase in rank (2002-2005), slight increase (2005-2009), and slight 
decrease (2009-2014). As we can see in table 17, the ranking frame has changed 
between periods following a change in ranking performance. While IntStu and SlyWgt 
show the highest score between 2003 and 2005 (757 and 181), these scores are 
considerably reduced in the period from 2005 to 2009, and turn negative in 2009 
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between 2014 (-12 and -18). In the latter period, criteria like WomBoa and WomStu 
that had been negative previously (-29 and -17; -29 and -9) turn positive in the two 
following periods (69 and 36). This suggests that a strong change in rank can serve as 
input for a decision to change focus on specific criteria in specific periods.  
 
 Conclusion. The criteria investigated in this study measure performance on 
mainly five dimensions: Employment (Emp3M), salary (SlyWgt, SlyInc), 
internationality (IntFac, IntBoa, IntStu, Lang), gender (WomBoa, WomFac, WomStu), 
and research (FacDoc). CEIBS has gone through a period of strategic change, with a 
ranking frame that suggests strong strategic emphasis on increasing salary-related 
performance in the first period, as well as on number of international students. As the 
ranking frame changes, a somewhat weaker emphasis on these criteria in the second 
period correlates with a slowing rise in ranking performance, while the decline on the 
same criteria in the last period coincides with a decline in ranking performance. Given 
this decline, an apparent shift in the ranking frame from salary-related criteria and 
international students to gender-related criteria (WomBoa and WomStu) ensues.  
 This could be the outcome of a strategic decision to focus on diversity criteria, 
or a reflection of the fact that improvement on salary criteria will be increasingly 
difficult to achieve for the school, given internal and external constraints. At the same 
time, the international faculty and board membership criteria remain negative 
throughout most periods. This suggests that CEIBS is relying on changing its input and 
output of students, rather than its internal structures in terms faculty and board 
membership, despite its stated mission of “becoming the most respected international 
business school by linking East and West in teaching, research, and business practice” 
(CEIBS, 2014a). The same counts for the percentage of female faculty, which remains 
negative in RFI throughout all periods.  
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 To summarise, CEIBS has shown a clear emphasis on the FT MBA rankings in 
its communication, which is supported by its change of ranking frames and its use of 
several temporal, segmental and geographical reference points, as well as the fact that 
most of its international partners are high performers in the same ranking. It is thus 
reasonable to conclude that CEIBS has not only reacted to the rankings by changing its 
ranking frames in dealing with FT MBA rankings, but that these ranking frames have 
played a central role in the strategic decision making of the school. 
 
 
4 Case study II – University of Edinburgh Business School  
 
Background. Founded in 1918 as part of the University of Edinburgh, Scotland, 
the University of Edinburgh Business School (hereafter: UEBS) has “an international 
student body typically representing more than 88 countries” (UEBS, 2014a). In 2014, 
UEBS had 99 full-time faculty, representing 26 different nationalities, of which 50% 
were from outside the UK (UEBS, 2014a). UEBS’s full-time MBA takes 12 months, 
and had a cohort of 39 students, representing 21 countries in 2014 (UEBS, 2014a). It 
also offers a 16-months option including an exchange with partners like Aalto (Finland), 
EADA (Spain), ESSEC (France), Fuqua (USA), IPADE (México), Kellogg (USA), 
Macquarie (Australia) and Schulich (Canada) (UEBS, 2014b), all of which have 
participated in the FT rankings as well, most of them displaying relatively low ranking 
performance.  
 
Ranking communication. UEBS has a dedicated ‘Accreditations and rankings’ 
page (UEBS, 2014c), which it introduces however solely by a reference to its reputation 
and achieved accreditations, stating that (emphasis in bold added by the author): 
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“The University of Edinburgh Business School is one of the most respected 
in the world. Our programmes are among the most highly sought after. 
Our reputation is given further substance by our accreditation from a 
wide range of leading business education organisations and professional 
bodies.” (UEBS, 2014c; emphasis added) 
 
The school then mentions its various accreditations like AACSB, EQUIS and 
AMBA. The ranking subsection of the page is introduced by stating that “The Business 
School and its programmes feature highly in the leading rankings and league tables” 
(UEBS, 2014c). It specifically mentions UEBS’s 100th spot in the Economist full-time 
MBA ranking 2013 and its performance in the FT MSc in Management and MSc in 
Finance rankings, but not the FT MBA or EMBA rankings (UEBS, 2014c).  
 
Ranking performance. As we can see in figure 44, UEBS starts being ranked in 
the 50
th
 position in 2001. However, the school quickly drops in ranking to 93
rd
 place in 
2004. In 2005, the position is maintained, followed by an increase in position that even 
surpasses the initial position by six places, resulting in a rank of 44 in 2008. This is 
followed by another sharp fall in rank to 92 in 2009, after which the school still 
manages to improve by nine ranks in 2012 (83
rd
). After that, the school drops off the 
ranking in 2013 and 2014 (indicated as rank 120). 
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Figure 44: UEBS – Ranking performance 2001-2014 (non-ranked coded as 120) 
 
 Marginal Improvement Indicator. As we can see in table 18, there are more 
negative than positive MIIs in most periods. Only in the periods of 2006-2008, 2009-
2011 and 2013-2014 more criteria show improvement than those that do not. These 
periods of improvement only translate into higher rankings between 2006 and 2008, 
while the other years show a fall in ranking despite the rising MII.  
 
 
MII 
UEBS 
01-02 02-03 03-04 04-05 05-06 06-07 07-08 08-09 09-10 10-11 11-12 12-13 13-14 
Empl3M 0 14 -13 -6 10 -24 16 3 4 -6 -6 8 1 
IntFac n/a -1 5 7 1 -1 1 -8 -1 3 1 7 3 
IntBoa n/a -1 -2 -22 5 2 3 0 1 -21 8 -2 13 
IntStu n/a 5 -4 -3 1 12 -8 1 4 10 -1 -13 -2 
WomBoa n/a -1 -1 -8 5 0 5 9 -6 8 -11 0 0 
WomFac n/a 1 -1 0 4 -2 5 -2 4 1 0 -1 -1 
WomStu n/a 1 4 -3 -14 20 -3 -9 1 7 12 -21 12 
FacDoc n/a 18 -13 -3 3 -2 7 0 -6 7 -4 -7 5 
Lang n/a 1 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SlyWgt -2885 -7510 -6828 1959 6885 9335 2082 -9044 -3504 1709 -3813 n/a n/a 
SlyInc 0 -18 -6 -1 29 8 1 -18 1 -9 -10 n/a n/a 
Table 18: UEBS – Change of criterion performance year-to-year, controlling for field changes (negative 
values in red, positive values in green) 
 
In a characteristic pattern, several MIIs show high values for particular periods, 
followed by a deterioration in MII the next year, for example 2002-2004 (Empl3M: 14 
and -13; FacDoc: 18 and -13), 2006-2008 (IntStu: 12 and -8), 2011-2013 (WomStu: 12 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Rank 50 77 73 93 93 82 54 44 92 89 88 83 120 120
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and -21). This suggests that UEBS has made an effort in improving on certain criteria, 
but the resulting marginal improvements are not sustainable. Contrastingly, periods of 
large negative marginal performance improvements are not usually met with 
corresponding improvements in the following periods, even when changes are positive, 
for example in 2002-2004 (SlyWgt: -7,510 and -6,828), 2004-2007 (IntBoa: -22 and 5 
and 2), 2008-2010 (SlyWgt: -9,044 and -3,504 and 1,709) and 2013-2014 (IntStu: -13 
and -2; WomStu: -21 and 12). However, overall, more criteria show marginal 
performance improvements than those that do not. Only FacDoc, Lang, SlyWgt and 
SlyInc have more negative than positive periods. This is an interesting observation, 
because it indicates that despite improving on each criterion as compared to the field in 
most periods, a ranking actor can still heavily decline in rank over time. Table 19 shows 
the performance of UEBS on all criteria.  
 
 
Ranking Frame Indicator. As we can see in table 20, the RFI reveals an 
emphasis on improving the IntFac (69), WomFac (44) and WomStu (25) criteria 
between 2002 and 2014, while it is negative for the SlyWgt, SlyInc and IntBoa criteria.  
 
RFI 2002-2005 2005-2008 2008-2012 2012-2014 2002-2014* 
IntFac 43 3 -10 23 69 
WomFac 0 34 13 -5 44 
WomStu 5 11 37 -22 25 
FacDoc 2 10 -4 -2 5 
Empl3M -4 2 -6 11 1 
WomBoa -40 57 -1 0 1 
IntStu -2 5 16 -15 0 
SlyWgt -15 23 -14 n/a -10 
SlyInc -23 49 -37 n/a -21 
IntBoa -50 36 -31 36 -33 
Table 20: UEBS – Ranking Frame Indicator over different periods  
*2002-2012 for salary criteria 
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This reflects the lack of emphasis on salary criteria in the ranking frame. The 
picture is however different for different periods. Between 2002 and 2005, mainly board 
indicators (WomBoa: -40; IntBoa: -50) as well as salary indicators (SlyWgt: -15; 
SlyInc: -23) are negative, while the ranking frame has an emphasis on international 
faculty (IntFac: 43). This leads to a fall in ranking position. In the 2005 to 2008 period, 
all criteria are positive, with WomBoa (57), SlyInc (49), IntBoa (36), WomFac (34) and 
SlyWgt (23) showing the highest increases, suggesting that the low performance on 
these criteria was strategically addressed by changing the ranking frame, resulting in a 
rise in ranking position. These gains are however lost in the following period, with all 
criteria except for WomStu (37), IntStu (16), and WomFac (13) showing negative RFIs, 
suggesting that the school attempted to address some of its gender related performance 
issues, as well as the number of international students between 2008 and 2012. The 
latter efforts are also carried into the next period between 2012 and 2014 (IntBoa: 36 
and IntFac: 23). However, UEBS deemphasised gender related indicators between 2012 
and 2014 (WomFac: -5; WomStu: -22 and WomBoa: 0), while it incorporated the 
expansion of international faculty (IntFac: 23) and board (IntBoa: 36), as well as 
employment (Emp3M: 11) into its ranking frame.  
 
Conclusion. UEBS has gone from being ranked in the top 50 of the FT MBA 
rankings to dropping off the rankings in 2013 and 2014. This development is largely 
due to a deterioration in salary related criteria and international board membership, 
despite a strong expansion of international faculty. It is apparent from the data that 
UEBS has changed its ranking frame to counter this fall, which led to a considerable 
improvement in ranking position between 2005 and 2008. The fact that most of the 
marginal improvements in terms of criteria were mirrored by a deterioration in the 
following periods indicates that changes were not sustainable. The frequent adjustments 
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in ranking frame, emphasising IntFac between 2002 and 2005, salary and gender-related 
indicators between 2005 and 2008 as well as international indicators between 2012 and 
2014 suggest that UEBS’s strategy vis-à-vis the ranking is fluctuating. Despite a 
marginal improvement on many criteria in most periods, the lack of focus on the most 
relevant ranking criteria contributes to the fall in rank. Overall, UEBS’s ranking frame 
is consistent with the public emphasis on international indicators of UEBS, but reveals 
an inconsistency of approach regarding the FT ranking, resulting ultimately in the 
school dropping off the rankings. This pattern, together with a lack of emphasis of the 
FT ranking in the school communication, suggests that the school is increasingly 
moving away from using the FT MBA rankings for the production of its ranking frame. 
 
 
5 Case study III – Western University – Richard Ivey Business School  
 
Background. Founded in 1922 as the Department of Commercial Economics of 
the University of Western Ontario, the Ivey Business School (WUIBS) claims it “has 
earned an international reputation for its teaching and research excellence and the high 
calibre of its students and faculty” (WUIBS, 2014a). WUIBS has a faculty of 108 
professors and lecturers whose mission is to “develop business leaders who think 
globally, act strategically and contribute to the societies in which they operate" 
(WUIBS, 2014a). The school offers a 12-months full-time MBA programme with a 
cohort of 104 students, of which 32% were from 13 countries in 2014 (WUIBS, 2014b). 
The school is part of the CEMS Global Alliance in Management Education and has 
established campuses in Toronto, Hong Kong and Mumbai (WUIBS, 2014a).  
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Ranking communication. WUIBS has a dedicated ‘Ranking Ivey’ page 
(WUIBS, 2014c). The school mentions its performance in several rankings, among 
them BusinessWeek, Canadian Business, as well as the FT EMBA and Executive 
Education rankings. Here, it claims that “there are some rankings dimensions that align 
with Ivey’s program strategies, which centre on student and recruiter satisfaction, and 
others that do not” (WUIBS, 2014c). WUIBS then relates the ranking performance to 
the strategy of the school: “On the measures that align with our strategy, we perform 
well and where we do not, we pay close attention and review the data to determine if 
there is opportunity to improve”, nevertheless concluding that “we do not formulate 
strategy based on their results” (WUIBS, 2014c). 
WUIBS dedicates a whole section to the analysis of its FT MBA ranking 
performance. The school still uses its performance in the FT rankings as “one of the top 
twenty MBA programs in the world” in the year 2000 in its history section (WUIBS, 
2014a). It also delivers a detailed analysis of its fall in ranking performance in the 
ranking section.  
 First, the school explains its overall ranking and drop in ranking performance, 
saying that “this year Ivey was ranked 89th internationally (of the top 100 global 
business schools) by the FT. This represents a drop in our position, despite improving 
our results in a number of areas this year” (WUIBS, 2014c). The school then goes on to 
discuss this development, pointing towards the complexity of the ranking system and its 
number of dimensions, and emphasising the criteria on which it performed well: “The 
FT Ranking is a complex ranking system that ultimately measures schools on 16 (sic!) 
different dimensions. Ivey performs well on several key criteria” (WUIBS, 2014c). The 
school uses the Weighted Salary figure and Placement Success sub-ranking to take a 
specifically Canadian and temporal reference point, emphasising the gap to its 
(unnamed) Canadian competitors:  
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“SALARY TODAY: Ivey retained its leadership position for top salary in 
Canada for 15 consecutive years at $99,072 with a significant $8,768 gap 
between us and next (sic!) closest Canadian school. 
PLACEMENT SUCCESS: Ivey scored 38th in the world with our nearest 
Canadian competitor at 81 and all other Canadian schools sitting in the 
bottom quartile. We are ahead of 9 schools that made the top 25 overall. 
This score measures satisfaction with Career Management Services.” 
(WUIBS, 2014c; emphasis added) 
 
On the Career Progress criterion, WUIBS takes a temporal reference point, 
emphasising its improvement over the last years, but without mentioning its 75
th
 
position on the career progress sub-ranking:  
“CAREER PROGRESS: Ivey improved 7 positions this year. This score 
measures improved level in seniority after an MBA.” (WUIBS, 2014c; 
emphasis added) 
 
 In terms of the Value for Money and Alumni Recommendation sub-
rankings, the school underlines its global position in the top 50 of all participating 
schools: 
“VALUE FOR MONEY: Ivey is in the top 50 schools and scored 43rd 
globally. 
ALUMNI RECOMMENDATION: Ivey ranked 35th globally on this score 
that asks alumni from all schools in the ranking to name three schools from 
which they would recruit MBA graduates.” (WUIBS, 2014c; emphasis 
added) 
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 Finally, WUIBS uses a detailed explanation of the measurement of the 
Employed at 3 Months metric, using an alleged difference in the reporting period. 
It then claims that this metric understates its job placement rate without providing 
evidence for this assertion. Subsequently, the school compares the performance to 
other Canadian business schools, and concludes that it would outperform most 
schools in the ranking: 
“EMPLOYED AT 3 MONTHS: Ivey is second in Canada at 83%. This 
metric measures our employment rate 3 months post-graduation. With 
April convocation instead of June, our reporting period is nearly two 
months shorter than most schools. This understates our placement rate by 
about 9%. For our Employment Report we report on the same time frame 
as other Canadian schools - as of September 1. Based on our September 1 
employment rate, Ivey would rank 1st in Canada and 24th globally 
(higher than 8 schools in the top 10 overall).” (WUIBS, 2014c; emphasis 
added) 
 
Ranking performance. As we can see in figure 45, WUIBS shows a fairly stable 
pattern of decline from a top 20 position in 2001, reaching 53
rd
 place in 2008. Between 
2008 and 2011, the school rank increases by a total of seven ranks, before it drops to 
68
th
 place in 2012, followed by a further decline to 89
th
 in 2014.  
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Figure 45: WUIBS – Ranking performance 2001-2014 
 
Marginal Improvement Indicator. As we can see in table 21, WUIBS has more 
criteria with a negative than a positive MII in most of the periods. In particular the 
IntBoa, IntStu, WomBoa and FacDoc indicators are negative in most periods, with 
SlyWgt and SlyInc only being positive in three and four of 13 periods. Positive 
indicators outweigh the negative ones only in the 2001-2002, 2004-2006, 2010-2012 
and 2013-2014 periods, which are nevertheless only translated to a simultaneous 
increase in rank in the 2010-2011 period.  Strong decreases in MII (Empl3M: -11 in 
2001-02 and -15 in 2002-03; IntFac: -15 in 2006-07; IntBoa: -9 in 2006-07 and 2007-
08; IntStu: -42 in 2006-07) are often followed by positive marginal improvements in 
subsequent periods (Empl3M: 14 in 2003-04 and 23 in 2005-06; IntFac: 13 in 2008-09; 
IntBoa: 10 in 2008-09; IntStu: 8 in 2013-14).  
 
MII 
WUIBS 
01-02 02-03 03-04 04-05 05- 06 06-07 07-08 08-09 09-10 10-11 11-12 12-13 13-14 
Empl3M -11 -15 14 1 23 -13 -2 1 5 2 -6 1 -4 
IntFac -3 -4 2 2 9 -15 0 13 -2 9 1 1 3 
IntBoa 18 6 -4 2 0 -9 -9 10 -13 -4 3 -2 1 
IntStu -1 0 -1 16 6 -42 -3 0 0 2 3 0 8 
WomBoa -1 0 2 -1 -2 2 -2 0 0 0 2 -2 1 
WomFac 5 2 -1 -4 1 -3 0 -1 2 5 -2 -3 3 
WomStu 0 3 -5 4 -1 8 -9 -2 6 2 0 -6 -2 
FacDoc -3 -2 0 1 1 -1 0 4 -2 -5 5 -2 1 
Lang 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Rank 19 18 22 29 34 31 41 53 47 49 46 68 78 89
0
20
40
60
80
100
Ranking performance WUIBS 
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SlyWgt 930 5472 -5475 -4719 -6409 -3846 2940 -3792 -1493 -615 -3067 -2186 -268 
SlyInc 7 -12 -4 -19 6 -12 -3 -2 -3 5 -18 1 -6 
Table 21: WUIBS – Change of criterion performance year-to-year, controlling for field changes (negative 
values in red, positive values in green) 
 
The 2006-07 period marks a turning point, with a strong decline in employment, 
international and salary MIIs. This deterioration in performance measures is however 
stopped in the subsequent years, in particular in the 2010-12 periods. The school 
however never manages to make up for this fall in rank. The constant drop in rank 
between 2001 and 2008 coincides with a preponderance of negative MIIs throughout 
this period. The change in tendency in 2008 can be partially explained by an increase in 
the SlyWgt criterion by $2,940 in 2007-08. Despite this improvement being lost again 
in the subsequent period, the improvement on other criteria (IntFac and IntBoa) 
translates into a higher rank. As these increases are modest, this is however not a 
sustainable development, resulting in a loss of the previously gained ranking positions 
after 2011. The high coefficient of variation of the IntStu (0.40), IntFac (0.28) as well as 
IntBoa (0.26) indicate that the school was making frequent and significant strategic 
changes on international criteria, indicating a lack of strategic focus. Table 22 shows the 
performance of WUIBS on each criterion. 
 
Ranking Frame Indicator. As we can see in table 23, most of the RFIs of 
WUIBS are consistently negative over the 2001-2014 period, with SlyWgt (-23), SlyInc 
(-34), and IntStu (-34) being the criteria that exhibit least strategic emphasis. Only the 
IntFac (46) and WomFac (29) criteria are positive, suggesting that the expansion of an 
international and gender-balanced faculty was a part of the ranking frame in that period. 
The picture is somewhat different for the first period of decline from a top 20 to a top 
50 position from 2001 to 2008, where the expansion of international faculty received 
less attention (-28), whereas the expansion of the international board did (25). The only 
period of rise in ranks from 2008 to 2011 features an adjusted ranking frame with 
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positive RFIs for the expansion of international (64) and female (38) faculty, and to a 
lesser extent international (6) and female students (27). However, the salary-related 
criteria that make up a large part of the weighting of the ranking receive only low 
SlyInc (0) or negative (-6) RFIs, indicating that the ranking frame does not emphasise 
these criteria. In the subsequent period of decline in ranking (2011-2014), the ranking 
frame adjusts to include the expansion of the international criteria, specifically IntFac 
(9), IntBoa (7) and IntStu (48).  
 
RFI 2001-2008 2008-2011 2011-2014 2001-2014 
IntFac -28 64 9 46 
WomFac -3 38 -6 29 
FacDoc -4 -4 5 -3 
Empl3M -2 8 -10 -4 
WomStu 2 27 -27 -4 
IntBoa 25 -24 7 -6 
WomBoa -19 1 5 -10 
SlyWgt -11 -6 -5 -23 
SlyInc -21 0 -23 -34 
IntStu -63 6 48 -34 
Table 23: WUIBS – Ranking Frame Indicator over different periods 
 
 
Conclusion. WUIBS’s assertion that “we do not formulate strategy based on 
[ranking] results” contradicts some of the patterns of strategic shifts observed in the 
previous sections, specifically in relation to faculty-related criteria, while it is more 
consistent with salary-related and international student criteria. Given the professed 
international outlook of the school, including its expansion with campuses in Asia, the 
lack of emphasis on these criteria in most periods, specifically on international students, 
is particularly inconsistent with the communication efforts of the school. In addition, the 
employment-related criteria do not receive a great deal of emphasis in the ranking 
frame, despite the lengthy explanation of the school on the website, which justifies its 
low performance on that criterion.  
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In conclusion, while some of the reference points the school is taking in its 
communication are still global, most comparisons now include a reference to Canadian 
schools. The lengthy explanations of ranking performance, and even specific criteria of 
the FT ranking, suggest that despite the fall in position, the ranking frame is still an 
important input into overall strategic decision making of the school. Hence, the school 
seems to deal with its low global ranking performance by increasingly adjusting its 
ranking frame to reflect a national, rather than a global identity, as evidenced by its 
frequent reference to national competitors. It appears that the FT MBA ranking is 
accelerating this process by making the impossibility of competing globally evident for 
the school.  
 
 
 
6 Conclusions from the case studies 
 As these three case studies have shown, schools adopt different strategies in 
dealing with the ranking, in both their changes in ranking frame as well as the way 
changes or conflicts in actual and aspired performance are communicated. The choice of 
segmental, temporal, geographic or criteria-specific reference points in the FT ranking 
speaks to the active engagement of the schools with the ranking. However, this appears 
to be partially conditional on ranking success – while CEIBS openly uses its good 
placement in the ranking as a sign of quality and reputation, UEBS is less open about its 
ranking success, or lack thereof. The school rather puts the emphasis on accreditations, 
and some other rankings in which it performs comparably well. However, WUIBS has a 
much more active approach, openly discussing its ranking success, taking various 
reference points, and even reinterpreting some of the results.  
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On the one hand, a high number of positive relative performance improvements 
on criteria do not guarantee increases in rank, as evidenced by the case of UEBS. On the 
other hand, a high number of negative relative performance deteriorations do not 
necessarily result in a fall in rank, as evidenced by the case of CEIBS. Performance 
gains can easily be lost subsequently, indicating that some ranking frame adjustments 
like positive learning are more sustainable than gaming strategies that lead to short-term 
wins. In addition, rather than overall improvements on all criteria, ranking frames that 
emphasise focused performance improvements on some criteria in specific periods can 
result in a strong increase in rank. Ranking actors pick an anchoring point, for example 
their initial ranking position, or their main competitor, and compare their performance 
to this rank over time, producing either active and open celebration of the rankings, as is 
the case with CEIBS, defensive reinterpretation, as is the case of WUIBS, or an active 
emphasis on other measures of social evaluation, as is the case with UEBS. This 
confirms the proposals on ranking frame adjustment made in chapter III. 
In conclusion, ranking actors are not passive recipients of the ranking process, 
but play an active role in the way ranking frames are being used and adjusted. This 
results in a variety of ranking frames that change over time, and are used for strategising 
and communication purposes by the ranking actor. However, as we have seen in chapter 
III, other templates as well as competitive and institutional pressures from peers also 
influence ranking frame formation. Hence, I will now turn to the question to what extent 
ranking frames are influenced by competitive clusters. In chapter VIII, I will thus do a 
cluster analysis of the FT rankings.  
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VIII CLUSTERS IN THE RANKING FIELD  
 
 
The existence of clusters in the ranking field that shape how ranking actors set 
aspiration levels and evaluate actual performance is integral to the concept of the 
ranking frame. I thus did a cluster analysis of the FT ranking data in order to clarify 
some of the issues raised in the preceding chapters, specifically to what extent clusters 
exist within the ranking fields, what their nature and composition is, and how they 
develop over time.   
There is a long-standing tradition in the organisational literature of using 
organisational metrics to determine clusters of organisations or individuals, in particular 
in the strategy, marketing, organisational behaviour and organisation theory fields. 
Gupta & Huefner (1972) were the first to cluster firms on financial ratios like cash 
velocity, inventory and asset turnover. They found that financial indicators could be 
used to determine characteristics of industries in which the clustered organisations were 
active. They concluded that “cluster analysis groupings of the ratio data correspond 
highly with both the judgmental classifications of economists and with numerous 
qualitatively expressed economic characteristics of the industries involved” (1972:90). 
Subsequently, there has been a number of organisational studies using cluster analysis 
to determine the dynamics of strategic groups of firms (Canina, Enz, & Harrison, 2005; 
Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1995; Porac, Thomas, Wilson, Paton & Kanfer, 1995; Reger & 
Huff, 1993), the structural asymmetries of competitors within industries of known 
rivalry characteristics (Harrigan, 1985), contingent employees (Marler, Woodard, 
Barringer & Milkovich, 2002), technology ventures (Grueber, Heinemann, Brettel & 
Hugeling, 2010), listed companies (Leask & Parker, 2007), public banks (DeSarbo & 
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Grewal, 2008), service professionals (Bensaou, Galunic & Jonczyk-Sédès, 2014), and 
work teams (Gilson & Shalley, 2004). 
Although widely used for creating groups of research subjects based on their 
performance on variables, cluster analysis remains a “complex challenge” and “has 
been often less than ideal”, as Ketchen and Shook (1996: 441) state in their review of 
the application of cluster analysis in the strategy field. A particular issue is that cluster 
analysis requires the “extensive reliance on researcher judgment” (Ketchen & Shook, 
1996: 442) as it cannot be reduced to a single test statistic. As Schneiderman, Willis & 
Kowalski (1993: 399) point out, this leads to situation where “a given clustering method 
can be characterized in terms of whether it does or does not possess some 45 properties 
[…] [thus,] the total number of possible methods is of the order of 245.” Therefore, great 
care and rigour is required when using cluster analysis. 
Despite calls to use longitudinal data for cluster analysis to overcome some of 
the previously mentioned statistical issues and to uncover performance differences 
within and across years (Ketchen & Shook, 1996: 455), one of the main weaknesses of 
the literature using cluster analysis has been the lack of longitudinal studies. To be 
specific, Ketchen and Shook (1996: 455) propose that longitudinal studies can help 
understand the cumulative and the lagged effect of cluster membership on performance 
over time, as well as how time impacts on the cluster-performance relationship. Yet, the 
studies that have addressed this issue remain the exception (see De la Cruz Mesía, 
Quintana & Marshall, 2008; Ketchen, Thomas & Snow, 1993; Osborne, Stubbart & 
Ramaprasad, 2001). Others have not used the full potential of longitudinal data sets. For 
example, Bierly & Chakrabarti (1996) split a 15-year sample into three 5-year periods 
to compare the development of cluster means. A reason for this is that little progress has 
been made to advance capabilities for analysing longitudinal cluster data, despite calls 
to develop methods and software (Schneiderman, Willis & Kowalski, 1993). In 
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addition, few studies have focused on developing new methods for longitudinal cluster 
analysis. However, the advances that have been made (see for example Heggeseth, 
2013) have not yet been put into practice in the field of organisational studies, possibly 
because the development of corresponding software has been lagging behind.  
Given that cluster analysis, and specifically longitudinal cluster analysis, still 
has no generally accepted single approach, I will thus base my analysis on the process 
proposed by Milligan (1996) and Everitt, Landau, Leese and Stahl (2011:261-262). The 
cluster analysis options of STATA 13 was used for all analyses. In the following, I will 
describe the process of the analysis in eight steps, addressing issues of the selection of 
clustering objects, dealing with missing and erroneous values and variable 
standardisation, choice of proximity measures, variable weighting and selection, as well 
as choice of clustering methods, determination of the number of clusters, and testing for 
reliability and validity of cluster solutions. In chapter IX, I will then interpret the 
resulting clusters and complement my analysis with qualitative data from business 
schools.  
 
 
1 Selection of clustering objects 
In order to provide for a triangulation (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994) of the results of 
the cluster analysis, I did the analysis with each of the three data sets DS1, DS2 and 
DS3 described in the previous chapters. As can be seen in table 24, these data sets all 
contain measures from the FT rankings, but are different in terms of type and number of 
ranking actors (non-ranked and ranked), inclusion of salary data and time frames. 
 
Data set 
DS1 DS2 DS3 
Number of actors  114 200 131 
Constant actors yes no no 
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Includes non-ranked yes yes no 
Includes salary data no no yes 
Years 2006-2014 2006-2014 2001-2014 
Table 24: Comparison of data sets used in the cluster analysis 
 
2 Dealing with missing and erroneous values and variable standardisation 
All three data sets included a small number of missing values. Nine of the 
Emp3M criteria were over 100%, indicating erroneous values. These values were 
replaced with the average of the values of all ranking actors in the particular year. Other 
missing values for the WomBoa and WomFac criteria were dealt with in the same 
manner.  
Ketchen and Shook (1996) define the process of standardisation as one of the 
most important steps in cluster analysis, as variables with large ranges can dominate 
cluster solutions. Many cluster analysis studies transform variables into z-scores with 
means of zero and equal variances. However, assuming that all variables have an equal 
contribution to the final cluster solution by discarding meaningful differences in 
variance can lead to a high loss of information (Edelbrock, 1979). Thus, Aldenderfer 
and Blashfield (1984) recommend the use of standardisation on a case-by-case basis, 
depending on the data structure. As can be seen in table 25, most variables were on a 
continuous scale, taking values between 0 and 100. Standardisation was thus not 
necessary for these variables.  
 
Criterion 
Weighting 
2014 in % 
Data available Unit 
Minimum 
value 
Maximum 
value 
Emp3M 2 All data sets Percentage 0 100 
EmpDat 0 All data sets Percentage 0 100 
FacDoc 5 All data sets Percentage 0 100 
IntBoa 2 All data sets Percentage 0 100 
IntFac 4 All data sets Percentage 0 100 
IntStu 4 All data sets Percentage 0 100 
WomBoa 1 All data sets Percentage 0 100 
WomFac 2 All data sets Percentage 0 100 
WomStu 2 All data sets Percentage 0 100 
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Lang 1* All data sets Languages 0 2 
SlyInc 20 DS3 only Percentage 42 252 
SlyWgt 20 DS3 only US$ PPP equivalent 31,184 194,645 
Table 25: Comparison of variables used in the cluster analysis 
                * changed from 2 to 1% in 2013 
 
 
Milligan and Cooper (1988) recommended standardisation using range rather 
than standard deviations to improve cluster recovery. The remaining Language, Salary 
Increase and Weighted Salary criteria were thus standardised according to the following 
formula:  
Standardised score = (
𝑥𝑣𝑡−𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑣
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑣−𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑣
) ∗  100 , 
where v= variable and t= year. Since the absolute maxima and minima remain constant 
for all criteria measured in percentages, I used the maximum and minimum over all 
years for the standardisation of the other variables.  
 
 
3 Choice of proximity measures 
While Sneath and Sokal (1973) suggest the use of the simplest possible measure 
to ease interpretability of results, the nature and scale of the data as well as the 
clustering method should inform the choice of the proximity measure (Everitt, Landau, 
Leese & Stahl, 2011: 68-69). Gower and Legendre (1986) discuss several similarity and 
dissimilarity measures and give a decision making table. According to that 
classification, the data are continuous, have only positive values, double zeroes are 
excluded, and there are few extreme values. Thus, simple Euclidean distances were used 
as proximity measures. 
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4 Variable weighting 
Cluster analysis treats all variables as equally important inputs. This can lead to 
misspecifications (Ketchen & Shook, 1996). Given that not all criteria do have an equal 
weighting in the ranking process, I considered a method for weighting the criteria. 
Milligan and Cooper (1988) propose eight different techniques for weighting 
continuous variables in cluster analyses, all based on variability. As Everitt et al. (2011: 
64) point out, this approach has been adopted for most studies involving the clustering 
of continuous variables, parting from the assumption that the importance of a variable is 
inversely proportional to its variability. This can be problematic, as variables that are 
high in variability have been shown to assist the emergence of clear cluster solutions 
(Fleiss and Zubin, 1969). Given that the criteria in this study differ considerably in 
terms of variability, and that there is no apparent correlation between variability and 
weighting, this is not a reasonable assumption to make for this data set. Weighting by 
the inverse of the standard error is also a possibility, but only when the aim is the 
acknowledgement of measurement error (Everitt, Landau, Leese and Stahl, 2011:66). 
Another option is the omission of variables, or giving them a weighting of zero. 
Gnanadesikan, Kettenring and Tsao (1995) tested several approaches to variable 
selection. They found that equal weighting, and weights based on standard deviation or 
range variability were “generally ineffective” (1995:134), and that “weighting that is 
intertwined with k-means cluster optimization is more effective overall” (1995:134).  
However, these studies do not discuss cases where there is a theoretical way of 
determining variable weighting, as is the case with the variables in the data sets in this 
study. As Morrison (1967) proposes, if there is a good rationale for assigning 
weightings, the researcher can weigh variables differently. I thus used the weights that 
the FT are employing for their MBA ranking as specified in table 25 above, multiplying 
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the values with the weighting divided by 100, as suggested by Bartholomew, Steele, 
Moustaki and Galbraith (2002:28).   
 
 
5 Variable selection  
The variable weighting process is inherently linked to the variable selection 
process, as omitting a variable from the analysis amounts to giving it a weighting of 
zero. Only criteria that are likely to define clusters should be included in the analysis 
(Everitt, Landau, Leese and Stahl, 2011:261). As the selection of variables that are 
“essentially 'white noise'” can be of great “discriminant importance” (Harrigan, 1985: 
70), this step is “perhaps the most important [one]” (Ketchen & Shook, 1996: 443). 
Punj and Stewart (1983) also caution against the inclusion of spurious variables, as they 
may distort cluster solutions, while Reger and Huff (1993:103) warn that the 
“haphazard” selection of strategic dimensions can affect cluster analysis results.  
The issue of multicollinearity is related to the question of variable selection. 
Ketchen and Shook (1996: 452) suggest that correlations of higher of 0.5 can serve as 
threshold for the exclusion of variables. As can be seen in table 26, the variables in the 
DS1 data set are not strongly correlated, with most below the 0.3 threshold. Few 
correlations are above the 0.5 threshold, and only those that are conceptually related, 
e.g. international indicators. Correlations for the DS2 and DS3 data sets showed similar 
results. However, citing Milligan (1996), Homburg, Jensen & Krohmer (2008: 137) 
point out that “unlike other multivariate methods, most cluster methods do not rely on 
the assumption that the input variables are uncorrelated”. Thus, variables were not 
excluded based on their correlation. 
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Year Variable Emp3M EmpDat WomFac WomStu WomBoa IntFac IntStu IntBoa FacDoc Lang 
2006 Emp3M 1 
         
2006 EmpDat 0.6 1 
        
2006 WomFac -0.1 -0.1 1 
       
2006 WomStu 0 0 0.1 1 
      
2006 WomBoa 0 0 0.3 0 1 
     
2006 IntFac 0.1 -0.1 -0.2 0 0.2 1 
    
2006 IntStu 0.1 -0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.3 0.6 1 
   
2006 IntBoa 0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.2 0.6 0.6 1 
  
2006 FacDoc 0.2 0.2 -0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.2 0 0 1 
 
2006 Lang -0.1 0 -0.1 -0.3 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.5 -0.3 1 
2007 Emp3M 1 
         
2007 EmpDat 0.5 1 
        
2007 WomFac -0.2 -0.1 1 
       
2007 WomStu -0.3 -0.2 0.3 1 
      
2007 WomBoa 0 0 0.3 0 1 
     
2007 IntFac 0 -0.3 -0.2 0 0.1 1 
    
2007 IntStu 0 -0.4 0 -0.1 0.2 0.6 1 
   
2007 IntBoa 0 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0.2 0.6 0.6 1 
  
2007 FacDoc 0.2 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.2 0 0 1 
 
2007 Lang 0 0 -0.2 -0.1 0 0.3 0.4 0.5 -0.2 1 
2008 Emp3M 1 
         
2008 EmpDat 0.2 1 
        
2008 WomFac 0 -0.2 1 
       
2008 WomStu -0.1 0 0.3 1 
      
2008 WomBoa 0.2 -0.2 0.1 0 1 
     
2008 IntFac 0.1 -0.2 -0.2 0 0.2 1 
    
2008 IntStu 0.1 -0.2 0 -0.2 0.3 0.6 1 
   
2008 IntBoa 0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 1 
  
2008 FacDoc 0.3 0.1 0 -0.1 0 0.2 0 0 1 
 
2008 Lang -0.3 0 -0.1 -0.1 0 0.2 0.3 0.5 -0.2 1 
         Table 26: Correlations between criteria for all years, DS1  
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Year Variable Emp3M EmpDat WomFac WomStu WomBoa IntFac IntStu IntBoa FacDoc Lang 
2009 Emp3M 1 
         
2009 EmpDat 0.3 1 
        
2009 WomFac -0.2 -0.1 1 
       
2009 WomStu 0 0 0 1 
      
2009 WomBoa 0.1 -0.2 0.2 -0.1 1 
     
2009 IntFac 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0 0.2 1 
    
2009 IntStu 0.1 -0.3 0 -0.1 0.4 0.6 1 
   
2009 IntBoa 0 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 0.3 0.6 0.7 1 
  
2009 FacDoc 0.2 0.3 0 -0.1 0 0.3 0 0 1 
 
2009 Lang -0.2 0 0 0 0 0.2 0.3 0.5 -0.3 1 
2010 Emp3M 1 
         
2010 EmpDat 0 1 
        
2010 WomFac 0.1 -0.1 1 
       
2010 WomStu -0.2 -0.1 0.2 1 
      
2010 WomBoa 0.1 -0.1 0.2 -0.1 1 
     
2010 IntFac 0.2 -0.1 -0.1 0 0.3 1 
    
2010 IntStu 0.2 -0.2 0 -0.1 0.5 0.6 1 
   
2010 IntBoa 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.3 0.6 0.6 1 
  
2010 FacDoc 0.2 0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.2 0 0.1 1 
 
2010 Lang -0.2 0 -0.1 0 0 0.3 0.4 0.5 -0.2 1 
2011 Emp3M 1 
         
2011 EmpDat 0.2 1 
        
2011 WomFac 0 -0.1 1 
       
2011 WomStu -0.2 0 0.1 1 
      
2011 WomBoa 0.1 -0.1 0.2 0 1 
     
2011 IntFac 0.1 -0.1 0 0 0.4 1 
    
2011 IntStu 0.1 -0.4 0.1 -0.1 0.5 0.6 1 
   
2011 IntBoa 0.1 -0.2 -0.1 0 0.3 0.5 0.6 1 
  
2011 FacDoc 0.1 0.2 0 -0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 1 
 
2011 Lang -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 0.1 0 0.3 0.4 0.5 -0.2 1 
         Table 26: Correlations between criteria for all years, DS1 (continued) 
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Year Variable Emp3M EmpDat WomFac WomStu WomBoa IntFac IntStu IntBoa FacDoc Lang 
2012 Emp3M 1 
         
2012 EmpDat 0.2 1 
        
2012 WomFac -0.1 -0.1 1 
       
2012 WomStu -0.2 0 -0.1 1 
      
2012 WomBoa 0 -0.2 0.3 0.2 1 
     
2012 IntFac 0.1 -0.1 0 0 0.2 1 
    
2012 IntStu 0.1 -0.4 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.6 1 
   
2012 IntBoa 0.1 0 -0.1 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.6 1 
  
2012 FacDoc 0.1 0.1 0 -0.2 0 0.3 0.2 0.1 1 
 
2012 Lang -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 0 0.3 0.3 0.5 -0.1 1 
2013 Emp3M 1 
         
2013 EmpDat 0.3 1 
        
2013 WomFac -0.1 0 1 
       
2013 WomStu -0.3 -0.2 0.1 1 
      
2013 WomBoa -0.1 -0.2 0.3 0.1 1 
     
2013 IntFac 0.1 -0.2 -0.1 0.2 0.2 1 
    
2013 IntStu 0.1 -0.4 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.6 1 
   
2013 IntBoa 0 -0.2 -0.1 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.6 1 
  
2013 FacDoc 0.2 0.1 0 -0.1 0 0.3 0.2 0.2 1 
 
2013 Lang -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 0 0.3 0.3 0.6 0 1 
2014 Emp3M 1 
         
2014 EmpDat 0.3 1 
        
2014 WomFac 0 -0.1 1 
       
2014 WomStu -0.2 -0.1 0.2 1 
      
2014 WomBoa -0.1 -0.2 0.3 0.2 1 
     
2014 IntFac -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 0.1 0.2 1 
    
2014 IntStu -0.1 -0.3 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.6 1 
   
2014 IntBoa -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 0.1 0.3 0.6 0.6 1 
  
2014 FacDoc 0.1 0.1 0 0.1 0 0.3 0.2 0.2 1 
 
2014 Lang -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 0 0.3 0.3 0.5 0 1 
         Table 26: Correlations between criteria for all years, DS1 (continued) 
 
As Harrigan (1985) suggests, adding additional variables often leads to only 
marginal improvements in cluster solutions, in particular if the variables are 
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standardised. She thus recommends that the researcher use judgement in selecting the 
number of variables. Noting that the chosen selection method should match the aim of 
the study, Ketchen and Shook (1996) propose three different approaches to variable 
selection. Inductive selection refers to the selection of variables without prior 
relationship to theory, often involving the maximisation of the number of variables. 
Deductive selection involves taking into account the expected cluster number and 
structure for selection. The cognitive approach uses the opinion of expert informants to 
inform variable selection. Ng, Westgren and Sonka (2008) suggest a fourth approach. 
They propose that high F-statistics indicate a great contribution to the separation of 
cluster solutions. They thus use the F-statistics of the ANOVA to determine key 
variables to include in the K-means analysis.  
While Ng, Westgren and Sonka’s (2008) method is rigorous in statistical terms, 
it can only be employed after an initial exploratory cluster analysis, and it does not take 
into account the expected cluster number and structure, as proposed by Ketchen and 
Shook’s deductive approach (1996). I thus ran the analysis with different variables with 
the aim of being as parsimonious as possible and producing meaningful and 
interpretable solutions. The Employment Data criterion contributes to the calculation of 
the Emp3M criterion, but carries no weighting in the ranking. I thus excluded the 
Employment Data criterion from the further analyses. As discussed in chapter VI, an 
examination of the measures of central tendency of the data sets revealed that some 
criteria were heavily skewed and lost variance over time. This increases the risk of 
creating unstable cluster solutions.  
As discussed in chapter VI, across all three data sets, the criteria with the lowest 
overall variance and the most highly skewed distributions were Lang, FacDoc, Emp3M, 
WomBoa as well as SlyInc. The language criterion was not excluded, as it was the only 
criterion with changing ranking weighting, as well as a significant decline in mean. 
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Based on this, different combinations of each data set, including all criteria or excluding 
FacDoc, Emp3M, WomBoa as well as SlyInc were used for determining the most 
meaningful and interpretable cluster solution. Including and excluding different 
variables, I thus compared the cluster solutions from the hierarchical cluster analysis, 
i.e. the cluster solutions as determined by interpreting the dendogram, the Duda-Hart 
criterion, and the Calinski-Harabasz criterion (see section “Choice of clustering 
methods” for a detailed explanation of the hierarchical cluster analysis and stopping 
rules employed) for each analysis. As can be seen in tables 27, 28 and 29, the solutions 
including all variables, but excluding the FacDoc criterion as highly weighted (5%) and 
heavily skewed criterion, produced the most stable and meaningful results for each of 
the three data sets. The FacDoc criterion was thus excluded from further analysis, and 
the outcome of the hierarchical cluster analysis was used as a starting point for the non-
hierarchical analysis. I will discuss this process now. 
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6 Choice of clustering methods 
I considered both agglomerative hierarchical and polythetic non-hierarchical 
divisive clustering methods for the analysis. The unweighted pair-group method using 
arithmetic averages (hereafter: UPGMA) (Sokal & Sneath, 1963) and single linkage are 
most commonly used in hierarchical cluster analysis (Aldenderfer & Blashfield, 1984; 
Ng, Westgren, & Sonka, 2008). 
The unweighted average linkage clustering method was chosen as it “tends to 
join clusters with small variances”, offers an “intermediate [solution] between single 
and complete linkage” and “takes account of cluster structure” (Everitt, Landau, Leese 
& Stahl, 2011:79). A combination of the Euclidian distance measure with the 
unweighted average linkage clustering method is particularly appropriate, as UPGMA 
takes into account (dis)similarity between pairs of cases in different clusters, thereby 
leading to comparatively little information loss (Romesburg, 1990). UPGMA is thus is 
“relatively robust” (Everitt, Landau, Leese & Stahl, 2011:79) as compared to methods 
that tend to produce ‘chained’ clusters like single linkage (Sneath, 1957), do not take 
into account cluster structure like complete linkage (Sorensen, 1948), lead to solutions 
where clusters are dominated by certain groups like centroid linkage (Sokal & 
Michener, 1958), weigh points in small clusters more highly than in large clusters like 
weighted average linkage (McQuitty, 1966), or are subject to reversals like median 
linkage (Gower, 1967). Ward’s method (Ward, 1963) was also considered, but not 
chosen as it tends to find same size clusters and is sensitive to outliers (Ketchen & 
Shook, 1996; Everitt, Landau, Leese & Stahl, 2011:79).  
However, there is a longstanding agreement in the literature that hierarchical 
agglomerative methods are, albeit popular, fraught with problems (Hawkins et al., 1982; 
Kaufman & Rousseeuw, 1990). In particular, hierarchical methods should not be 
applied where the data structure is itself not hierarchical (Everitt et al., 2011). As 
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Ketchen and Shook (1996) point out, all hierarchical algorithms suffer from instability 
of solutions, specifically for small sample sizes, as researchers do not know the cluster 
structure in advance.  
Non-hierarchical methods have the advantage of being less prone to distortion 
by outliers (Aldenderfer & Blashfield, 1984). In addition, through passing through 
cluster solutions not once, but several times, they simultaneously maximise within-
cluster homogeneity and between-cluster variance. Milligan and Cooper (1985: 351) 
deem the use of the results of hierarchical clustering as a starting point for non-
hierarchical methods like k-means to be “an excellent strategy for establishing the 
generalizability of a cluster analysis”. The consensus among cluster researchers has thus 
been to use hierarchical algorithms to cross-validate results from non-hierarchical 
analysis and use results from hierarchical analysis as a starting points for non-
hierarchical methods to determine the appropriate cluster structure (Aldenderfer & 
Blashfield, 1984; Hair et al., 1992; Hartigan, 1975; Ketchen & Shook, 1996; Milligan, 
1980; Punj & Stewart, 1983). In consequence, the replication and testing of the results 
of hierarchical cluster analyses with non-hierarchical k-means analysis has become a 
common feature of cluster analysis studies in the strategy, marketing and organisational 
literatures (see for example Bensaou, Galunic & Jonczyk-Sédès, 2014; Gilson & 
Shalley, 2003; Grueber, Heinemann, Brettel & Hungeling, 2010; Homburg, Jensen & 
Krohmer, 2008; Short, Ketchen & Palmer, 2007). I am thus employing a combination of 
hierarchical unweighted average linkage clustering and non-hierarchical k-means 
clustering.  
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7 Determination of the number of clusters 
Harrigan suggests that “the appropriate number of clusters will be a trade-off 
between parsimony and one's need for detail” (1985: 61). She thus encourages the 
researcher to decide what number of clusters provide for a meaningful portrayal of the 
data. Ketchen and Shook (1996: 446) suggest using the dendogram to look for natural 
clusters, as evidenced by dense branches. As this requires considerable interpretation of 
the researcher, Aldenderfer and Blashfield (1984) caution against the exclusive use of 
this method. Ketchen and Shook (1996) point out that attempts to formalise the 
interpretation of the dendogram like the use of the absolute or incremental value of the 
agglomeration coefficient, as well as the cubic clustering criterion (Milligan & Cooper, 
1985) are also fraught with problems. A priori-theory about the number of clusters can 
also serve to inform the number of clusters (Hair et al., 1992). Ketchen and Shook thus 
conclude that “confidence in the number of clusters identified may be greater when 
determined through the convergence of multiple methods” (1996: 447). 
Reger and Huff (1993) used three decision rules to ascertain the number of 
clusters from various hierarchical clustering techniques. The first rule is to select 
clusters that become evident through large distances in the dendogram; the second rule 
is to avoid one-actor cluster solutions and the third rule is to choose solutions with high 
interpretability based on qualitative data (Everitt, 1980; Hartigan, 1975). Ketchen and 
Shook (1996:442) also caution that cluster analysis “will provide clusters even if no 
meaningful groups are embedded in a sample”. It is thus necessary to test for the 
existence of a cluster structure.  
Stopping rules, which determine after which point increasing the number of 
clusters leads to a loss of within cluster homogeneity and between cluster variance are 
appropriate for testing for cluster structures. In a test and review of 30 different stopping 
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rules, Milligan and Cooper’s (1985) find that the Calinski–Harabasz pseudo-F index 
(Calinski & Harabasz, 1974) and the Duda–Hart Je(2)/Je(1) index (Duda & Hart 1973) 
are most successful in recovering cluster structures. Large values of the Calinski–
Harabasz pseudo-F point to the existence of distinct clusters, as well as large values of 
the Je(2)/Je(1) index, coupled with a simultaneous small pseudo-T-squared value and a 
steep change in the pseudo-T-squared between cluster solutions. The Duda–Hart index 
can only be used for hierarchical cluster methods, while the Calinski–Harabasz index 
can be used for both non-hierarchical and hierarchical cluster analyses (Everitt et al., 
2011). The Duda-Hart index has the additional advantage of testing for a one-cluster 
solution, i.e. the absence of cluster structure.  
Following Homburg, Jensen & Krohmer (2008), who use the pseudo-t2 index in 
combination with hierarchical clustering and Fukuoka, Lindgren, Rankin, Cooper & 
Carroll (2007), I used a combination of the dendograms, as well as the Duda-Hart and 
Calinski-Harabasz stopping rules to assess the cluster structure and minimise 
subjectivity in determination of cluster solutions. In particular, I looked for changes in 
solutions that are substantively not meaningful, e.g. a change from nine to two clusters 
for the Calinski-Harabasz criterion between 2006 and 2007, with a corresponding 
solution of four for the dendogram, and two for the Duda-Hart criterion (DS3). As can 
be seen in table 30, the DS1 data set delivers the most stable solution, both within and 
between stopping rules. In the following, I will thus limit my analysis to the DS1 data 
set.  
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Taking the average between the two stopping rules and the dendogram analysis, 
the number of clusters decreases in all solutions over time. This is from approximately 
four to two clusters in DS1 between 2006 and 2014, from three to two clusters in DS2 
from 2006 to 2014, and approximately seven to three clusters in DS3 from 2001 to 2014 
(five to three clusters between 2006 and 2014). This indicates that overall, there is a 
clear decrease in the number of clusters in all data sets, with two out of three data sets 
showing a decrease to two clusters. In addition, none of the cluster solutions consisted 
in only one cluster, leaving the conclusion that while clusters do persist in the FT 
ranking, their number decreases considerably over time, leaving two main clusters. The 
cluster composition and structure will be further analysed in chapter IX. 
 
 
8 Testing for reliability and validity of cluster solutions 
Grueber, Heinemann, Brettel and Hungeling (2010) and Homburg, Jensen & 
Krohmer (2008) use the cross-validation procedure proposed by McIntyre and 
Blashfield (1980) and Hambrick (1983). This procedure randomly splits the sample into 
equal halves and runs the k-means algorithm for each half, assigning each actor in the 
second half to a cluster based on the cluster mean of the first half, and comparing the 
agreement between the two solutions. Homburg, Jensen & Krohmer (2008) then used 
the Rand (1971) index to cross-validate the results. I did not use that method as it is not 
appropriate for small sample sizes (Ketchen & Shook, 1996).  
Ketchen and Shook (1996) suggest that cluster reliability has to be established as 
a condition for cluster validity. Reliability can be ascertained through multiple 
repetitions of the analysis with different algorithms, as described in section 7. External 
validity needs to be established for generalising about a population of interest (Cook & 
Campbell, 1979). Criterion-related validity needs to be established for the prediction of 
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outcomes (Kerlinger, 1986). Ketchen and Shook (1996: 447) suggest that “extreme care 
in validation is warranted, because without validation one is not assured of having 
arrived at a meaningful and useful set of clusters”. External validity can be established 
by analysing both the focal sample, as well as another similar sample (Hair et al., 1992; 
Hambrick, 1983). This should only be done when both samples are industry specific 
(Thomas & Venkatraman, 1988), as is the case of the DS1, DS2 and DS3 data sets used 
for this analysis.  
Many studies have used t-tests of homogeneity to compare group means of 
clustering variables (Bierly & Chakrabarti, 1996; Harrigan, 1985; Ng, Westgren, & 
Sonka, 2008; Reger & Huff, 1993). As can be seen in table 31, a t-test of homogeneity 
of means assuming equal variances yielded significant results for virtually all variables 
and years, except for the Emp3M, WomFac, WomStu and FacDoc variables.   
 
T-test of homogeneity 
Criterion 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Emp3M 0.310 0.820 0.450 0.510 0.047 0.290 0.560 0.590 0.017 
EmpDat 0.061 0.000 0.001 0.012 0.011 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.001 
WomFac 0.991 0.977 0.195 0.959 0.106 0.423 0.363 0.500 0.158 
WomStu 0.137 0.389 0.124 0.338 0.090 0.182 0.880 0.435 0.760 
WomBoa 0.001 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
IntFac 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
IntStu 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
IntBoa 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
FacDoc 0.481 0.558 0.471 0.675 0.152 0.245 0.395 0.267 0.178 
Lang 0.000 0.000 0.182 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
Table 31: T-test of homogeneity of criteria, per cluster (DS1) 
 
The basic version of the t-test makes the assumption of normal distribution. Not 
all variables are distributed normally (see chapter IV). To ensure the accuracy of the 
results, I thus conducted the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank sum test. This is a non-
parametric t-test that does not operate under the assumption of normality. The results 
are virtually identical to the previous analysis, as can be seen in table 32. 
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Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank sum test 
Criterion 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Emp3M 0.288 0.782 0.836 0.528 0.003 0.300 0.270 0.309 0.007 
EmpDat 0.019 0.001 0.019 0.023 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
WomFac 0.940 0.911 0.134 0.725 0.088 0.198 0.184 0.235 0.048 
WomStu 0.122 0.426 0.233 0.240 0.049 0.129 0.950 0.485 0.580 
WomBoa 0.004 0.033 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
IntFac 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
IntStu 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
IntBoa 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
FacDoc 0.651 0.819 0.854 0.957 0.145 0.045 0.260 0.087 0.078 
Lang 0.001 0.000 0.180 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
Table 32: Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney of criteria, per cluster (DS1) 
 
MANOVA procedures can be used for testing the equality of means for more 
than two groups to account for several dependent variables, even if they are correlated 
(Aldenderfer & Blashfield, 1984; Ketchen and Shook, 1996; Ng, Westgren, and Sonka 
2008). Others have used Tukey's studentized range t-tests and chi-square statistics to 
ascertain to what extent variables had significantly different values between clusters 
(Marler, Woodard Barringer & Milkovich, 2002; Gilson & Shalley, 2004; Grueber, 
Heinemann, Brettel & Hungeling, 2010; Shore & Barksdale, 1998). All of these 
techniques assume the existence of more than two cluster solutions. As there were only 
two stable core clusters in the DS1 data set, I did a one-way ANOVA to confirm the 
results from the t-tests. As can be seen in table 33, the results of the t-tests are 
confirmed.  
 
ANOVA (p-values) 
Criterion 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Emp3M 0.310 0.819 0.457 0.508 0.048 0.294 0.561 0.585 0.018 
EmpDat 0.061 0.000 0.001 0.012 0.011 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 
WomFac 0.991 0.977 0.195 0.959 0.106 0.423 0.363 0.500 0.158 
WomStu 0.137 0.389 0.124 0.338 0.090 0.182 0.880 0.435 0.760 
WomBoa 0.001 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
IntFac 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
IntStu 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
IntBoa 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
FacDoc 0.481 0.558 0.471 0.675 0.152 0.245 0.395 0.267 0.178 
Lang 0.000 0.000 0.182 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
Table 33: ANOVA of criteria per cluster, p-values (DS1) 
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The F-test statistic of the ANOVA indicates the ratio between explained and 
unexplained variance and can thus serve not only as an indicator of criterion-related 
validity, but also as an indication of which variables contribute most to the emergence 
of the clusters (Aldenderfer & Blashfield, 1984; Harrigan, 1985; Ketchen & Shook, 
1996; Ng, Westgren, & Sonka, 2008). As can be seen in table 34, WomFac, FacDoc, 
WomStu and Emp3M show consistently low values in the F-test statistics. This 
provides further support to the decision to exclude the heavily weighted FacDoc 
criterion. At the same time, it indicates that criteria like WomFac, WomStu and Emp3M 
were not as relevant as other criteria for the emergence of a clear cluster solution. 
 
ANOVA (F-test statistics) 
Criterion 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 SUM 
WomFac 0.0 0.0 1.7 0.0 2.7 0.7 0.8 0.5 2.0 8.3 
FacDoc 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.2 2.1 1.4 0.7 1.2 1.8 8.8 
WomStu 2.3 0.8 2.4 0.9 2.9 1.8 0.0 0.6 0.1 11.8 
Emp3M 1.1 0.1 0.6 0.4 4.0 1.1 0.3 0.3 5.8 13.7 
EmpDat 3.7 16.8 11.4 6.6 6.7 21.7 9.7 14.5 15.6 106.8 
Lang 14.4 24.1 1.8 17.8 18.6 23.0 29.0 18.6 12.1 159.4 
WomBoa 13.0 6.8 15.2 17.9 33.3 43.4 26.3 25.3 28.5 209.5 
IntFac 75.4 80.2 33.5 94.2 41.4 93.5 74.4 91.6 85.5 669.6 
IntBoa 90.0 129.6 41.2 181.1 54.3 104.1 76.3 77.2 66.5 820.0 
IntStu 371.0 645.1 313.2 483.6 520.6 673.6 366.8 329.0 367.5 4070.3 
SUM 571.1 903.6 421.4 802.8 686.5 964.2 584.5 558.7 585.4  
Table 34: ANOVA of criteria per cluster, ordered by F-test statistics (DS1) 
 
In conclusion, the cluster analysis revealed a relatively stable, but decreasing 
number of clusters across all data sets. In chapter IX, I will use the results from this 
section as well as qualitative data to analyse and interpret the cluster solutions, and 
demonstrate the relevance that clusters are playing for the construction of ranking 
frames.  
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IX CLUSTER CASE STUDIES 
 
 
In this chapter, I will use both the quantitative data from the cluster analysis of 
chapter VIII, as well as qualitative data collected from school websites in order to 
analyse and interpret the clusters. I will thus use multiple sources of evidence in order to 
provide for data triangulation (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994), including both qualitative and 
quantitative data (Yin, 1994), aiming to provide a rich set of descriptions (Kidder, 1982) 
that can be used to understand the composition and development of the clusters. I will 
follow a similar structure of analysis to the case studies in chapter VII. Specifically, I 
will use the Marginal Improvement and Ranking Frame Indicators introduced earlier to 
analyse the quantitative data from the cluster analysis, and as well as qualitative data 
from the public communication of ranking actors. 
As Harrigan (1985: 70) points out, “a very heavy element of managerial 
judgement is needed in developing the cluster dimensions and interpreting the results.” 
To establish the clusters, I thus compared the cluster results according to country and 
average rank of the ranking actors. As can be seen in table 35, four clusters with similar 
geographic and rank profile emerged.  
 
Cluster 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Mean Min Max 
EU 60 53 58 45 50 42 55 57 61 53 42 61 
EU2   40  59     50 40 59 
US 70 69 68 79 68 78 71 74 71 72 68 79 
US2 54 57  55  58    56 54 58 
Table 35: Average ranks of clusters (non-ranked schools are counted as rank 120) 
 
European (EU) clusters consisted mostly of European and some Asian actors, 
whereas the American (US) clusters consisted of mostly US, Canadian as well as some 
Latin American and Asian schools. In order to provide for a longitudinal analysis of the 
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data, I thus joined the clusters with the most similar profiles in terms of geographical 
provenance and average overall ranking to form a longitudinal data set. In order to 
facilitate interpretability, I took care to include as many ranking actors as possible. For 
example, in 2008, the smaller EU2 cluster showed an unusually low average ranking of 
40 as compared to the clusters in the other years. I thus decided to include the other 
cluster in to the European longitudinal set of cluster, obtaining two stable sets of 
clusters, with the European cluster set having an average rank of 53 and the American 
cluster set of 72.  
In the following, the sets of clusters will be either presented as peripheral 
clusters, which includes all ranking actors in all years, even if they are not part of the 
cluster in every year; or as core clusters, which only includes the actors that are part of 
the set of clusters in each year of the ranking. This is consistent with the approach of 
Porac et al. (1995) and Reger and Huff (1993), who propose that competitive groupings 
can contain a core and peripheral structure, as well as DeSarbo and Grewal (2008), who 
propose that there are hybrid strategic groups, consisting of core firms and secondary 
firms that are loosely related to the first group.  
 
 
1 The European cluster  
 
Core cluster. As can be seen in table 36, the European core cluster includes four 
British schools, one Spanish school, and one school from Singapore. These are 
University of Birmingham Business School (hereafter: UBBS), Eada, NUS Business 
School (hereafter: NUSBS), University of Cambridge Judge Business School (hereafter: 
CJBS), University of Oxford Said Business School (hereafter: OSBS) and Strathclyde 
Business School (hereafter: USBS).  
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EU core cluster Country 
Birmingham Business School U.K. 
Eada Spain 
National University of Singapore Business School Singapore 
University of Cambridge: Judge U.K. 
University of Oxford: Saïd U.K. 
University of Strathclyde Business School U.K. 
                             Table 36: EU core cluster members 
 
All schools in the core cluster, except for CJBS and OSBS, have dedicated 
‘rankings’ websites, meaning that they have a separate site on their main website 
focusing specifically on their ranking performance. In the following, I will describe how 
the schools in the EU core cluster present rankings in their communication. I will 
specifically focus on the presentation of the FT MBA ranking. 
EADA presents results from the various FT and Economist rankings, and 
includes a specific reference to the FT MBA ranking 2011, the last time the school was 
ranked, without further comment (EADA, 2014).  
University of Birmingham Business School introduces its rankings website by 
stating that “the Birmingham MBA is highly ranked in the Global Top 100s. In fact, it 
has attracted excellent ratings from some of the leading business education rankings 
year after year” (UBBS, 2014). The school then showcases its performance in the 
Economist and Expansion MBA rankings, and falsely claims that “Birmingham 
Business School’s MBA was positioned at 86th in the world, 20th in Europe and 11th in 
the UK which included being ranked 35th for Career progression and ranked 6th for 
Value for Money” in the 2012 FT MBA ranking. In fact, UBBS had not been ranked at 
all in 2012, and achieved 87th and 73rd position worldwide in 2013 and 2014. The 
school then emphasises the importance of rankings with a section on “Why do rankings 
matter?”, making specific reference to quality, brand, value and marketability of the 
degree: 
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“Rankings are important because they are a measure of the quality of the 
MBA degree programme and student experience at specific universities and 
schools. Rankings are a quality mark for your MBA and add value to the 
brand of your business school. Success within the rankings guarantees that 
your degree remains highly regarded within the global employment market 
and enhances your portfolio, allowing you to boost your career, and 
command a higher salary.” (UBBS, 2014; emphasis added) 
 
The school nevertheless follows this up by including a subsection on “More than 
just rankings”: 
“Whilst rankings are very important, an MBA at Birmingham Business 
School offers much more. We offer a range of MBA student experiences to 
accompany our global top 100 rankings, including: Distinguished Leader 
Series Guest Lectures […],Networking and Employer Engagement […], 
[and] MBA Career Support […].” (UBBS, 2014; emphasis added). 
 
UBBS then concludes the page with a note to its alumni about the importance of 
rankings, pointing out how ranking participation “guarantees the value of your 
qualification within the employment market as well as assisting Birmingham Business 
School” (UBBS, 2014; emphasis added). 
 
NUS Business School has a dedicated ‘Rankings & Accreditation’ page, where 
it references the ranking performance of the university (QS World Rankings: “24th 
globally”; Times Higher Education World University Rankings: “26th globally”, Times 
Higher Education World Reputation Rankings: “22nd globally”), and the Business 
School (QS Global 200 Top Business Schools Report, University of Texas, Top 100 
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Business School Research Rankings, Forbes), including references to “#1”, “#2”, and 
“#3” placements in Asia. Despite its relatively high ranking (2011: 23rd, 2012: 23rd, 
2013: 36
th
, 2014:32
nd
), it only references its performance in the FT MBA rankings as 
“#10 for International Mobility”. The school concludes the section with a reference to 
its AACSB and EQUIS accreditations (NUSBS, 2014).  
 
 Strathclyde Business School has an ‘International Accreditations’ website, 
which it divides into three sections. In the “Rankings – undergraduate” section, the 
school references its ranking in disciplinary sub-rankings of the Times and Sunday 
Times Good University rankings, Guardian University rankings and Complete 
University guide. In the “Rankings – postgraduate” section, the school mentions that it 
is “1st in Scotland, top 10 in UK, top 20 in Europe and 73rd in the world (FT MBA, 
January 2014)”, and makes further reference to its performance in various other FT and 
Economist rankings. In the “External Recognition” section, the school states that it is “1 
of only 59 business schools in the world (out of 5000 +), and only Scottish business 
school with full international accreditation (AMBA, AACSB and EQUIS) ” (USBS, 
2014). This is false, as the University of Edinburgh Business School has been featuring 
these three accreditations for years (UEBS, 2014c). 
 
University of Oxford Said Business School does not have a dedicated rankings 
website, but features a ‘Facts and figures’ section on its MBA programme page with a 
subsection called “Oxford MBA in the rankings”, where it makes reference to the data 
sources and the school’s ranking performance in the BusinessWeek, FT and Forbes 
MBA rankings. It thereby takes a geographic reference point that is specifically not 
American: “Our one-year MBA is ranked 5th in Business Week’s full time MBA ranking 
outside the USA. […]Forbes magazine has ranked the Oxford MBA fifth among the top 
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non-US Business Schools.” (OSBS, 2014a; emphasis added). For the FT MBA ranking 
it adds criteria-specific performance to the geographic reference points: 
“Saïd Business School's MBA programme is ranked 23rd in the world and 
third in the UK. Our programme is in the top ten globally for student 
diversity and in the top twenty for value for money. (OSBS, 2014a; 
emphasis added)  
 This information is also emphasised in a press release regarding the rankings 
(OSBS, 2014b). Both pages conclude by a reference to OSBS’s AMBA and EQUIS 
accreditations. 
 
University of Cambridge Judge Business School does not have a dedicated 
‘rankings’ or ‘accreditations’ website. However, in a statement with regards to the FT 
MBA rankings, the school presents itself as the “top ranked one-year programme in the 
UK for the second year running” (CJBS, 2014; emphasis added). It then picks three 
criteria as reference points, saying that the school “featured in the top ten business 
schools in the world in three key areas of the FT survey: it was ranked 10th for career 
progression, 8th for value for money and 7th for aims achieved” (CJBS, 2014; emphasis 
added).  
To emphasise the importance of the outcome, a note by the dean of the school to 
the alumni is included: “I want to sincerely thank the alumni who took the time to give 
their feedback in response to the survey […]” (CJBS, 2014). This is followed by an 
appreciation of rankings in general: 
“This solid positioning in the global top 20 reflects the world-class 
programme we deliver at Cambridge Judge Business School. Rankings can 
be useful in giving us a chance to reflect on individual elements of our 
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students’ experience and of the School more broadly in relation to our 
peers.” (CJBS, 2014; emphasis added) 
 
The school then nevertheless adds that  
“However, [rankings] do not and should not drive our strategy, which is 
to offer our students a transformative educational experience and the tools 
to pursue their dreams. Along with providing elements that can be ranked 
– and ranked highly – our main goal is to offer a business education that 
equips people to understand the role of managerial actions in society and 
helps them shape their careers in the wider context of offering value to 
society.” (CJBS, 2014; emphasis added) 
 
 In conclusion, not only do all schools of the core cluster actively engage with 
rankings in general and the FT MBA rankings specifically, but they do so by following 
some of the mechanisms laid out in chapter III. Cluster members actively reinterpret 
ranking results, for example by choosing national or regional reference points, including 
the construction of sub-rankings on specific criteria. There is a discrepancy between 
some schools pointing out that rankings “do not drive strategy” and that “student 
experience” is more important than ranking performance. Contrastingly, others 
emphasise how rankings are “very important” as they measure “quality”. This includes 
claims of a positive effect of rankings on value, brand and general “regard”, including a 
positive outcome in terms of salary and employment prospects. These claims are not 
substantiated subsequently. Others specifically thank their alumni for participating, 
indicating that rankings are important tools for engaging with alumni. Virtually all 
actors mention other measurement devices, specifically other rankings and 
accreditations as a way of comparing, contrasting and relativising ranking results, above 
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all for low-performing cluster members. Remarkably, some schools make false claims 
about their ranking performance. Overall, this suggests that members of the EU cluster 
actively communicate their performance in the FT rankings specifically and rankings in 
general, indicating that there is an active engagement of the cluster members with their 
respective ranking frame. However, these observations are limited to the core cluster 
members. I will now discuss the composition of the peripheral cluster.  
 
Peripheral cluster. As can be seen in table 37, the composition of the EU 
peripheral cluster distinguishes itself from the core cluster on several dimensions, with 
the number of ranking actors in the peripheral cluster more than doubling in size from 
14 schools in 2006 to 33 in 2014. 
 
While the core cluster is mostly composed of mid to lowly or non-ranked schools, 
the peripheral cluster includes the full range of mainly European ranking actors in terms 
of ranking performance. However, many of the prestigious ranking actors like London 
Business School (appearing seven out of nine years between 2006 and 2014), IE 
Business School (eight years), IMD (seven years), HEC Paris (eight years), ESADE 
(eight years), IESE (seven years), INSEAD (six years) and Hong Kong UST (six years) 
gain high positions in the ranking in many years.  
This suggests that some European and Asian high-ranking schools, while not 
part of the core cluster, still are closely aligned with each other in most of the years. 
From 2011 on, all of the previously mentioned schools cluster with each other, as well 
as the lower ranked Bocconi, Manchester, Cass, Nanyang, Cranfield, AGSM, 
Rotterdam, Imperial, Lancaster, Schulich, Melbourne, Durham, Warwick, INCAE, 
Edinburgh, Bradford, Leeds, and EMLyon. This indicates that, while high-ranking 
actors are relatively dissimilar in the period between 2006 and 2010, over time they 
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become more similar to both each other and the combined EU core and peripheral 
cluster. This suggests that the core cluster expands over time, leading to an extended 
core of ranking actors that show similar characteristics.  
Tables 38 and 39 show a comparison of the means and standard deviations for 
all criteria and ranks of the European core and peripheral cluster. 
 
 
Table 38: Criteria means of core and peripheral EU clusters, per year 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean of 
criteria EU 
cluster 
Core (C) or 
peripheral 
(P) 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Emp3M C 84 86 93 92 79 85 89 93 85 
Emp3M P 79 89 90 88 87 84 86 86 80 
EmpDat C 87 80 81 79 75 80 83 83 87 
EmpDat P 80 88 84 88 89 88 92 91 89 
FacDoc C 79 77 79 78 77 81 86 85 83 
FacDoc P 89 91 93 90 89 93 93 93 94 
IntBoa C 41 42 40 43 39 39 42 43 44 
IntBoa P 43 48 35 52 44 52 46 46 48 
IntFac C 40 40 42 43 45 48 48 53 51 
IntFac P 53 51 54 53 43 54 56 58 58 
IntStu C 92 88 93 93 93 93 91 91 94 
IntStu P 78 83 77 81 87 84 80 80 81 
Lang C 8 0 0 8 8 8 8 0 0 
Lang P 39 39 0 28 31 27 26 24 23 
Rank C 79 69 66 48 67 50 66 67 64 
Rank P 52 49 54 45 44 40 53 55 61 
WomBoa C 29 30 31 28 27 31 32 32 34 
WomBoa P 18 18 21 23 25 25 24 24 25 
WomFac C 25 26 27 24 25 26 22 25 27 
WomFac P 21 22 24 24 27 26 26 26 27 
WomStu C 27 29 33 32 33 31 32 31 32 
WomStu P 27 31 28 29 27 29 30 34 32 
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 Table 39: Standard deviations of EU core and peripheral clusters, per year 
 
 
Interpretation. As we can see in tables 40 and 41, the EU core cluster ranks on 
average 26 places higher than the field average with an overall average rank of 38, and 
10 percentage points lower in terms of Faculty with Doctorate. However, the cluster 
distinguishes itself most clearly from the field in terms of international diversity criteria 
(Averages across years: IntFac: +9%; IntStu: +43% and IntBoa: +18%), as well as the 
female representation on the academic board (WomBoa: +12%).  
 
 
 
Standard 
deviation of 
criteria EU 
cluster 
Core (C) or 
peripheral 
(P) 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Emp3M C 14 13 4 5 25 11 7 4 8 
Emp3M P 17 9 6 13 5 10 11 12 14 
EmpDat C 17 20 25 13 23 11 7 14 14 
EmpDat P 20 10 13 12 8 13 6 11 11 
FacDoc C 25 30 25 26 25 24 15 17 15 
FacDoc P 10 8 5 10 8 6 9 9 7 
IntBoa C 23 21 23 18 15 16 12 10 12 
IntBoa P 28 27 20 24 24 27 24 25 25 
IntFac C 15 12 15 16 12 11 10 13 12 
IntFac P 25 22 15 22 14 22 19 18 18 
IntStu C 3 10 3 2 2 3 3 4 4 
IntStu P 11 8 12 12 9 10 16 15 13 
Lang C 20 0 0 20 20 20 20 0 0 
Lang P 40 37 0 32 31 29 28 28 28 
Rank C 42 43 52 32 46 28 49 48 48 
Rank P 39 35 26 36 32 29 37 39 41 
WomBoa C 14 11 15 16 13 13 14 14 15 
WomBoa P 10 12 12 11 11 10 10 9 9 
WomFac C 6 5 5 7 10 11 9 10 10 
WomFac P 8 8 4 8 7 7 7 7 7 
WomStu C 8 6 7 9 5 8 7 4 7 
WomStu P 6 7 7 9 5 5 6 7 9 
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EU Core Cluster 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Mean CV 
Rank 40 39 39 39 38 40 37 34 33 38 0.07 
Empl3M 84 86 93 92 79 85 89 93 85 87 0.06 
EmpDat 87 80 81 79 75 80 83 83 87 81 0.04 
WomFac 25 26 27 24 25 26 22 25 27 25 0.05 
WomStu 27 29 33 32 33 31 32 31 32 31 0.06 
WomBoa 29 30 31 28 27 31 32 32 34 30 0.07 
IntFac 40 40 42 43 45 48 48 53 51 46 0.10 
IntStu 92 88 93 93 93 93 91 91 94 92 0.02 
IntBoa 41 42 40 43 39 39 42 43 44 41 0.04 
FacDoc 79 77 79 78 77 81 86 85 83 80 0.04 
Lang 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.95 
Table 40: EU core cluster average performance, per year 
 
As we can see in tables 42 and 43, the picture is slightly different for the 
peripheral cluster. The average ranking of the peripheral cluster is 50, which is 12 ranks 
lower than the core cluster. As compared to the core cluster, the peripheral cluster also 
shows a less pronounced difference to the field (average across years: WomBoa: +3, 
IntStu: +26 and FacDoc: +1). Contrastingly, the average difference for IntFac (+13) is 
more pronounced, and equally as pronounced for IntBoa (+18). Thus, the peripheral 
cluster consists of ranking actors ranked lower than the average field and the EU core 
cluster, but outperform both in terms of international faculty, while scoring similarly on 
international board membership. Moreover, the EU peripheral cluster only distinguishes 
itself significantly from the field in terms of international diversity criteria, while the 
EU core cluster does so on female board membership and faculty with doctorates as 
well.  
 
Cluster EU P 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Mean CV 
Rank 52 49 54 45 44 40 53 55 61 50 0.13 
Empl3M 79 89 90 88 87 84 86 86 80 86 0.05 
EmpDat 80 88 84 88 89 88 92 91 89 88 0.04 
WomFac 21 22 24 24 27 26 26 26 27 25 0.10 
WomStu 27 31 28 29 27 29 30 34 32 30 0.08 
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WomBoa 18 18 21 23 25 25 24 24 25 23 0.12 
IntFac 53 51 54 53 43 54 56 58 58 53 0.08 
IntStu 78 83 77 81 87 84 80 80 81 81 0.04 
IntBoa 43 48 35 52 44 52 46 46 48 46 0.11 
FacDoc 89 91 93 90 89 93 93 93 94 92 0.02 
Lang 0.79 0.78 0.00 0.56 0.63 0.54 0.53 0.49 0.45 0.53 0.44 
Table 42: EU peripheral cluster average performance, per year 
 
The strength on the international criteria of the cluster is partly a reflection of 
the fact that European schools are based in relatively small countries with a low 
geographic distance to other countries. European schools thus have a tradition of 
recruiting students, faculty and board members from beyond their home market. They 
also face fewer barriers in doing so, as other markets are geographically close. The 
same applies to Singapore, which is an international trade hub. The differences in 
ranking position, faculty with doctorate and female board membership require a more 
detailed explanation. I will thus examine the Marginal Improvement Indicator as well as 
the Ranking Frame Indicator (see chapter VII) for both clusters. 
As we can see in tables 44 and 45, the marginal performance improvement or 
deterioration of both the core and peripheral cluster as compared to the field are 
relatively low. Only three periods (EU core, EmpDat, 2006-07: -10; EU peripheral, 
IntBoa, 2007-09: -14 and +15; EU peripheral, IntFac, 2009-11: -10 and +10) show 
changes above 10 points, with an approximately equal number of negative and positive 
MMIs. On average, year-to-year improvements are between -1 and +1 over all periods. 
This suggests that the clusters are not improving or deteriorating significantly in 
performance as compared to the field, meaning that not only the number of clusters is 
stable, but also their position in the field. 
As shown in table 46, this is confirmed when looking at the Ranking Frame 
Indicators for both the EU core and peripheral clusters. Strategic emphasis on 
improvement as compared to the field is low on all criteria, and only appears to be 
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higher for the language criterion, which can however be explained for the most part 
through a triple change of the indicator for a single school (EADA). 
 
RFI for EU C and P RFI EU C RFI EU P 
WomStu 11 12 
IntFac 11 -2 
WomBoa 8 18 
FacDoc 4 5 
Empl3M 2 2 
IntStu -3 -2 
IntBoa -3 -1 
EmpDat -5 6 
WomFac -10 13 
Lang -68 -35 
              Table 46: Ranking Frame Indicator of EU core and peripheral clusters 
 
 Conclusion. A stable core cluster of predominantly European ranking actors has 
emerged from the data. These actors actively communicate their performance in the FT 
rankings in specific and rankings in general, indicating that there is an engagement of 
the cluster members with their respective ranking frame. EU cluster members 
distinguish themselves from the field by their high performance on international 
diversity criteria, their relatively high overall ranking performance, their low 
performance on the faculty with doctorate criterion and their relatively high 
participation of female board members. In addition, the peripheral cluster shows a less 
pronounced difference in performance to the field average, but includes many high-
ranking actors that perform very highly on most criteria, above all on international 
diversity criteria. The strength of the EU clusters in terms of international criteria is 
consistent with the overall strength of European and some Asian ranking actors in terms 
of attracting international students and faculty, and the emphasis on international and 
diversity dimensions in communication of schools. Importantly, the marginal 
performance improvements of EU core and peripheral ranking actors do not indicate an 
increase in difference between the EU clusters and the ranking field. This suggests that 
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the position of the clusters within the field is stable over time. This lends further 
evidence to the proposition that the clusters are indeed stable and not ephemeral within 
the ranking field. In addition, the evidence points to an expansion of the core cluster 
over time, suggesting that European ranking actors show an increasingly similar 
performance over time.   
 
 
2 The American cluster 
 
Core cluster. As can be seen in table 47, the US core cluster consists of 35 
ranking actors, most of them being situated in the southern and mid-western parts of the 
US. One cluster member is from Brazil (Coppead), one from Mexico (IPADE), one 
from Colombia (Facultad de Administracion Universidad de los Andes) and one from 
South Korea (Kaist College of Business). The overall rank average of the cluster is 72. 
 
 In the following, I will describe how the schools in the US core cluster present 
rankings in general, and specifically the FT MBA ranking in their public 
communication. As can be seen in table 48, 30 out of 35 schools have dedicated ranking 
websites.  
  
Out of the five schools that do not, four however mention or discuss ranking 
results in other sections, for example ‘Fast facts’. Only Carroll School of Management 
does not mention rakings in their publication communication at all. Out of the 34 
schools that use rankings, most use the U.S. News & World Report MBA or Business 
School rankings (26). About an equal number of schools makes reference to the 
BusinessWeek MBA ranking (19), Forbes MBA or Business School ranking (21), and 
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FT MBA rankings (20). For the FT ranking, not all schools use the most recent results, 
but rather communicate their ranking position using data reaching back up to 2011. This 
is usually the case when schools have suffered a decrease in performance, or dropped 
off the rankings. Only four schools use the Wall Street Journal MBA ranking, whilst 13 
schools are using other MBA rankings like Expansion, or Poets & Quants.  
Thus, despite the FT not having an equally prominent position in the US as on 
the European continent, most schools still use the FT MBA rankings as a marker of 
quality, reputation or status. The considerable number of 15 schools that do not use the 
FT rankings, despite participating in the ranking process, suggest however that US 
schools in particular are in a position to strategically choose what ranking to use in their 
communication. Unsurprisingly, the schools usually pick the rankings in which they 
show high performance. As most of the schools in the US core cluster perform on a 
rather low level, many choose not to communicate their low performance in the FT 
ranking. This suggests that in the American business school field, the FT rankings are 
not currently seen as an essential part of the social standing of schools.  
As we can see in table 49, out of the 20 schools that use the FT ranking, most 
use specific reference points to reinterpret the ranking result.  
 
Five schools use their performance on specific criteria to build sub-rankings, 
above all using the career, salary and ‘aims achieved’ related indicators. Three schools 
build sub-rankings in terms of institutional control (public/ private). While ten schools 
take their national performance as reference points, all except for one also disclose their 
performance in terms of the worldwide ranking position. While 13 schools use their 
AACSB accreditation, only three use the European EQUIS accreditation, and only one 
the British AMBA accreditation. Overall, while most of the schools use their FT 
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ranking results, most do so in an eclectic manner, choosing specific reference points to 
present their ranking performance.  
Notably, and as compared to the European schools in the EU core cluster, none 
of the schools offers a critique or appreciation of rankings. Neither does any school 
mention specific competitors, reference regional competitors, or use North America or 
the American continent as geographic reference points. This contrasts with the 
European and Asian ranking actors, which make frequent reference to their position 
within Europe or Asia, and offer at times detailed critiques of ranking methodology or 
practice.  
 
 Peripheral cluster. Similarly to the EU cluster, the composition of the US 
peripheral cluster distinguishes itself from the US core cluster on several accounts. As 
we can see in table 50, the number of ranking actors in the peripheral cluster multiplies 
in size from seven schools in 2006 to 40 schools in 2014.  
While the core cluster is mostly composed of mid to lowly or non-ranked 
schools, the peripheral cluster includes the full range of ranking actors in terms of 
ranking performance. However, many prestigious ranking actors like Yale School of 
Management (part of the peripheral cluster eight out of nine times between 2006 and 
2014), Tuck School of Business (eight years), Kellogg School of Management (seven 
years), Wharton School (five years), Stanford Graduate School of Business (five years), 
Harvard Business School (five years), Sloan School of Management (six years), Booth 
School of Business (five years), Stern School of Business (five years), Fuqua School of 
Business (five years), Johnson Graduate School of Management (six years) gain high 
positions in the ranking in many years. This suggests that some of the high-performing 
American schools, while not part of the core cluster, are still closely aligned with the 
core cluster in most of the years. From 2010 on, Sloan, Yale, Tuck and Johnson cluster 
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with each other, as do the lower performing Connecticut, D'Amore-McKim, Katz, 
Washington University Olin, Fox, Haskayne, Ross, Smith, Urbana-Champaign, Merage, 
Cape Town, Kenan-Flagler, Tippie, Davis, and Babson College Olin. This indicates 
that, while high-ranking actors are relatively dissimilar in the period between 2006 and 
2009 in terms of ranking performance, over time they become more similar to both each 
other and the combined US core and peripheral cluster. Overall, similarly to the EU 
cluster, this suggests that the core cluster expands over time, leading to an extended 
core of ranking actors that show similar characteristics. 
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A comparison of the performance of the core and peripheral US cluster can be 
found in tables 51 and 52. 
 
Table 51: Criteria means of core and peripheral US clusters, per year 
 
Standard 
deviation of 
criteria (US 
cluster) 
Core (C) 
or 
peripheral 
(P) 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Emp3M C 15 11 17 15 17 18 14 15 13 
Emp3M P 7 7 9 6 10 8 8 9 6 
EmpDat C 16 5 10 9 9 5 8 5 6 
EmpDat P 3 7 9 7 12 3 7 6 7 
FacDoc C 15 15 13 13 13 12 13 13 12 
FacDoc P 12 6 7 6 9 10 9 8 9 
IntBoa C 4 6 4 5 4 7 14 10 11 
IntBoa P 7 8 17 4 18 15 17 16 18 
IntFac C 8 7 7 8 7 8 9 12 10 
IntFac P 8 9 14 7 10 8 12 12 13 
IntStu C 10 9 9 9 10 9 10 12 11 
IntStu P 6 8 9 8 9 9 10 9 10 
Lang C 16 16 16 14 14 14 16 16 18 
Lang P 0 0 13 0 16 0 8 11 13 
Rank C 29 32 31 31 30 29 31 31 33 
Rank P 27 37 39 35 40 42 43 44 44 
WomBoa C 5 6 6 6 5 6 7 6 8 
WomBoa P 12 8 9 7 8 4 9 9 8 
WomFac C 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
WomFac P 4 6 6 4 6 6 6 7 7 
WomStu C 9 6 6 6 7 7 7 7 6 
WomStu P 4 7 9 6 6 7 5 6 6 
Table 52: Standard deviations of US core and peripheral cluster, per year 
Mean of 
criteria (US 
cluster) 
Core (C) or 
peripheral 
(P) 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Emp3M C 83 88 87 86 75 79 83 84 84 
Emp3M P 90 91 90 89 81 86 88 87 88 
EmpDat C 89 96 93 93 93 95 95 97 96 
EmpDat P 96 94 93 93 91 96 95 95 95 
FacDoc C 88 89 88 88 88 87 87 86 87 
FacDoc P 91 93 93 92 92 90 92 92 91 
IntBoa C 3 3 3 4 3 5 7 7 8 
IntBoa P 6 7 17 5 19 15 18 20 23 
IntFac C 14 16 17 17 17 18 20 22 21 
IntFac P 18 26 36 22 32 28 36 36 37 
IntStu C 27 27 27 25 23 25 25 30 29 
IntStu P 33 35 38 39 36 34 39 41 41 
Lang C 6 6 6 4 4 4 6 6 7 
Lang P 0 0 3 0 5 0 1 3 4 
Rank C 76 75 82 81 80 82 84 89 86 
Rank P 42 56 58 75 58 71 60 60 58 
WomBoa C 13 14 12 15 14 14 15 16 16 
WomBoa P 15 17 17 17 16 16 17 18 17 
WomFac C 22 23 23 24 24 24 24 25 26 
WomFac P 20 23 22 24 24 26 24 25 25 
WomStu C 31 31 31 31 30 31 29 32 30 
WomStu P 28 33 34 33 32 31 32 33 33 
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Interpretation. As we can see in tables 53 and 54, with an overall average 
ranking of 82, the US core cluster ranks on average 18 ranks lower than the field 
average. The US core cluster exhibits an average of female board members that is 
slightly lower (-4%) than the field average over the years. However, the cluster 
distinguishes itself most clearly from the field in terms of the international diversity 
criteria (IntFac: -18%; IntStu: -22% and IntBoa: -19%). The criteria that change most 
over time are IntBoa (CV=0.40), IntFac (CV=0.13), and Lang (CV=0.18), suggesting 
that international criteria are more frequently the target of strategic changes than other 
the criteria, which remain relatively stable.  
 
Cluster US C 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Mean CV 
Rank 76 75 82 81 80 82 84 89 86 82 0.05 
Emp3M 83 88 87 86 75 79 83 84 84 83 0.05 
EmpDat 89 96 93 93 93 95 95 97 96 94 0.03 
WomFac 22 23 23 24 24 24 24 25 26 24 0.05 
WomStu 31 31 31 31 30 31 29 32 30 31 0.03 
WomBoa 13 14 12 15 14 14 15 16 16 14 0.09 
IntFac 14 16 17 17 17 18 20 22 21 18 0.13 
IntStu 27 27 27 25 23 25 25 30 29 26 0.08 
IntBoa 3 3 3 4 3 5 7 7 8 5 0.40 
FacDoc 88 89 88 88 88 87 87 86 87 88 0.01 
Lang 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.18 
Table 53: US core cluster average performance   
 
The picture is only slightly different for the peripheral US cluster, as an 
examination of tables 55 and 56 reveals. While the average rank is higher (60), and thus 
only six places below the average field ranking, the difference of the international 
diversity criteria is not as strong as for the core cluster, with IntFac scoring 6% and 
IntStu 12% and IntBoa 9% below field average, while WomBoa performs only 2% 
below field average. This suggests that US cluster members distinguish themselves 
mainly along the lines of international student, faculty and board membership. This is 
explained mainly through the large home market of the US business school field, and 
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the relative distance to other geographic markets, which makes the recruitment of 
foreign nationals more difficult. Another explanation might be the citizenship laws of 
the US. As foreign passport holders usually have the possibility of acquiring US 
citizenship after few years, whereas other countries have higher barriers and longer 
procedures the naturalisation of immigrants, this might lead to a relatively lower 
number of foreign passport holders in US schools. Notably, the FT uses the numbers of 
foreign passport holders as measure of internationality, not origin or migration status.  
 
Cluster US P 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Mean CV 
Rank 42 56 58 75 58 71 60 60 58 60 0.16 
Emp3M 90 91 90 89 81 86 88 87 88 88 0.04 
EmpDat 96 94 93 93 91 96 95 95 95 94 0.02 
WomFac 20 23 22 24 24 26 24 25 25 24 0.07 
WomStu 28 33 34 33 32 31 32 33 33 32 0.06 
WomBoa 15 17 17 17 16 16 17 18 17 16 0.06 
IntFac 18 26 36 22 32 28 36 36 37 30 0.24 
IntStu 33 35 38 39 36 34 39 41 41 37 0.08 
IntBoa 6 7 17 5 19 15 18 20 23 14 0.46 
FacDoc 91 93 93 92 92 90 92 92 91 92 0.01 
Lang 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.11 
Table 55: US peripheral cluster average performance  
 
As we can see in tables 57 and 58, the marginal performance improvement or 
deterioration of both clusters as compared to the field is relatively low. For the EU core 
cluster, the highest MMIs are +4 and -2 (EmpDat: 2006 to 2008). Most other criteria are 
between -2 and +2.  
The picture for the peripheral cluster is only slightly different. Only four periods 
(IntFac, 2008-10: -15 and +10; IntBoa, 2008-10: -13 and +14) show changes above 10 
points, with an approximately equal number of negative and positive MMIs. However, 
these changes are usually equalised in the following periods. Thus, on average over all 
years, year-to-year improvements are between -1 and +2. This suggests that the cluster 
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is not improving or deteriorating significantly in performance as compared to the field, 
meaning that the US cluster is stable in terms of its position in the field. 
 
MII US C - 
DS1 
2006-
2007 
2007-
2008 
2008-
2009 
2009-
2010 
2010-
2011 
2011-
2012 
2012-
2013 
2013-
2014 
Mean 
Rank 10 10 17 -20 18 -13 4 0 3 
Emp3M 2 -2 0 -2 0 1 1 2 0 
EmpDat 4 -2 0 2 -1 -1 1 0 0 
WomFac 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 
WomStu -1 0 0 0 1 -2 1 -1 0 
WomBoa 1 -2 1 -1 0 0 0 0 0 
IntFac 1 -1 0 -1 0 1 0 0 0 
IntStu 0 -1 -2 0 0 -1 2 -1 0 
IntBoa 1 -1 0 -1 1 2 -1 -1 0 
FacDoc 0 -1 0 0 -1 0 -1 1 0 
Lang 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Table 57: Marginal Improvement Indicator of US core cluster 
 
MII US P - 
DS1 
2006-
2007 
2007-
2008 
2008-
2009 
2009-
2010 
2010-
2011 
2011-
2012 
2012-
2013 
2013-
2014 
Mean 
Rank 25 5 35 -37 31 -27 -2 1 4 
Emp3M -3 -1 -1 1 2 -2 0 3 0 
EmpDat -5 -1 0 -1 3 -3 0 1 -1 
WomFac 2 -1 2 -1 2 -2 0 -1 0 
WomStu 3 1 -1 1 -2 1 -1 1 0 
WomBoa 2 1 -1 -1 0 0 0 0 0 
IntFac 7 9 -15 10 -5 7 -2 1 2 
IntStu 2 3 1 -3 -3 3 0 1 1 
IntBoa 1 9 -13 14 -5 3 1 2 1 
FacDoc 2 -1 0 0 -2 1 0 -1 0 
Lang 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Table 58: Marginal Improvement Indicator of US peripheral cluster 
 
This is confirmed when looking at the Ranking Frame Indicators for both the US 
core and peripheral clusters, as shown in table 59. Strategic emphasis on improvement 
as compared to the field is low on all criteria, and only appears to be higher for the 
language criterion of the core cluster. For the peripheral cluster, the RFI is low for most 
criteria, while being moderately high for IntFac (73) and high for IntBoa (185). This 
suggests that, for the period between 2006 and 2014, the strategic emphasis on the 
international diversity criteria was limited to the peripheral cluster. As compared to the 
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field average, the core cluster remains remarkably stable on all criteria throughout all 
periods. This again suggests that the cluster, as well as its position in the field, is 
relatively stable.  
 
RFI 2006-2014 US C US P 
Lang 71 - 
EmpDat 3 -5 
Emp3M 1 -2 
WomBoa 1 0 
WomFac -2 1 
IntFac -2 73 
FacDoc -2 -1 
WomStu -7 11 
IntStu -8 13 
IntBoa -12 185 
                            Table 59: Ranking Frame Indicator of US core and peripheral clusters 
 
Conclusion. As we can see from the preceding sections, a stable core cluster of 
predominantly US schools has emerged from the data. These actors distinguish 
themselves from the field by their low performance on international diversity criteria 
and their relatively low overall ranking performance. In addition, the peripheral cluster 
of ranking actors has a less pronounced difference in performance to the field average, 
but includes many high-ranking actors that perform very strongly on most criteria. 
Importantly, the marginal performance improvements of US core and peripheral ranking 
actors do not indicate an increasing difference between the US clusters and the ranking 
field. Similarly to the EU cluster, this suggests that the position of the cluster is stable, 
lending further evidence to the proposition that the clusters are indeed stable within the 
ranking field. In addition, the evidence points to an expansion of the core cluster from 
2010 on, indicating that an increasing number of American ranking actors show a 
similar performance in terms of ranking criteria, in particular high-ranking ones like 
162 
 
 
 
Sloan and Yale School of Management. Having examined each set of clusters in detail, 
I will now compare the EU and US clusters.  
 
 
 
 
3 Comparison of the European and American clusters 
 In the following, I will compare the development of the EU and US clusters in 
terms of measures of central tendency. Firstly, I will however examine the ranking 
actors that are non-affiliated, meaning that they are neither part of the EU or US 
clusters. I will conclude with a discussion of the differences between the ranking field 
and both clusters. 
 
 Non-aligned ranking actors. As we can see in table 60, while there are 37 
ranking actors that cluster neither with the US or EU clusters in 2006, this number 
declines to reach 27 ranking actors in 2011. In 2012, 2013, and 2014, all ranking actors 
cluster with either the EU or US clusters. This suggests that over time, there is an 
increasing split in the ranking field, as schools align with either cluster. The non-
affiliated ranking actors are mainly from three groups. The smallest group is composed 
of low-ranking US actors, for example Jindal (ranked five out of nine years), Simon 
(four years) and Thunderbird (four years). The second group are Canadian business 
schools, composed of Desautels (five years), Alberta (four years), Sauder (four years), 
Rotman (five years), HEC Montreal (four years) and Telfer (five years). The biggest 
group consists in a set of high-ranking and high status business schools from the US, 
including one from France (HEC, five years) and one Chinese school (CEIBS, five 
years). The American schools are Harvard (four years), Stanford (four years), Columbia 
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(five years), Booth (four years), Stern (four years), Haas (four years), Fuqua (four years) 
and Wharton (four years).  
 Thus, in particular prestigious American schools and mid to low ranking 
Canadian schools are forming a distinct group in many years, only joining the clusters 
in the later periods. This suggests that these schools, albeit not being part of a stable 
third cluster, are distinct from the other American and European schools in their 
strategic profiles for most of the year.   
Figures 47 to 64 show a comparison of the trends in terms of means and 
standard deviations of all ranking actors as well as the two clusters, for each criterion. 
As can be seen in the figures, while some of the trends converge over time, several 
variables show a pattern of increasingly different means and variances, or stable 
difference. In the following, I will analyse the development of the criteria on which 
ranking actors do not cluster, followed by a description of the criteria on which they do.  
 
Criteria on which ranking actors do not cluster. As we can see in figures 46, 
47 and 48, the means of the clusters as well as the field are virtually indistinguishable in 
terms of the Emp3M, WomFac and WomStu criteria over most years. Confirming the 
findings from chapter VIII, this suggests that clusters do not distinguish themselves on 
these criteria. 
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Figure 46: Comparison of cluster means, Emp3M 
 
 
 
 
165 
 
 
 
 
Figure 47: Comparison of cluster means, WomFac 
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Figure 48: Comparison of cluster means, WomStu 
 
As can be seen in figure 49, from the 2008 on, both clusters and the field diverge 
in variance on the Emp3M criterion, with the EU core cluster showing lower variance 
throughout all years except for 2010. This suggests that for the European cluster 
schools, employment prospects are a mark of distinction, but less so than both the 
average ranking field and the US core cluster. The exceptionally high variance in the 
year 2010 can be explained by the effects of the financial crisis, which affected 
European schools to a greater extent than American ones in terms of employment. 
While the field trend and US cluster show a slight decline in terms of variance, the 
European cluster shows the heaviest decline. This suggests that in the European 
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business school field, placing graduates quickly into jobs is becoming less of a means of 
distinction, while it remains one in the US field.  
 
 
Figure 49: Comparison of cluster standard deviations, Emp3M 
 
 
 As we can see in figure 50, in terms of female faculty, the field and the US core 
cluster show a very similar variance in all periods, with barely any change in tendency 
over the years. However, the EU core cluster shows a relatively strong and almost 
continuous increase in variance over time. This suggests that for European business 
schools, female participation in the faculty becomes increasingly a means of distinction, 
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and that the European business school field becomes increasingly different in terms of 
the variance of female faculty participation from both the US and the overall business 
school fields.   
 
 
Figure 50: Comparison of cluster standard deviations, WomFac 
 
 As we can see in figure 51, while the variance of all both clusters and the field 
appears to be slightly decreasing over the years, no clear pattern emerges in terms of the 
distinctiveness of the clusters and the field in terms of female participation in the 
student body.  
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Figure 51: Comparison of cluster standard deviations, WomStu 
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Criteria on which ranking actors cluster. As we can see in figure 52, while 
both clusters and the field show a slight increase in compliance with employment data, 
the US cluster and the overall ranking field have virtually indistinguishable rates of 
compliance. This suggest that the US cluster is closer to the field than the European 
cluster on that criterion. While the difference between the average field compliance and 
the EU cluster compliance shrinks in 2014, the distinction between the cluster and the 
European schools is nevertheless maintained. This suggests that the EU cluster schools 
are different in terms of compliance with employment data submission from both the 
field and the US cluster. This effect may be due to the overall weaker relation with 
alumni that European schools have as compared to their American counterparts, 
resulting in lower compliance rates with ranking data submission. 
 
171 
 
 
 
 
Figure 52: Comparison of cluster means, EmpDat 
 
As we can see in figure 53, on the EmpDat criterion, the clusters and the field 
distinguish themselves in terms of variance from 2007 on. The only exception is the 
year 2012, where both clusters and the field have similar variances. While the EU 
cluster shows a constantly high variance as compared to the field and the US cluster 
with the exception of 2012, the variance of the field declines strongly at the same time. 
The decline in variance of the EU cluster is less pronounced. The decline of the 
variance of the US cluster is thus stronger than the decline of both the EU cluster and 
the field, with the variance staying well below the field average in all years except 2012. 
Overall, this suggests that the EmpDat criterion is becoming less of a means of 
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distinction for the field and both clusters. However, while compliance with the 
submission of employment data was a distinguishing factor for both American and 
European schools in 2006, by 2014 this was much less the case for American schools 
than it was for European ones.  
 
 
Figure 53: Comparison of cluster standard deviations, EmpDat 
 
 As figure 54 shows, the US cluster barely distinguishes itself from the overall 
field in terms of the percentage of faculty with a doctorate. However, the difference is 
becoming more pronounced over the years, with US schools showing lower scores on 
this criterion as compared to the field. This might be partially due to a trend of making 
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business education more practitioner-oriented in the US. At the same time, the EU 
cluster shows a relatively clear increase in terms of faculty with doctorates, approaching 
the average of the US cluster in 2012 and 2013.   
 
 
Figure 54: Comparison of cluster means, FacDoc 
 
As we can see in figure 55, the variance of the US cluster and the field is 
virtually indistinguishable for most years, suggesting that the faculty with doctorates is 
losing in significance as distinguishing factor to a similar extent in both the US cluster 
and the field. The EU cluster appears to converge to that trend, with the initially high 
values in terms of variance almost constantly declining to similar levels until 2014. 
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Overall, this suggests that faculty with a doctorate is becoming less of a distinguishing 
factor in both clusters as well as the overall ranking field.  
 
 
Figure 55: Comparison of cluster standard deviations, FacDoc 
 
As we can see in figure 56, the clusters and the field clearly distinguish 
themselves from each other in terms of female board participation. While both the US 
core cluster and the field show a slight rise in terms of the WomBoa criterion, female 
board participation in US schools in the cluster remains distinctively low. Contrastingly, 
the EU core cluster shows a much stronger increase in female board participation than 
the US cluster, despite its high starting value in 2006, which is more than double (29%) 
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as high as the score of the US core cluster (13%). This suggests that not only does the 
EU cluster distinguish itself from both the US cluster and the field in terms of female 
board participation, but also that that distinction is growing.  
 
 
Figure 56: Comparison of cluster means, WomBoa 
 
 As we can see in figure 57, both the EU cluster shows a high, and increasing, 
distinctiveness from the field in terms of female board membership. The US cluster 
variance is increasing at a similar rate, but from an average below the ranking field. 
This suggests that female board membership remains a constant distinguishing feature 
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of the field, with both clusters increasing in distinctiveness, while at the same time 
maintaining a different degree of variance from both each other and the field over time. 
 
 
Figure 57: Comparison of cluster standard deviations, WomBoa 
 
 As we can see in figures 58, 59 and 60, the clusters and the ranking field most 
clearly distinguish themselves on all three international diversity criteria, i.e. 
international board, student and faculty participation. For all three criteria, the 
distinctive profile is maintained for the field and both clusters between 2006 and 2009, 
despite both the clusters and the field slightly growing over time. The only exception is 
the EU cluster, where the percentage of international faculty is increasing at a slightly 
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faster rate than the US cluster and the field average. Overall, this suggests that 
international diversity in terms of faculty, student and board participation is a lasting 
point of distinction for both clusters from the field, with the EU cluster performing 
markedly higher on international criteria than the US cluster and the field.  
  
 
Figure 58: Comparison of cluster means, IntBoa 
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Figure 59: Comparison of cluster means, IntFac 
 
  
0.0
10.0
20.0
30.0
40.0
50.0
60.0
70.0
80.0
90.0
100.0
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Cluster means IntFac 
IntFac mean EU core IntFac mean US core
IntFac mean overall Linear (IntFac mean EU core)
Linear (IntFac mean US core) Linear (IntFac mean overall)
179 
 
 
 
 
Figure 60: Comparison of cluster means, IntStu 
 
 As we can see in figure 61 and 62, international board and faculty membership 
remain fairly constant factors of distinction in the field between 2006 and 2014. 
However, the EU cluster shows a declining trend in terms of variance on both criteria, 
while the US cluster starts from relatively low levels in 2006 and converges with the EU 
cluster variance trend from 2012 on. This suggests that international board and faculty 
membership are becoming less of a distinguishing feature of the EU cluster ranking 
actors, while the opposite is the case for the US cluster. However, both clusters 
converge to equal levels of variance from 2012 on. This is in contrast to the high field 
average, which suggests that distinction through the international board and faculty 
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membership is more of a factor in the field than it is within the clusters. This indicates 
that the ranking actors outside the EU and US clusters continue to distinguish 
themselves through their percentage of international board and faculty members. 
  
 
 
Figure 61: Comparison of cluster standard deviations, IntBoa 
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Figure 62: Comparison of cluster standard deviations, IntFac 
 
 As we can see in figure 63, the pattern is different for international student 
participation. While the variance of the field increases slowly but clearly between 2006 
and 2014, it increases at a similar rate for the US cluster, but decreases for the EU 
cluster. This suggests that international students are becoming more of a distinguishing 
feature for the field and the US cluster, while becoming less so for the EU cluster. This 
can be partially explained through the high average percentage of international students 
in the EU cluster, which may make it more difficult for ranking actors to achieve 
performance improvements or show varying performance.  
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Figure 63: Comparison of cluster standard deviations, IntStu 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
183 
 
 
 
Conclusion. In the preceding sections, I have described the EU and US core and 
peripheral clusters, as well as non-affiliated ranking actors, both in terms of 
composition, structure, and development of measures of central tendency. While the 
core clusters are naturally homogeneous in their composition, both the peripheral EU 
and US clusters contain many business schools that are performing highly in the 
ranking, suggesting that high status schools are only loosely related to the core clusters. 
This however changes over time, as an increasing number of high status ranking actors 
are clustering with the core cluster members. This indicates that the field of business 
schools is increasingly splitting into one EU cluster, mainly containing European 
ranking actors, and a US cluster, mainly containing American ranking actors of both 
high and low ranks. In the long term, this raises questions about the approach of the FT 
to combine American, European and Asian schools in a single ranking, as discussed in 
chapter II. The evidence presented in this chapter shows that despite the strong 
influence of the FT ranking, the attainment of this objective is becoming less feasible.  
In addition, a strong number of Canadian and low and high status American 
business schools remains independent of the clustering process for most of the time, 
only joining either cluster after 2011. This suggests that some schools, above all high 
status American schools, were able to maintain their distinctive profile, only becoming 
more similar to either cluster towards the end of the observation period. This provides 
confirmation of the proposition of the emergence of two distinctive fields with a core of 
American and European business schools as well as a periphery of schools that align 
with the core. 
On the one hand, EU ranking actors deal with their performance in the FT MBA 
rankings in more detail in their communication, including critique and appreciation of 
the ranking and its methodology on dedicated ‘rankings’ websites. On the other hand, 
schools in the US cluster only use the FT rankings as one of several measurement 
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devices, specifically other rankings and accreditations. However, actors from both 
clusters display an active engagement with the rankings, discussing them in light of 
their strategy, and using reference points, specifically geographic and criterion-related 
ones, to contextualise and reinterpret the FT rankings.  
The criteria on which the clusters and the field distinguish themselves most 
clearly are the diversity criteria International Faculty, International Board and 
International Student, as well as female board membership. The Faculty with Doctorate 
criterion serves to a lesser extent as a mark of distinction. This suggests that diversity as 
well as faculty-related criteria serve most clearly to distinguish schools in the ranking 
field. This can be explained through the availability of candidates in the European and 
American Business School fields, as well as the ensuing different strategic outlook of 
the schools in each field.  Confirming the findings from chapter VIII, I showed that the 
two clusters distinguish themselves barely on the Emp3M, WomFac and WomStu 
criteria over most years. This suggests that schools in both clusters are subject to similar 
environmental conditions in terms of employment conditions, given that there is an 
international labour market for MBA graduates. This also indicates that schools in both 
clusters face similar difficulty in recruiting female faculty and students, indicating that 
the issue of gender imbalance in business education transcends national boundaries.  
While the clusters change over time, both barely change as compared to the 
field, suggesting that not only the number, but also the relative position of the clusters 
remains stable over time. The development of schools in terms of performance and 
similarity is criterion specific. With the exception of the heavily left-skewed criteria 
Emp3M and FacDoc, all criteria show slow, but clear upwards trends in terms of their 
performance. This counts for the field as well as both clusters. The fact that these 
criteria are heavily left-skewed suggests also that high employment prospects and high 
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percentage of faculty with a doctorate have become a de facto standard in the FT 
ranking field.  
The development of the criteria in terms of their capability to serve as markers 
of distinctiveness between low and high performers is however more nuanced. While 
some criteria decrease in variance (Emp3M, EmpDat, FacDoc, IntStu, WomStu), others 
increase in variance (WomFac, WomBoa) while others do not show a clear 
development (IntBoa, IntFac, Lang) in terms of their different field and respective 
cluster variances, suggesting that the FT ranking does not have a consistent 
homogenising effect on ranking actors. At the same time, international diversity criteria 
maintain, but do not expand their status as indicators of distinction. Overall, this 
indicates that individual and clusters of ranking actors respond to the pressures 
emanating from the ranking with a range of different adaptive strategies, based on the 
range of strategic responses discussed in chapter III. However, it also shows that how 
ranking actors choose to engage with their ranking frame is at least partially contingent 
on their environmental context, and particularly geographic location. I will summarise 
my key findings from the thesis and discuss their significance in more detail in chapter 
X. 
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X DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
 
This thesis has significantly advanced the literature on rankings through 
elucidating the relationship between concepts that help to understand rankings and their 
impact on organisations and fields. In particular, it has clarified how cognitive and 
strategic processes at the organisational level, which underlie the measurement and 
ranking process, impact on macro outcomes on the level of the organisational field. In 
doing so, it has introduced the concepts of the ranking template and frame, and offered 
an explanation of the conditions and mechanisms of the ranking process. As a result, it 
has shown that the outcome of the ranking process can both be differentiation and 
homogenisation of ranking actors and fields. This thesis thus makes several 
contributions to the literatures on rankings and performance measurement.  
In this chapter, I first will explain the key findings of the thesis. These include 
the clarification of the rationality assumptions in the literature on rankings, as well as 
the introduction of the concept of the ranking template, the explanation of the 
conditions of ranking impact, ranking frames, ranking field segments, boundaries and 
clusters, ranking frame adjustments and finally ranking outcomes. I will show how each 
of these findings contributes to the literature on rankings, and discuss how this thesis 
has also advanced the literature on rankings in terms of methodological approach. I will 
follow up that section by explaining the limitations of this thesis. These include 
limitations on the vertical elements of ranking frames, the development of clusters, 
actor response discretion, the competition of measurement devices, rankings in different 
fields and ranking field construction. I will show how each of these limitations can be 
constructively addressed in future research. Finally, I will conclude the thesis with some 
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observations about the future of the FT ranking, and business school rankings in 
general.  
 
1 Key findings and contributions  
The fact that the previous literature has not yet developed a common language 
on rankings has led to a limited understanding in terms of roles of actors, conditions and 
mechanisms of the ranking process. I thus introduced clear definitions of what rankings 
and ranking fields are, as well as of the actors that make up the ranking field. These are 
organisations that publish rankings, organisations that are ranked, and stakeholders in 
the ranking process. The definition of rankings as an aggregation of metrics ordered 
transitively and relatively into a matrix by an algorithm is particularly helpful because it 
provides a clear definition of the cognitive and strategic bases that underlie the 
construction of frames for different performance measures. Thereby, the thesis adds to 
the literature on organisational performance measures (Meyer, 2002; Meyer & Gupta, 
1994). This new terminology is particularly useful when explained in the context of the 
other concepts that the thesis has introduced. I will first start with the rationality 
assumptions.  
 
Rationality assumptions. I have argued that understanding the impact of 
rankings on organisations and organisational fields requires an understanding of the 
rationality assumptions that underlie the ranking process. This thesis has thus clarified 
the previously unspecified rationality assumptions that pervade the literature on 
rankings. Drawing on the concept of bounded rationality of Simon (1997 [1947]), I 
proposed that ranking agents are subject to cognitive limitations when constructing 
rankings, and are also taking into account the cognitive limitations of ranking actors 
when constructing rankings. I have also argued that ranking actors are boundedly 
188 
 
 
 
rational actors that use rankings as devices to overcome their cognitive limitations, 
thereby developing a variety of cognitive and strategic frames that help them to position 
themselves strategically in the ranking field. In addition, I have clarified the role the 
conditions of informational complexity of the ranking zone are playing in the ranking 
process. I explained how the relationship between the bounded rationality of ranking 
actors and field conditions determines ranking impact over time as informational 
complexity changes and the ranking zone moves. I have thus shown how the bounded 
rationality of both ranking actors and agents interacts with conditions of informational 
complexity in the construction of both ranking frames and templates. These concepts 
are novel and useful for future studies of rankings and other performance measures, as 
they provide a clear basis for understanding how cognition, informational complexity 
and strategising of actors work together in determining the impact of performance 
measures.  
 
Ranking templates. Contrasting the concept of templates of organising proposed 
by the New Institutional literature (DiMaggio & Powel, 1991; Fligstein, 1996; 
Greenwood & Hinings, 1996; Heugens & Lander, 2009; D’Aunno, Succi & Alexander, 
2000), and based on Wedlin’s (2006, 2007) concept of the template, I have shown how 
a variety of competing templates coexist within a field. I have also demonstrated how 
this makes the emergence of a single template that all field actors use in the same way 
unlikely. Building on this, I proposed the concept of the ranking template as the models 
of organising that ranking agents create through rankings, thereby defining what is 
legitimate or of high reputation, status or performance in the field. Adding to that, my 
use of concept of prestige and the introduction of a distinction between legitimacy, 
reputation and status devices provides an explanation of the dynamics that ranking 
actors are subject to independently of the ranking process. It shows that rankings draw 
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on several types of social judgement formation. In particular, this extends Wedlin’s 
concept of measurement devices (2011). 
The concept of the ranking template thus significantly adds to the previous 
literature on rankings (Sauder, 2008; Wedlin, 2006; 2007), as it explicitly allows for the 
creation of multiple templates of organising through ranking and other agents. In 
particular, this adds to Wedlin, who has shown that pressures from different templates 
co-exist in the ranking field, but has not explained how and under what circumstances 
certain templates prevail over others (Wedlin, 2007: 36). While this thesis does not offer 
a full explanation of the mechanisms of how ranking templates prevail over others, it 
clarifies that any such process will be based on the perpetual competition of templates, 
rather than the emergence of a single one. 
 
Conditions of ranking impact. The previous literature on rankings has not 
addressed the question of the conditions under which rankings impact on organisations 
and fields. I proposed that informational complexity is the main field condition for the 
impact of performance measures like rankings, above all with post-experience goods 
like education or research. I also outlined how the degree of informational complexity 
in a field is related to status orders and the degree of structuration and resource 
conflicts. Based on this, and a discussion of the role of the environment for boundedly 
rational actors, I proposed the concept of the ranking zone to show how informational 
complexity interacts with the probability of ranking impact to create ranking and non-
ranking zones. In particular, I showed how the degree of institutionalisation of the 
ranking limits the response discretion of ranking actors to ranking templates. I have thus 
demonstrated under what conditions rankings are more or less likely to impact on 
organisational fields, and have given an explanation of why in particular in business 
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education, the influence of rankings on ranking actors has increased considerably in 
recent years (see Sauder & Fine, 2008). This presents a significant addition to the 
ranking literature, as previous studies have not investigated the relationship between 
field conditions and ranking impact, thereby assuming that rankings emerge 
independently of field conditions. 
 
Ranking frames. The previous literature has failed to explain the dynamic 
process of interaction between ranking agents and actors in the use of templates of 
organising, in particular ranking templates. I proposed that in order to understand how 
rankings impact on organisations, one has to understand how ranking actors ‘see’ and 
consequently use templates emanating from rankings, and to what extent their cognitive 
limitations impact that process. This provides an important counterpoint to the previous 
literature, which has assumed that rankings are “seen” and used similarly by ranking 
actors. In particular, how actors use their cognition and strategise in response to 
measurement devices has remained unclear. This thesis has addressed this by outlining 
the collaborative nature of the construction of ranking frames between ranking actors, 
stakeholders and agents.  
Building on the literature on frames (Goffman, 1974, Daft & Weick, 1984; 
Kaplan, 2008; Nadkarni & Barr, 2008; Walsh, 1995), I thus introduced the ranking 
frame as a concept that bridges meso and macro-level explanations between actors and 
fields. This adds significantly to the literature, as it takes into account the cognitive and 
strategic bases of the ranking process. Specifically, it clarifies the cognitive and 
strategic bases on which ranking actors respond to ranking templates produced by 
ranking agents. This also contrasts the previous literature, which conceptualised the 
agency of ranking actors as either limited to gaming (see Espeland & Sauder, 2007) or 
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conforming to one ranking template (Glick, 2008, Jablecka, 2012; Shin & 
Toutkoushian, 2011; Proulx 2009; Tight, 2000; Van Damme, 2009). 
In addition, the concept of the ranking frame extends the work of Kaplan on 
frames and framing contests, who has investigated the microfoundations of the 
competitive creation of frames between individual organisational actors (2008). The 
concept of the ranking frame extends this work to the organisational level, showing how 
ranked organisations form ranking frames by using ranking templates, other templates, 
their own set of performances and aspirations as well as the ones of their competitors. 
Through the introduction of the concepts of aspiration levels, preliminary ranking 
frames, the segmentation of the ranking field, and ranking frame adjustment, I have also 
mapped the process of the construction of ranking frames. I will discuss these concepts 
in more detail in the following sections. 
 
Ranking field segments, boundaries and clusters. I have shown how the 
concept of the ranking frame is useful to sketch out the boundaries of a ranking field, as 
well as its clusters and horizontal and vertical segments. The analysis of the 
development of the ranking criteria in terms of variance revealed that more criteria in 
terms of weighting remained constant or increased in variance than those that decreased 
in variance over the same time. The empirical results confirmed that the ranking frame 
thus cannot be reduced to a single overall ranking metric that is used by all ranking 
actors indiscriminately, but rather has to be analysed for each criterion and its impact on 
the ranking actor.  
As part of the analysis of ranking criteria, I showed that the process of wearing 
down of performance measures is more complex than described by Meyer and Gupta 
(1994) and Meyer (2002). Specifically, I demonstrated how correlated measures can 
‘run down’ in very different ways, including the simultaneous increase of means with 
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decrease in variance, and vice versa. I extended their work by proposing two other types 
of attrition. Type 2 attrition features a decrease or stability in the mean and the variance 
of a performance measure. Type 3 attrition occurs when both the mean and the variance 
of the performance measure increase or remain stable. Importantly, I also showed that 
exogenous shocks, such as the crisis of 2008 and its effects on the ranking year 2010, 
can have a lasting effect on the way criteria decay over time. This provides evidence for 
the proposal that rankings have to be conceptualised as part of a ranking field that is 
subject to not only institutional, but also competitive pressures. 
An analysis of the development of ranking field boundaries confirmed that there 
is a dynamic process of engagement between ranking actors and the ranking agent, in 
which ranking actors build their ranking frame through entering and exiting the ranking 
field. This suggests that schools are not the passive recipients of ranking templates from 
the ranking agent, but choose to use the ranking strategically and opportunistically. 
Nevertheless, most ranking actors show relatively consistent patterns of participation, 
indicating that they have a fairly stable ranking frame. This in turn affects how ranking 
actors continue with their participation, even when they are non-ranked. Importantly, a 
substantive minority of schools show more unstable patterns of participation, suggesting 
an alternative process of building, testing and adjusting of ranking frames. This also 
adds to the literature in that it is the first empirical investigation of Wedlin’s ideas about 
the establishment and negotiation of the boundaries of the ranking field (2006, 2007, 
2011). 
The concept of the existence of clusters in the ranking field that are a priori 
independent of the ranking adds significantly to the understanding of the role of 
cognitive and strategic processes of ranking actors that other authors (Locke, 2011; 
Sauder, 2006; Sauder & Espeland, 2009; Sauder, 2008) have only marginally outlined. 
In addition, the existence of core and peripheral clusters confirms the findings of work 
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on strategic groups and competitive clusters (McNamara, Deephouse & Luce; 2003). 
The results of the cluster analysis as well as a longitudinal analysis of the development 
of the criteria also confirmed the proposition that ranking actors respond to rankings 
with a range of different strategies. I will discuss this in more detail in the following 
section. 
 
Change and homogenisation. As chapter II has shown, the main assumptions of 
the current literature on rankings have been that there is a simple cause-effect 
relationship between the emergence of rankings and change and homogenisation 
processes in organisational fields. Through my analysis of the ranking field, I have 
shown that these two assumptions have led to a limited understanding of the variety of 
outcomes of the ranking process and the models of organising that exist within ranking 
fields.  
Building on the ideas of Locke (2011), who theorised that rankings are focal 
points of attention around which already existing trends for change are being justified, 
publicised, negotiated and implemented, I proposed that the highly publicised nature of 
the ranking process impacts perceptions about rankings that are a priori independent of 
them. I thus demonstrated how claims that rankings have negative effects on 
organisations and fields (Adler & Harzing, 2009; Walsh, 2011; Osterloh & Frey, 2009, 
Marginson & Van der Wende, 2007; Van der Wende & Westerheijden, 2009; Vogel & 
Kieser, 2014) are based on a loose and contested definition of what quality or ‘good’ 
education and research are. I also proposed that the focus on rankings, specifically the 
attribution of negative developments in organisations and fields to the emergence of 
rankings, can partially be explained by a wider trend towards quality assurance, 
accountability, performance measurement and evaluation (Frolich, Coate, Mignot-
Gerard, Knill, 2010; Lawrence & Sharma, 2002; Shin, 2011; see also Power, 1997). 
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This provides a counterpoint to scholars who have assumed that rankings necessarily 
impact on organisations and fields (Czarniawska, 2011; Hazelkorn, 2007, 2011; 
Ozbilgin, 2009; Zemsky, 2008; Shin and Toutkoushian, 2011), as well as research, that 
has shown how rankings change fields (Corley & Gioia, 2000; Elsbach & Kramer, 
1996; Martins, 2005; Sauder, 2008; Wedlin, 2006).  
I also argued that the assumption of isomorphic change or homogenisation is 
counterintuitive, as a ranking has, by definition, the goal of differentiating between 
ranking actors, and sufficient variance between ranking actors is thus a pre-condition for 
measurement. The results of the cluster analysis confirmed that there are no consistent 
homogenising effects of rankings, but that as cluster members, ranking actors respond 
to the ranking with a range of different strategies. I found that there were a relatively 
stable, but decreasing number of clusters across all data sets. The field exhibited a split 
into two longitudinal sets of core and peripheral clusters, one European and one 
American. While core clusters were naturally homogeneous in their composition, over 
time, more high-ranking and highly prestigious schools joined the EU and US clusters, 
leading to two integrated American and European/Asian clusters of high and low 
performing actors over time. A high number of Canadian and low and high status 
American business schools remained independent of the clustering process for most of 
the time, only joining either cluster after 2011. This suggests that some ranking actors, 
above all high status American schools, were able to maintain their distinctive profile, 
only becoming more similar to the American cluster towards the end of the observation 
period. This confirms the emergence of two distinctive ranking subfields with a core of 
American and European business schools. This is especially relevant for the Financial 
Times, as the FT Global MBA rankings were explicitly created with the aim of closing 
the transatlantic divide in the MBA market (Wedlin, 2006). The criteria on which the 
clusters and the field distinguished themselves most clearly were international diversity 
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related. The EU and US clusters distinguished themselves barely on the employment 
and female faculty and students criteria. Importantly, the data revealed that although 
clusters changed over time, both barely change as compared to the field, suggesting that 
the relative position of the core clusters in the field remained stable over time.  
The development of the criteria in terms of their capability to serve as markers 
of distinction between low and high performers was however more nuanced. Only 28% 
of criteria in terms of weighting decreased in variance over time. Criteria counting for 
35% of the weighting either remained constant, or increased, in variance. Notably, 
international diversity criteria remained relatively constant in terms of field variance, 
while the female faculty criterion increased. This suggests that on the ranking field 
level, international diversity remains a constant factor of distinction, while gender 
diversity on the faculty increases in importance. While this holds true on the field level, 
it does not necessarily do so on the cluster level. The results suggested that clusters of 
ranking actors respond to the pressures emanating from the ranking with a range of 
different strategies for all criteria except for the Employed After Three Months and the 
Women Faculty and Students. I thus demonstrated how cluster membership and 
geographic location play a role in how ranking actors respond to rankings.  
This confirmed the proposition that there are no one-dimensional homogenising 
effects of rankings, but that ranking actors and clusters respond to the ranking with a 
range of different strategies. In particular, the analysis of the public communication of 
cluster members revealed that they actively engage with the rankings, discussing them 
in light of their strategy, and using reference points to contextualise and reinterpret 
specifically the FT rankings. This also revealed that while almost all ranking actors in 
the study strategically and publicly engaged with the rankings, a number of them 
explicitly denied doing so.  
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Therefore, both conceptually and empirically, I have shown that the claim that 
rankings generally homogenise organisations and fields (Glick, 2008, Grey, 2009; 
Hazelkorn, 2011; Jablecka, 2012; Shin & Toutkoushian, 2011; Proulx 2009; Tight, 
2000; Van Damme, 2009) does not hold up to scrutiny. In particular, I have shown how 
rankings can trigger both processes of differentiation and homogenisation, thereby 
providing evidence that organisations can still “act rationally and strategically”, but 
without “effectively becoming what is being measured” (Van der Wende & 
Westerheijden, 2009: 77). This adds in particular to Martins, 2005; Wedlin (2006, 
2007), Hedmo, Sahlin-Andersson and Wedlin (2006) and Locke (2011), who have thus 
far not provided a mechanism for how organisational fields can become more diverse 
following the emergence of a ranking.  
 
Ranking frame adjustment. Building on Bromiley’s concept of aspiration levels 
(2005), anchoring (Tversky & Kahnemann, 1974) and prospect theory (Kahnemann & 
Tversky, 1979), I showed that through the preliminary ranking frame, rankings can 
influence the process of the setting of aspiration levels in the pre-ranking field even 
before they enter a field. Based on this, I explained the mechanisms through which 
ranking actors can deal with discrepancies between actual and aspired performance. The 
current literature has focused on the reactivity to rankings and gaming strategies that 
ranking actors can employ to deal with rankings (see Espeland & Sauder, 2007). In 
contrast, I have shown that the adjustment of aspiration levels and mechanisms of 
reinterpretation, learning, lobbying, mergers and alliances, challenge and exit are also 
employed by ranking actors, leading to a variety of possible outcomes of the ranking 
process. This provides a richer conceptualisation of the array of strategic options of 
ranking actors, as well as a basis for practitioners and scholars, to understand the 
mechanisms of how measured organisations react to measurement in more detail.  
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In addition, I developed the Marginal Improvement Indicator in order to assess 
the impact of a ranking on ranking actors. I also introduced the Ranking Frame 
Indicator, which serves as proxy for the strategic emphasis that ranking actors put on 
changing their performance on a criterion, thereby reflecting its ranking frame. 
Applying these indicators to three case studies, I showed how ranking actors go through 
periods of strategic change, giving more or less emphasis to certain criteria over time. I 
specifically pointed to the limitations in terms of strategic decision making that ranking 
actors are facing vis-à-vis the ranking, in particular resource and organisational 
constraints, for example, in terms of faculty and board membership. However, while 
some of the data indicated that ranking actors are more prone to adjusting their 
performance on criteria such as the composition of their students, the available data did 
not allow for a definitive conclusion about the reasons for which ranking actors change 
on certain criteria, or not.  
I also used the case studies to show how schools adopt different strategies in 
dealing with the ranking, in both their changes in ranking frame, as well as the way 
changes or conflicts in actual and aspired performance are communicated. The choice of 
segmental, temporal, geographic or criteria-specific reference points speaks to the active 
engagement of ranking actors with the ranking. Some ranking actors were shown to put 
more emphasis on accreditations, and some on other rankings in which they performed 
comparatively well. Other schools have a much more pro-active approach, openly 
discussing their ranking success, falsifying results, taking various reference points, and 
reinterpreting some of the results. I suggested that this is partially conditional on 
ranking success. 
Performance gains and losses indicated that some ranking frame adjustments 
like positive learning are more sustainable than gaming strategies that lead to short-term 
wins. In addition, the data showed that rather than overall improvements on all criteria, 
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ranking frames that emphasised focused performance improvements on some criteria in 
specific periods resulted in particularly strong increases in rank. As part of this process, 
I demonstrated how ranking actors pick an anchoring point, for example their initial 
ranking position, or their main competitor, and compare their performance to this rank 
over time, producing either active and open celebration of the rankings, defensive 
reinterpretation or an emphasis on other measurement devices like accreditations. I also 
proposed that the stage of development of the ranking, ranking agents, actors and fields 
play a role in how ranking actors respond to rankings. This provides a conceptual 
framework for the empirical findings of Bowman and Bastedo (2010), who had first 
demonstrated the existence of anchoring effects in reputational judgements emanating 
from university rankings. However, it also extends their work, as it allows for flexibility 
and change of the anchoring point over time. Adding to that, I then proposed a model of 
how ranking impact and the discretion of ranking actors interact over time, leading to 
different paths of internalisation and institutionalisation of the ranking. I concluded that, 
although the boundaries of possible action are set by the ranking and field conditions, 
ranking actors have considerable leeway in creating and adjusting ranking frames.  
 
Methodology. This thesis distinguishes itself from other studies on rankings in 
its empirical approach. Previous studies had mainly used interviews and archival data, 
most of them with academics, administrators, career services staff, deans, prospective 
students and employers of European business or American law schools (e.g. Elsbach & 
Kramer, 1996; Espeland & Sauder, 2007; Sauder, 2006; 2008; Sauder & Espeland, 
2006; Sauder & Espeland, 2009; Sauder & Fine, 2008; Wedlin, 2006, 2007, 2011). Few 
other studies have used quantitative surveys of organisational members of ranking 
actors (Higher Education Funding Council for England, 2008; Martins, 2005; Sauder & 
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Lancaster, 2006). Starting from the assumption that cognitive and strategic responses 
cannot be understood by solely relying on qualitative or quantitative data from 
organisational members, I have instead analysed the data from the ranking.  
Given the facility of rankings to dominate discourses and become focal points of 
attention (see Locke, 2011), in particular in the higher education field, this has the 
advantage of separating perceptions of the impact of rankings from the patterns that can 
be observed from the development of the ranking. Triangulated with data published by 
ranking actors, this analysis gives an insight into the difference between actual and 
aspired strategies of ranking actors vis-à-vis the ranking. This thesis thus adds to the 
limited number of studies that have used ranking data to investigate patterns of ranking 
development (Grewal, Dearden & Llilien, 2008; Rindova, Williamson, Petkova & 
Sever, 2005). In addition, a parallel analysis of different data sets allowed for a 
triangulation of the data (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994), and a rare application of 
longitudinal cluster analysis in the organisation theory field.  
 
 
2 Limitations and avenues for future research 
This thesis has several limitations, in particular concerning the empirical 
analysis on vertical frames, the development of clusters, actor response discretion, the 
competition of measurement devices, rankings in different fields and ranking field 
construction. In the following, I will discuss those limitations, and indicate avenues for 
future research to overcome them.  
 
Data set. The data set I used has the limitation that it does not incorporate the 
full data of all criteria, specifically the highly weighted salary-related criteria. This 
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shortcoming should be addressed in future studies. However, the present data set is also 
interesting for future studies for the following reasons. As it includes both published 
and non-published ranking actors, the thesis is based on a novel data set, which is the 
result of the merging of nine different data sets (one for each year between 2006 and 
2014). The data has been cleaned and prepared for further analysis. Given the 
limitations of the data, I split it into three self-contained data sets, with either constant 
or changing ranking actors over the years, and including or excluding salary data. Each 
of these data sets is novel and includes thousands of data points. Either of them can thus 
provide a basis for future research in the following aspects. Firstly, gender-related 
research can use the data to show patterns of increase of female participation over time. 
Interdependencies and dynamics between the development of female students, faculty 
and board members over time can be constructively explored. In particular, the fact that 
to date no business school has exceeded 50% of female participation on either of these 
criteria without heavily reducing that participation in the subsequent year can be a point 
of departure for further investigations. Secondly, data from international diversity 
criteria like international students, faculty and board members can be used to evaluate 
the effects of internationalisation strategies of business schools. Similar to the gender-
related criteria, differences and interdependencies of how the three criteria develop over 
time might be a point of departure for further analyses, specifically for international 
business research. In addition, the data can be used to determine geographic patterns of 
changes over time, specifically when the coding is extended to include subnational 
geographic data. Thirdly, given the longitudinal nature of the data, the data can be used 
to build models that can be used to predict approximate ranks of non-ranked ranking 
actors and ranked ranking actors.  
 
201 
 
 
 
Vertical frames. This thesis has provided empirical evidence of how the ranking 
field is made up of horizontal segments, boundaries, and clusters. The issue of the 
existence of vertical segments has however remained largely unaddressed. This is due to 
methodological limitations, as ascertaining to what extent changes of ranking actors in 
terms of vertical segments impact on their future behaviour requires the extensive use of 
inferential longitudinal statistical techniques.  
A future study should address this gap, using for example, multilevel mixed-
effect models to analyse to what extent belonging of ranking actors to a certain ranking 
segment and cluster impacts on the overall and criteria-specific performance of ranking 
actors over time. Such a study would benefit in particular from the inclusion of salary 
data of non-ranked ranking actors, which were not available for this study.  
 
Development of clusters. This thesis has shown that the development of clusters 
changes over time, as an increasing number of high status ranking actors are clustering 
with the core cluster members. This indicates that the field of business schools is 
increasingly splitting into one EU cluster, mainly containing European ranking actors, 
and a US cluster, mainly containing American ranking actors of both high and low 
ranks. In the long term, this raises questions about the approach of ranking agents to 
combine American, European and Asian schools in a single ranking to reduce the 
intercontinental divide in business school education. The evidence presented in this 
chapter shows that despite the strong influence of the FT ranking, the attainment of this 
objective is becoming less likely.  
In terms of avenues for future research, a future study should thus investigate the 
further development of the clusters in the FT Global MBA ranking, above all taking 
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into account the development of the criteria on which the rankings cluster, and observe 
the changes or adjustments to the criteria where they do not. 
 
Actor response discretion. This thesis has given some indication of which 
criteria are more susceptible to triggering a reaction in ranking actors than others. 
However, it has not found a conclusive answer to the question of which criteria ranking 
actors are more likely to change their performance on, and why.  
Future research could use a survey design to ask decision makers of ranking 
actors to rank and weigh different criteria in terms of their and the school’s response 
discretion. This would also provide further evidence for the mechanism through which 
ranking actors decide which criteria to respond to, thereby indicating how ranking 
actors find a balance between conformity and differentiation in terms of aggregate 
performance measures. This survey should also probe for performance measures that 
are not captured by the ranking, but might be affected by it. 
 
Intraorganisational competition and individual ranking actors. This thesis has 
assumed that organisations involved in rankings are unified actors. While studies have 
investigated the perceptions of different actors within organisations vis-à-vis rankings 
(Elsbach & Kramer, 1996; Espeland & Sauder, 2007; Sauder, 2006; 2008; Sauder & 
Espeland, 2006; Sauder & Espeland, 2009; Sauder & Fine, 2008; Wedlin, 2006, 2007, 
2011), these authors have mainly focused on the consensus of the perceptions between 
organisational members. However, as rankings have become highly contested in 
organisational fields, it is likely that strategic responses to rankings are going to be 
contested within organisations.  
In future research, an investigation of how different levels of organisational 
members and groups collaboratively create a ranking frame could reveal important 
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mechanisms about the politics of rankings. Kaplan’s concept of the frame and framing 
contests (2008) would be particularly useful for investigating the microfoundations of 
the competitive creation of frames between individual organisational members. 
 
The competition of measurement devices. By highlighting the role of prestige, 
and providing a typology of measurement devices, this thesis has outlined the basis for 
an investigation of how measurement devices work together in the formation of 
templates. In particular, I proposed that rankings cannot be viewed as measurement 
devices that deliver social judgments about field actors in an exclusive and isolated 
manner, because they will compete with other measurement devices for definitional 
authority in the field (Espeland, 1997; Espeland & Stevens, 1998, 2008; Porter, 1995; 
Sauder & Espeland, 2006). However, I have not significantly added to the work of 
Bartlett, Pallas & Frostenson’s (2013) on the interaction of measurement devices such 
as rankings and accreditations.  
Further work should close that gap and provide an empirical analysis of the 
relationship between rankings and other measurement devices in the social judgement 
formation in organisational fields. This should take into account ratings (e.g. Fleischer, 
2009), accreditations (e.g. Durand & McGuire, 2005; Trank & Washington, 2009), 
certificates (e.g. Guler, Guillen & MacPherson, 2002) and also other measurement 
devices like audits. Studies that investigate more than one measurement device are of 
special value to learn about the interaction of measurement devices in a field. For 
example, Mills, Weatherbee & Colwell (2006) show how a combination of 
ethnostatistics from accreditations and rankings are tied to the sensemaking of important 
stakeholders in a field. However, they only show the parallel use of the two 
measurement devices, but not their interdependence and competition with each other. A 
future study could close that gap and investigate how the competition of measurement 
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devices for similar reputational and status resources in a field impacts on the reputation 
and status of field actors. For example, in the field of business schools, accreditation 
status could serve as a buffer against low ranking performance in terms of reputational 
outcomes, or rankings could serve as a reputational complement to the legitimacy 
derived from an accreditation.  
 
Rankings in different fields. Based on the question why rankings appear to 
impact more on some organisational fields than on others, this thesis has proposed 
informational complexity as the central condition for the emergence of rankings. In 
particular, I proposed that when informational complexity changes, the conditions for 
ranking impact do so as well. One of the limitations of this thesis is it has not presented 
empirical evidence for these proposals. 
In future research, this should thus be explored empirically through a 
comparative and longitudinal study of the emergence of rankings in different fields, 
such as the rankings of corporations according to global brands (Interbrand, 2014), 
sustainability (Corporate Knights, 2014), or revenue (Fortune, 2014). This research 
could specifically investigate field conditions in terms of informational complexity, 
status order, structuration and resource conflicts, and show how these conditions impact 
on the construction of ranking templates and frames in each ranking field.  
For example, in situations of informational complexity, rankings provide field 
actors with a comparison of organisations in a discriminating, evaluative and 
hierarchical way (Benjamin & Podolny, 1999; Podolny, 1993; Washington & Zajac, 
2005; Wejnert, 2002). Thus, rankings should lead to a clearer positioning of ranking 
actors in the status hierarchy, leading to less miscategorisations. Status anxiety (Jensen, 
2006) should thus be less prominent in fields with established rankings. However, 
qualitative evidence suggests that status anxiety increases considerably through 
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rankings (Locke, 2011). An avenue for future research would be investigating to what 
extent and in what stages of the ranking process and development status anxiety is 
increased or decreased, and for what actors. Here, a comparative longitudinal study 
design that takes into account both the development of rankings and status positions that 
exist independently of rankings would be fruitful to explore.  
 
Ranking field construction. While this thesis has outlined a model of the 
mechanism of ranking field construction, these proposals need to be substantiated both 
conceptually and empirically. 
Wedlin (2006) has studied how rankings can shape and transform an already 
existing field. However, there are no empirical studies on the mechanisms through 
which rankings can bring a whole field into existence. Rankings of emerging 
organisations or actors, for example start-ups (e.g. www.startupranking.com), or the 
Times Higher Education 100 under 50 years universities can provide a rich empirical 
context for this kind of studies.  In particular, static rankings, of which only one version 
is disseminated, differ in construction from interactive rankings, where the user can 
create their own ranking on the website. Given the extensive need for collaboration 
between ranking actors and agents for the latter type of ranking, this could be an 
especially interesting case of the construction of a ranking field. A research design that 
combines participant observation and in-depth interviews of a ranking agent, ideally one 
that is in the process of launching a first ranking, would be a good way of gathering a 
rich data set on the process of field construction. Obtaining access to a ranking agent 
that also constructs other measurement devices like ratings or awards would provide for 
a rich comparison of the construction of measurement devices. 
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3 Conclusion 
In conclusion of the thesis, I will now offer some observations about the future of 
FT Global MBA rankings as well as business school rankings in general.  
As we have seen, a European and an American cluster have emerged in the FT 
rankings over time. As mentioned in chapter III, the FT rankings were created with the 
explicit goal of providing for a comparison of “global” MBA programmes across North 
American and European business schools. It appears that the provision of a unified 
transatlantic ranking is becoming less, not more feasible. Instead of decreasing them, 
the ranking appears to have exposed some of the differences between the continents in 
terms of MBA education, and reinforced the field boundaries between the European and 
American markets. In the future, this development might make it harder for the FT to 
provide a truly global ranking.  
Another interesting observation is that Asian schools are generally more aligned 
with European schools than with their American counterparts, thereby confirming the 
special status of the American market. In this sense, publications like BusinessWeek, 
who rank American and non-American schools separately, have a methodological 
advantage over the FT. This raises the question of whether a global ranking like the FT 
Global MBA ranking, even of a relatively homogenous degree like the MBA, will be 
able to cope with the diversity of the ranking field in the long-term, given the 
homogenisation processes along cluster lines as described in this thesis.  
One way the FT could respond to that development is by adjusting the criteria and 
their weightings. More business schools from lowly developed but rapidly growing 
countries like India and China are joining the ranking. On the one hand, this introduces 
welcome variance into the ranking. On the other hand, this creates an increasing 
problem of commensurability, especially when business schools based in countries with 
low weighted salaries, yet high potential for salary increase, are measured against high 
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income and low growth countries. As a result, the pressure on the FT to make the 
commensuration process more transparent will probably increase in the future. This 
problem will also become more apparent when an increasing number of ranking actors 
try to respond to ranking results through gaming. The FT’s response to gaming attempts 
has until now been to maintain comparability and stability across years, only making 
small adjustments in the calculation of criteria, but not in the criteria themselves, and 
barely the weightings. The more these differences become apparent, the more the FT 
will need to think about finding a balance between newcomers that introduce variance 
but may push actors to game the system, and incumbents who have most to lose from an 
adjustment of criteria and weightings. The more the traditional MBA market becomes 
shaken up by newcomers, the more and the quicker ranking frames of ranking actors are 
also set to change. Hence, the FT will need to develop a strategy to deal with the 
emergence of different and new ranking frames.  
Another issue is the increasing number of business school rankings. The FT is 
now publishing a total of nine business school rankings and lists. At the same time, 
more competitors are entering the business school rankings market, the most recent one 
being Quacquarelli Symonds with its Global 200 Business Schools Report. On the one 
hand, for ranking agents, more rankings can pose a potential threat, and not only 
through the competition for media attention. The more different and competing ranking 
templates are produced, the more specific ranking templates may lose legitimacy as 
compared to other templates of organising. On the other hand, as the number of 
rankings expands, ranking actors have more leeway in withstanding pressures from any 
particular ranking by using rankings electively. Templates created by traditional 
competitors such as accreditations, awards, certificates and ratings will also play a role 
in this process, as well as templates from more innovative devices like interactive 
rankings, maps, or evaluation tools. The future of MBA rankings will thus be largely 
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determined by how ranking agents and actors can address the previously mentioned 
issues collaboratively, especially the emergence of new templates and frames from 
within and without the ranking field.  
 
In conclusion, this thesis has shown that the investigation of ranking fields, agents 
and actors can be a pathway into understanding the dynamics of cognition, strategising 
and institutionalisation between organisations that carry out performance measurement, 
and those who are subject to it. As organisations and organisational fields are becoming 
more complex through the expansion of information technologies and processes of 
globalisation, more rankings and other performance measures are likely to emerge; both 
as reducers of information and focal points of attention around which organisational 
fields crystallise. The emergence of rankings is thus a sign that the audit society (Power, 
1997) is not only a project of intellectual elites that can process complex econometric 
models. Rather, the audit society is becoming closer to reality through the mediatised 
popularisation of basic, yet complex statistical measures like rankings. For scholars and 
practitioners alike, understanding what the audit society is and what the effects of its 
proliferation are will thus increasingly require an in-depth understanding of the 
dynamics of methodologically simple, yet socially powerful, performance measures like 
rankings.  
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